Commonwealth v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 19 January 1973
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert H. JACKSON, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

299 A.2d 213

450 Pa. 113

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert H. JACKSON, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 19, 1973.

John J. Dean, Sallie Ann Radick, Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Robert W. Duggan, Dist. Atty., Carol Mary Los, Robert L. Eberhardt Asst. Dist. Attys., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before JONES C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION

JONES, Chief Justice.

This is a direct appeal from the denial of Nunc pro tunc post-trial motions in the court below.

On February 27, 1958, appellant was adjudged guilty of murder in the first degree. On June 26, 1958, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. ^[*]

On October 8 1964, appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging, Inter alia, that his warrantless arrest was illegal, that the statements which he made to police officers were involuntary, that he was without custodial counsel and that he had not been advised of his right to remain silent. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied on September 2, 1965.

Appellant thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. That petition was denied on January 3, 1967.

In May of 1969 appellant filed a Post Conviction Hearing Act petition. Again he alleged, Inter alia, that he had been unlawfully arrested and that evidence introduced against him was obtained by reason of the unlawful arrest, that statements introduced against him were obtained in the absence of counsel and that his privilege against self-incrimination was thus denied. From the denial of that petition on September 9, 1970, appellant appealed to this Court. This Court reversed the denial of the PCHA petition and remanded with directions to allow the filing of post-trial motions Nunc pro tunc. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 443 Pa. 553, 279 A.2d 163 (1971).

Appellant, in this appeal, poses the questions whether the police had probable cause to arrest him and whether his custodial statement was, therefore, properly admitted into evidence. He also queries whether the extra-judicial statement admitted into evidence at his 1958 trial can be challenged on the basis of the decisions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), through the vehicle of a Nunc pro tunc direct appeal.

The facts giving rise to appellant's claim of unlawful arrest are as follows: Appellant Jackson found Miss Irene Richardson, a woman with whom appellant had kept company, and Mr. Edward Page, deceased, in a sexual embrace in appellant's apartment. After Page left the apartment, appellant gave chase, knocking Page to the ground with a wooden plank and stabbing him to death with a butcher knife. Miss Richardson was stabbed in the breast and left shoulder while attempting to pull Jackson away from the victim.

Appellant was later apprehended while standing in a barroom. The arresting officer was possessed of an old photograph of appellant and was accompanied to the barroom premises by a prisoner informer, a man acquainted with appellant, who identified appellant as the man in the photograph, Robert H. Jackson. Jackson made no attempt to conceal himself nor did he take flight from arrest. The arrest was made without the issuance of a warrant.

It is well-established that a police officer is authorized to arrest without a warrant where he has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person to be arrested is the felon. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 66, 190 A.2d 304, 310 (1963). It is uncontested by appellant that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe a felony had been committed. Appellant alleges, however, that there was not probable cause to arrest him as the perpetrator of the subject homicide. He alleges particularly that the police did not know him and that the only identifying basis for the barroom arrest was an 'old' photograph and the 'unreliable' identification by the prisoner informer. Appellant also urges that probable cause is vitiated by the fact that he did not attempt to hide or escape from arrest.

' Probable cause' is said to exist where facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer are reasonably trustworthy and sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the offense. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1930); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). Though an arrest without warrant must rest upon more than mere suspicion, the arresting officer need not be possessed of evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

Patrolman Michael Dougherty, who...