Commonwealth v. Hayes
| Decision Date | 25 February 1942 |
| Citation | 311 Mass. 21,40 N.E.2d 27 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. IRVING C. HAYES. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
September 18, 1941.
Present: FIELD, C.
J., QUA, DOLAN COX, & RONAN, JJ.
Bribery. Public Officer.
Municipal Corporations, Officers and agents. Pleading, Criminal Indictment, Bill of particulars. Evidence, Extrinsic affecting writings, Relevancy and materiality.
Evidence that the chairman of a city board authorized to grant transportation licenses approached an applicant for a bus license, in substance called attention to the fact that he was on the board and stated that "everything is in my hands" and that, if the applicant did not sign an order for the purchase of a bus from a motor company for which he, the chairman, was a salesman, he was "all through with that"; and that the applicant signed the order and gave the chairman a check payable to the motor company, as a result of which the chairman subsequently received a cash commission and credit on a drawing account, warranted a finding of a request and acceptance of a gift or gratuity in violation of Section 8 of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 268, and conviction under an indictment making that charge with a bill of particulars specifying in substance that the defendant had requested the applicant corporation to purchase the bus from and through the defendant and that as a result of the purchase the defendant received from his motor company the stated cash and credit; the Commonwealth was not limited to proof of a request for or acceptance of merely a promise to do an act beneficial to the defendant.
Although the provisions of a contract in writing between a salesman and a corporation did not entitle him to any commission for a certain kind of sale, the Commonwealth, at the trial of an indictment charging the agent with requesting and accepting a gratuity as a municipal officer in violation of Section 8 of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 268, was entitled to show that it was the custom of the corporation to pay a commission in case of such a sale and that, in procuring it in circumstances violating the statute, the salesman sought a commission and a credit on a drawing account. An indictment charging a crime in the words of Section 8 of G. L. (Ter.
Ed.) c. 268 was sufficient, and a motion to quash it properly was denied.
At the trial of an indictment against a member of a municipal board for violation of Section 8 of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 268, in alleged corrupt dealings with one seeking a license from the board evidence was admissible that, after the board had refused to grant the license, the defendant had suggested that the alleged briber seek another similar license.
INDICTMENT, found and returned on September 25, 1939. The case was heard by Collins, J., without a jury.
J. F. Egan, (J.
F. Hennessy with him,) for the defendant.
J. F. Kelly, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
The defendant, a member of the board of aldermen of Springfield was charged with a violation of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 268, Section 8, in an indictment which, in the first count, alleged that he corruptly requested a gift or gratuity under an agreement or with an understanding that his vote would be given in a particular manner in a cause or proceeding that was or would be by law brought before him in his official capacity; and, in the second count, alleged that he accepted a gift or gratuity for the said purpose. The judge found the defendant guilty upon both counts. The assignments of error filed by the defendant are based upon the denial of a motion to quash and a motion for a finding of not guilty, to the admission of evidence, and to the refusal to give certain requests for rulings.
The defendant was the chairman of the transportation board, consisting of two aldermen and three councilmen, which was authorized to grant licenses, subject to approval by the mayor, to carry passengers for hire in Springfield. One Shenas, an officer of the Yellow Cabs of Springfield, Inc., filed on February 25, 1936, an application for a license to carry passengers for hire to the race track in Agawam. A public hearing on this application was held by the board on April 8, 1936. The board voted on May 6, 1936, to grant the license by a vote of three in favor and two opposed. Hayes voted to grant the license. The mayor, however, refused to approve the issuance of a license and no license was ever issued. There was evidence that within a few days after the filing of the application the defendant, who on March 1, 1936, had entered into a salesman's agreement with Mack Motor Truck Company, saw Shenas and told him that he ought to have a motor bus; that Hayes within a few days again saw Shenas and had some papers, and told him that he would make a mistake if he did not then order a Mack bus, and when Shenas refused to sign the papers Hayes said: "You know who is on transportation board" here "and everything is in my hands"; that Hayes then called at the home of Shenas on April 13, 1936, and told him: "If you don't sign these papers, I am all through with that. . . . you sign these papers because you don't have no time for the bus to come in and I take care of you for the license." Shenas asked him to wait until he had secured the license. Hayes told him he was chairman of the board, and Shenas signed an order for a motor bus from the Mack Motor Truck Company, and gave Hayes a check in the amount of $367 payable to the company. [1] There was evidence to the contrary which it is not necessary to recite.
The sixth assignment of error is based upon the refusal of the judge to give four requests for rulings which, although variously phrased, in effect sought a ruling that upon the indictment, the bill of particulars and the evidence the defendant was entitled to an acquittal. The indictment charges that the defendant requested and accepted a gift or gratuity, but it does not allege that he requested and accepted a promise to make a gift or to do an act beneficial to him. The bill of particulars, in answer to a motion asking the Commonwealth to describe the gift or gratuity and to state from whom it was requested and accepted and by whom it was paid, specified that the defendant requested William Shenas to purchase a Mack bus from and through the defendant and that as a result of the purchase the defendant, from the proceeds of the sale, received $50 from the motor company and a credit of $150 on his employment account.
The specifications on their face state the request of the defendant that Shenas purchase the motor vehicle and show that the subsequent action of Shenas in compliance with this request was, as between Shenas and himself, the consideration which Shenas was to furnish the defendant for his vote to grant the license. The defendant contends that the most that the testimony shows is that he requested and accepted from Shenas a promise to do an act beneficial to the defendant in order that the latter might receive a commission from the motor company and, that being all that the specifications disclose, that the Commonwealth was precluded from showing that the defendant requested or accepted anything but this commission, and that he could not be convicted upon proof that he received a commission from the motor company because the indictment does not charge him with requesting or accepting a promise from Shenas or from anyone to do an act beneficial to the defendant.
The purpose of the specifications in a criminal case is to give the defendant reasonable knowledge of the nature and character of the crime charged, and if the indictment does not fully, plainly, substantially and formally set out the offence charged in compliance with art. 12 of the Declaration of Rights he is entitled as of right to a bill of particulars, Commonwealth v. Kelley, 184 Mass. 320; Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 195 Mass. 100; Commonwealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507; and in cases where the indictment complies with this requirement of our Constitution but where the nature of the offence is such that the court in its discretion believes that in the interest of justice the defendant ought to be furnished with additional information as to the grounds which the Commonwealth contends constitute the offence and the method and means by which the alleged crime was committed, then the Commonwealth may be ordered to file a bill of particulars. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 277, Section 40. Commonwealth v. Wood, 4 Gray, 11. Commonwealth v. Brothers, 158 Mass. 200 . Commonwealth v. King, 202 Mass. 379 . Commonwealth v. Mercier, 257 Mass. 353 . Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503 . A party is bound by the specifications that he has furnished, and this applies to criminal proceedings and civil actions, Commonwealth v. Giles, 1 Gray, 466; Corsick v. Boston Elevated Railway, 218 Mass. 144; Shea v. Crompton & Knowles Loom Works, 305 Mass. 327 , but the court may allow the bill of particulars to be amended. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 277, Section 40. Powers v. Bergman, 197 Mass. 39 . Hines v. Stanley G. I. Electric Manuf. Co. 199 Mass. 522 . Commonwealth v. Green, 302 Mass. 547 . Commonwealth v. Albert, 307 Mass. 239 .
A defendant in a criminal proceeding is not entitled by a motion for a bill of particulars to secure a resume of the evidence that the Commonwealth intends to introduce at the trial, or to have such motion treated in all respects as if it were a set of interrogatories. The function of a bill of particulars is to set out in detail that which is included in the allegations of a complaint or indictment. The extent to which the Commonwealth may be required to specify as to matters of detail rests in the sound judicial discretion of the judge. All that is required is that the indictment, read with the bill of particulars,...
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