Commonwealth v. Hughes
| Docket Number | 18-P-1717 |
| Decision Date | 22 December 2023 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. DARREN HUGHES. |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
1
COMMONWEALTH
v.
DARREN HUGHES.
No. 18-P-1717
Appeals Court of Massachusetts
December 22, 2023
Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant, Darren Hughes, was convicted following a jury trial in Middlesex County Superior Court of one count of trafficking of a person for sexual servitude, G. L. c. 265, § 50 (a), one count of distribution of a class D substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (b), and one count of possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute, G. L. c. 94C, § 32C (a). In his appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, the failure to excuse two jurors for cause, the admission of various trial exhibits, the sufficiency of the evidence, and various jury instructions. We affirm.
Background.
1. Facts.
As we will first address the motion to suppress, we summarize the facts found by the motion judge, supplemented by uncontested testimony from the motion to suppress hearing. Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 478 Mass. 820, 821 (2018).
Additional facts adduced at trial will be included below in the sections regarding trial errors as necessary.
In February of 2015, as part of an undercover investigation, an officer with the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (MBTA) transit police, Lieutenant Detective Richard Sullivan, met with the defendant at the Woburn Mall to conduct a controlled buy of so-called "butane honey oil" (BHO), which is derived from marijuana. The defendant sold Lieutenant Sullivan the BHO, and during the sale he asked if Lieutenant Sullivan "liked pussy." The defendant explained that he was staying in a hotel nearby, and had "girls close by" in which the Lieutenant might be interested. As they exited the mall, Lieutenant Sullivan signaled to officers from the Woburn Police Department to arrest the defendant for the drug offenses.
Detective Sergeant Brian McManus of the Woburn Police Department searched the defendant incident to his arrest. The search uncovered, among other things, a hotel room key card with the logo from the Red Roof Inn. McManus was familiar with the Red Roof Inn located near the Woburn Mall as he previously conducted investigations of prostitution there. After learning from Lieutenant Sullivan about the defendant's statements suggesting possible prostitution, Sergeant McManus proceeded to the Red Roof Inn.
Sergeant McManus presented the key card seized from the defendant to the front desk clerk, who stated that the room associated with the key was room 216, and that the room had been rented to the defendant, Darren Hughes. When officers knocked on the door of room 216, a woman (the victim) answered and invited the officers into the room. On entering, the officers could see a digital scale with what appeared to be a small amount of BHO on it. They also found more BHO inside the refrigerator in the room.
Once the officers were inside the hotel room, the victim explained her involvement with the defendant. The victim told Sergeant McManus that she had responded to the defendant's advertisement on Backpage.com, which she showed Sergeant McManus. After meeting the defendant, the victim was thereafter employed by the defendant as a prostitute. The defendant paid for the room at the Red Roof Inn, and both the defendant and the victim stayed there.
2. Procedural history.
a. Motion to suppress.
In a motion to suppress, the defendant argued that the warrantless seizure of the Red Roof Inn key card was unlawful, and therefore that the key card could not be used for investigative purposes. In the alternative, the defendant argued that the victim did not have the authority to consent to the officers' search of the hotel room, and even if she did, her consent was not free and
voluntary. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained in room 216 and the statements the victim made to the police officers in that room.
The motion judge denied the motion to suppress. Specifically, the judge ruled that the police discovered the hotel room key card pursuant to a lawful search incident to arrest. The court held that the seizure of the room key card and its use for further investigative purposes was permissible because of the defendant's statements to Lieutenant Sullivan suggesting that he was involved in prostitution and Sergeant McManus' experience with that particular hotel. The court also found that the victim had actual authority to consent to the warrantless search of the room. As the court found that the search was permissible and that the victim voluntarily spoke with the officers, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and statements obtained in room 216.
b. Jury trial.
During voir dire, the defendant's trial counsel challenged two jurors for cause, juror number five (juror 5) and juror number seventy-two (juror 72). The trial judge found both to stand indifferent. The defense exercised a peremptory challenge to strike juror 5 from the jury but had exhausted its peremptory challenges before reaching juror 72, and the trial judge denied the defense's request for additional peremptory challenges. Juror 72 was then seated on the jury.
After the evidence was presented, the trial judge denied defense counsel's motion for a required finding of not guilty of the count of trafficking of a person for sexual servitude. The jury then deliberated, after which it delivered a verdict finding the defendant guilty of trafficking of a person for sexual servitude, distribution of a class D substance, and possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute.
Discussion.
1. Denial of motion to suppress.
The defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence found in room 216 and the victim's statements therein. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we accept the judge's findings of fact absent clear error and defer to the judge's assessment of the credibility of the testimony taken at the evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004). We review de novo the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996).
a. Key card.
The defendant contends that, even if the search of his person after his arrest and the discovery of the Red Roof Inn key card was lawful, the seizure and subsequent investigative use of the key card was not. Our caselaw holds that an object discovered in a search incident to a lawful arrest can be seized and used for investigatory purposes if it is related to the offense for which the defendant was arrested,
Commonwealth v. Blevines, 438 Mass. 604, 607-608 (2003), or if it is related to an offense in which law enforcement officers have a reasonable suspicion that the defendant is involved. Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 92 Mass.App.Ct. 587, 592 (2018). In this case, the police could reasonably have inferred from conversation with the defendant that he may have been keeping a woman or women at the nearby Red Roof Inn for the purposes of prostitution. In this case, the information known to the police thus provided reasonable suspicion that the Red Roof Inn key card was related to the crime of human trafficking. Its use for investigatory purposes thus was permissible.
b. Consent to enter room 216.
The defendant also alleges that police unlawfully entered room 216, leading to the discovery of physical evidence in the room (the scale with residue of BHO and the BHO in the refrigerator) and the discovery of the victim, who then made statements to the police officers. The defendant argues that this warrantless entry was unlawful because, although the victim allowed the officers into the room, she did not have the authority to consent to the officers' entry, nor was the mere act of letting the officers into the room sufficient to constitute consent. We disagree.
Entry into a hotel room is a search for purposes of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Commonwealth v. Lopez, 458 Mass. 383, 389 (2010).
Because it is deemed their "home," an occupant of a hotel room has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that room, Commonwealth v. Molina, 459 Mass. 819, 825 (2011), and thus is protected from warrantless entries into the room unless there is probable cause and an exception to the warrant requirement. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 444 Mass. 234, 236 (2005). In addition, where there is consent, there is no need for probable cause or a warrant. Lopez, supra at 391. Even if the primary occupant does not consent to a search, a third party may provide consent. This can happen if the third party has "actual authority" or "apparent authority." Actual authority is possessed not only by the property owner, but by a "third party possessing 'common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.' United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). See Commonwealth v. Porter P., 456 Mass. 254, 262 (2010), and cases cited. Common authority is 'mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so...
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