Commonwealth v. Hayden
| Decision Date | 01 March 1912 |
| Citation | 211 Mass. 296,97 N.E. 783 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. HAYDEN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John J. Higgins, Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
Wm. H Best, for defendant.
The defendant was convicted upon a complaint which charged him with the violation of an ordinance of the city of Somerville in that he replaced upon a certain roof old shingles with new, without otherwise changing the roof. The ordinance was as follows: 'Whenever a roof covering, other than noncombustible, is hereafter replaced in whole or in part the new roof covering shall be noncombustible to the satisfaction of said inspector, if as much as one-third of the superficial area of the entire roof is replaced.' The maximum penalty for violation of the ordinance was $100. It is plain that the ordinance was framed not under the general power of the city to enact ordinances, where the largest penalty authorized for an infraction is $20, but under the authority assumed to be conferred by R. L. c. 104, § 1, which had been accepted by the city of Somerville. The primary question is whether it can be sustained under this statute. Its material portion is that any city, except Boston, for the prevention of fire, may 'regulate the inspection, materials, construction, alteration and use of buildings' and may prescribe penalties not exceeding $100 for each violation of such regulation. This statute is a constitutional exercise of the police power. Salem v. Maynes, 123 Mass. 372.
The reshingling of a roof theretofore shingled does not come within the enumeration of purposes set forth in this section of the statute. Reshingling is simply a repair of an existing structure. It is not a 'construction.' This word in the connection in which it occurs means the erection of a new building or an addition to an old building. 'Alteration' denotes a change or substitution in a substantial particular of one part of building for a building different in that particular. See Bigelow v Worcester, 169 Mass. 390, 48 N.E. 1. 'Use' indicates the purposes for which the building may be occupied. 'Materials' is a word of general signification, and must be interpreted as ancillary to the other more definite terms employed in the statute. It does not extend the scope of the act beyond the subjects otherwise designated. It refers to the materials to be employed in the construction and alteration of buildings. There is no word in this section of the statute which, properly construed with its collocation, comprehends repairs upon buildings. A legislative enactment of...
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