Commonwealth v. Hayes
| Decision Date | 02 March 1889 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. HAYES. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
J.L. Eldridge and R.O. Harris, for appellant,
A.J Waterman, Atty. Gen., and H.A. Wyman, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
It is conceded that St.1888, c. 340, went into effect on June 14 1888. Pub.St. c. 3, § 1. By Pub.St. c. 100, § 5, a city at its annual municipal election, or a town at its annual meeting, may vote to authorize the granting of licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquors of the first five classes, and the licenses so granted "shall continue in force until the 1st day of May next ensuing, unless sooner forfeited or rendered void." By St.1883, c. 93, the licensing board of any city or town may receive applications for licenses during the months of March and April, and may during the month of April grant licenses to take effect on the 1st day of the following month of May. The annual meeting of every town must be held in February, March, or April. Pub.St. c. 27, § 53.
It must have been known to the legislature when the statute of 1888, c. 340, was passed, that the towns and cities in the commonwealth had already voted upon the question whether licenses should be granted for the year beginning May 1, 1888, and that in those towns and cities which had voted "Yes" on this question many licenses had already been granted which, under the laws then existing, would continue in force until the 1st day of May, 1889, unless sooner forfeited or rendered void. It is conceded that licenses are not contracts, and that existing licenses might be annulled by an act of the legislature, and that if the intention of St.1888, c. 340, was to annul all licenses existing when it went into effect, then, so far as appears from the report, the defendant's was the first and only license granted under St.1888, c. 340, and was valid.
The general rule undoubtedly is that statutes are to be considered as prospective only in their operation, unless they are expressly made retroactive, or unless it is necessary to construe them as retroactive in order to give effect to their provisions. Shallow v. Salem, 136 Mass. 136; Bank v. Copeland, 7 Allen, 139.
It is another contention of the counsel for the defendant that the statute was intended to regulate the granting of licenses for the year beginning May 1, 1889, and the subsequent years, and not for the remainder of the year beginning May 1, 1888, and that it...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXES AND THE PROTEAN IRREVOCABLE TRUST.
...1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRS. [section] 65; UNIF. TR. CODE [section] 411. (78) See Matthews, supra note 60, at 284. (79) Claflin, 20 N.E. at 456 (emphasis (80) See, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law. 97 IOWA L. REV. 215, 216 (2011). As is made more expli......