Commonwealth v. Hoover
| Decision Date | 19 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 25 MAP 2019,25 MAP 2019 |
| Citation | 231 A.3d 785 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Todd Daniel HOOVER, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
In this discretionary appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred by vacating, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 ("Modification of orders"), a prior order granting a petition for early termination of a sentence of intermediate punishment based on the court's discovery that the defendant committed a new offense shortly after the early termination order was entered. For the reasons that follow, we hold that, in the instant case, the trial court erred, and, therefore, we reverse the decision of the Superior Court affirming the trial court's order.
In May 2013, Appellant Todd Daniel Hoover pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence of alcohol ("DUI") - general impairment, and one count of DUI - highest rate of impairment. On August 13, 2013, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of five years intermediate punishment, which included 90 days incarceration at the Lycoming County Prison pre-release facility. He also was ordered to pay the costs of prosecution and a $1,500 fine.
In 2017, Appellant filed a motion for early termination of his sentence of intermediate punishment pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9773, which provided, inter alia , that "[t]he court may at any time terminate a sentence of county intermediate punishment or increase or decrease the conditions of a sentence pursuant to section 9763 ()." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9773(a) (repealed).1 On September 29, 2017, the trial court determined that Appellant had "complied with all conditions of supervision, paid all fines and costs, and completed all obligations" associated with his county intermediate punishment, and, accordingly, granted his petition. Trial Court Order, 9/29/17. That night, however, Appellant was arrested for, and charged with, another DUI offense.
On October 2, 2017, the Lycoming County Adult Probation Office ("LCAPO") contacted the trial court and orally requested that it reconsider its order granting Appellant's petition for early termination of his sentence. The trial court granted the request the same day, and scheduled a hearing to consider "whether the Court should vacate its Order releasing [Appellant] from supervision in light of the new charges." Trial Court Opinion, 1/11/18, at 2.
In the interim, the Commonwealth filed a petition to revoke Appellant's probation, asserting that his new DUI offense constituted a violation of his probation. Appellant proceeded to a probation revocation hearing, and the revocation court determined that, in light of the trial court's September 29, 2017 order releasing Appellant from his sentence of intermediate punishment, Appellant was not on probation when he committed the new DUI offense and, thus, could not be found to have violated the terms thereof. Nevertheless, the revocation court urged the trial court to vacate its prior order granting Appellant early release so that Appellant could "be replaced onto supervision." Id. (quoting Revocation Court Order, 10/13/17, at 1).
On October 23, 2017, Appellant appeared at the hearing scheduled by the trial court. For reasons unknown, the hearing was not conducted on the record. However, in its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the trial court indicated that, at the time of the hearing, it "was persuaded by [Appellant's counsel] that the Court was without authority to vacate the early release Order." Id. at 3. The trial court further noted that it specifically asked the Commonwealth to address whether the court had jurisdiction to vacate the order. According to the court, however, it subsequently determined that it did have authority to vacate its prior order pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, titled "Modification of orders":
Except as otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken or allowed.
42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. Thus, by order dated October 26, 2017, the trial court vacated its September 29, 2017 order granting Appellant's petition for early termination of his sentence of county intermediate punishment. The order dated October 26, 2017 was not entered on the docket until October 31, 2017.
Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, wherein he argued that the trial court erred in vacating its prior order terminating his sentence of intermediate punishment because the court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter. He further suggested that, because the trial court's October 26, 2017 order was not entered on the docket until October 31, 2017, it was outside the 30-day window specified in Section 5505. The Commonwealth did not file a responsive brief.
The Superior Court affirmed in a divided, unpublished memorandum opinion. Commonwealth v. Hoover , 1893 MDA 2017, 2018 WL 4215020 (Pa. Super. filed Aug. 31, 2018). The majority, in an opinion authored by Senior Judge John Musmanno, and joined by Judge Judith Olson, recognized that, under Section 5505, once 30 days has passed, a trial court generally no longer has authority to alter a prior order. Id. at 3 (citing Commonwealth v. Walters , 814 A.2d 253, 256 (Pa. Super. 2002) ). It further noted that a trial court's authority under Section 5505 "to modify or rescind an order is almost entirely discretionary." Id. (citing Hayward v. Hayward , 808 A.2d 232, 235 (Pa. Super. 2002) ). However, the majority determined that, because the trial court, on October 2, 2017, within Section 5505's 30-day window, expressly granted reconsideration of its prior order granting Appellant's petition for early termination of his sentence, "the trial court still had jurisdiction to vacate the early release Order." Id. at 4 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 ; Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) ).
Judge Deborah Kunselman authored a dissenting memorandum, in which she agreed that, in light of the trial court's express grant of reconsideration of its prior order on October 2, 2017, the trial court retained jurisdiction under the 30-day window prescribed in Section 5505. Nevertheless, she expressed concern as to whether LCAPO had standing, in the first instance, to request reconsideration of the trial court's order terminating Appellant's sentence of intermediate punishment on the Commonwealth's behalf, and she additionally noted that LCAPO's request for reconsideration was made ex parte . Furthermore, relevant to the issue presently before this Court, Judge Kunselman observed that, when considering whether to modify a prior order, a trial court generally is limited to consideration of facts that were of record in the original proceeding. See Hoover , 1893 MDA 2017, at 1-2 (Kunselman, J., dissenting) (). She also suggested that the trial court's actions were inconsistent with this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Holmes , 593 Pa. 601, 933 A.2d 57, 67 (2007), which she cited for the proposition that a trial court's authority under Section 5505 is meant to correct errors, not to reevaluate its sentencing decision based on a defendant's subsequent conduct. Thus, Judge Kunselman concluded that the trial court erred in revoking its prior order granting Appellant's petition for early termination based on his subsequent arrest for DUI, and she would have reversed the trial court's October 26, 2017 order vacating its prior termination order, and reinstated the trial court's order of September 29, 2017.
Appellant filed a petition for allowance of appeal, and this Court granted review to consider whether, pursuant to Section 5505, the trial court had the authority to vacate its prior order granting Appellant's petition for early termination of his intermediate punishment sentence based on the court's discovery that Appellant was arrested for a new DUI offense shortly after his petition had been granted.
As a preliminary matter, we reiterate that Section 9721, which authorized a sentence of county intermediate punishment as a sentencing option, and Section 9773, which provided for the termination, modification, or revocation of a county intermediate punishment sentence, were repealed effective December 18, 2019. See supra note 1. Further, Section 9763, which previously was titled "Sentence of county intermediate punishment," was retitled "Conditions of probation," and intermediate punishment is now classified as a type of probation. See id. However, pursuant to the amended version of Section 9771, titled "Modification or revocation of order of probation," a trial court has the "inherent power to at any time terminate continued supervision, lessen the conditions upon which an order of probation has been imposed or increase the conditions under which an order of probation has been imposed upon a finding that a person presents an identifiable threat to public safety." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(a). Thus, the issue of whether, pursuant to Section 5505, a trial court may revoke a prior order terminating a defendant's sentence of county intermediate punishment (albeit now under the label of probation) based on a defendant's subsequent actions remains; accordingly, we conclude that the amendments to the statute under which Appellant was sentenced and released do not impede our review of the broader question at hand.
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