Commonwealth v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 13 May 2015
• Docket Number: No. 1414 MDA 2014,J-S16030-15,1414 MDA 2014
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. DARYIN JACKSON, Appellee

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellant v. DARYIN JACKSON, Appellee

J-S16030-15

No. 1414 MDA 2014

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MAY 13, 2015

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered July 24, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003621-2013

BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON AND OTT, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the order entered on July 24, 2014 granting Appellee Daryin Jackson's motion to suppress and motion for a writ of habeas corpus. After careful consideration, we reverse and remand.

The Honorable Stephen B. Lieberman, a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, made the following factual findings:

On July 19, 2013, Sergeant Paul Reilly of the Reading Police Department was on bike patrol during the late evening hours in the City of Reading, Berks County, Pennsylvania. While on patrol in the 700 block of Franklin Street, Sergeant Reilly, who was dressed in full uniform, observed a Mazda. Sergeant Reilly knew from prior encounters that the driver of the vehicle[, Hector Rivera-Aleman ("Rivera-Aleman"),] had a suspended driver's license. Sergeant Reilly observed [Rivera-Aleman] interacting with a man who was later identified as [Appellee]. The two men met briefly and then walked to the Mazda. [Appellee] got into the passenger side of the vehicle.

[Rivera-Aleman] then drove the Mazda to the Good Deal Mini Mart, which is located at the intersection of Eighth Street and Walnut Street in the City of Reading.

Sergeant Reilly and other police officers pursued the Mazda, and Sergeant Reilly approached [Rivera-Aleman] when it stopped at the mini mart. Sergeant Reilly checked [Rivera-Aleman's] license [status], and confirmed that it was still suspended. While Sergeant Reilly was interacting with [Rivera-Aleman], Officer Brett Sneeringer approached [Appellee]. Officer Sneeringer observed that [Appellee] was sweating and that he appeared to be nervous. Officer Sneeringer asked [Appellee] for identification, which [Appellee] did not have on his person. [Appellee] stated that his name was James Jackson, which Officer Sneeringer attempted to verify through dispatch.

Officer Sneeringer informed [Appellee] that there was no record of his name in either the PennDOT or [National Crime Information] systems. Officer Sneeringer testified that [Appellee] was not free to leave at this point in time. [Appellee] then contacted his wife, who arrived at the scene and provided information to Officer Sneeringer which enabled him to learn that [Appellee]'s name was in fact Daryin Jackson, and that there was an active warrant for [Appellee] due to a parole violation. A subsequent search of [Appellee]'s person resulted in the seizure of cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and approximately [$600.00] of United States currency.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 7/24/14, at 3-4 (paragraph numbers and certain paragraph breaks omitted).

The procedural history of this case is as follows. On August 30, 2013, Appellee was charged via criminal information with possession of a controlled substance¹ and possession with intent to deliver a controlledsubstance.² On September 30, 2013, Appellee filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, which included a motion to suppress and a motion for a writ of habeas corpus. On January 10, 2014, a suppression hearing was presided over by the Honorable Charles B. Smith, a senior judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County. At the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Smith discussed various aspects of the case but did not rule on the motion to suppress.

Although no definitive ruling was issued on the pending motion to suppress, on April 17, 2014, Appellee filed a motion to reconsider. On April 22, 2014, Judge Lieberman granted the motion to reconsider. On July 24, 2014, Judge Lieberman granted the motion to suppress, granted the motion for a writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed the charges against Appellee. Contemporaneously therewith, Judge Lieberman issued findings of facts and conclusions of law based upon the transcript of the suppression hearing held before Judge Smith. The timely appeal followed.³

The Commonwealth presents three issues for our review.

1. Did [Judge Lieberman] violate the law of the case doctrine by overruling [Judge Smith]?

2. Did [Judge Lieberman] err in suppressing evidence obtained as a result of a lawful traffic stop where police properly sought to identify [ ]Appellee?

3. Did [Judge Lieberman] err in granting the request for a writ of habeas corpus without permitting the Commonwealth to appeal from the adverse suppression ruling?

Commonwealth's Brief at 4 (complete capitalization removed).

The Commonwealth first contends that Judge Lieberman violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule by overturning Judge Smith's decision. As this presents a pure question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Jones v. Rivera, 866 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Pa. Super. 2005). This Court has explained:

Generally, the coordinate jurisdiction rule commands that upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, a transferee trial judge may not alter resolution of a legal question previously decided by a transferor trial judge. More simply stated, judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not overrule each other's decisions.

The reason for this respect for an equal tribunal's decision, as explained by our court, is that the coordinate jurisdiction rule is based on a policy of fostering the finality of pre-trial applications in an effort to maintain judicial economy and efficiency. Furthermore, consistent with the law of the case doctrine, the coordinate jurisdiction rule serves to protect the expectations of the parties, to insure uniformity of decisions, to maintain consistency in proceedings, to effectuate the administration of justice, and to bring finality to the litigation.

Keffer v. Bob Nolan's Auto Serv., Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 629-630 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In order for the coordinate jurisdiction rule to apply, the transferee trial judge must have resolved a legal question. In this case, careful review of the record indicates that Judge Smith never resolved Appellee's motion to suppress. The certified record is devoid of any order entered by Judge Smith granting or denying the motion to suppress. The notes of testimony indicate that, after the presentation of evidence and hearing counsel's arguments, Judge Smith discussed the legal issues raised by Appellee's motion to suppress. The entirety of Judge Smith's statement was:

All right. Well, I'm impressed with what happens once the interaction begins, once there's a stop at the mini mart. That's where the case begins because two guys can't walk up to one another on the street and say, hi, and then go get in the car. That's probable cause for nothing. You can talk to everyone on the street at that time of night that talks to one another. And the area where this took place, that's just unfortunate that there is high crime in that area; but that doesn't mean that everybody in that area is a criminal.

My problem is that a police officer who makes a stop, and a reasonable one, certainly because we know the guy shouldn't be driving, has a right to find out who else is in the car kind of for his own protection so he knows who's around. And if you want to give him bad information and he wants to check it out, give him the probable cause, then I think at that point there's probable cause to do what he has to do. But I'm not impressed with what happened in the 700 block of Franklin or whatever street we were on. But we're convinced that the probable cause - or once the gentlemen gave false information and it was shown to be false and then you find out who he really is and he's got a bench warrant out there or parole violation of some kind, then it's done. You can do what you will with him in terms of a stop and search. And so we find.

N.T., 1/10/14, at 40-41.

Judge Smith never stated on the record that he was granting or denying Appellee's motion to suppress. See id. The closest he came was the last four words of his statement, when he stated, "And so we find." Id. at 41. It is unclear, however, exactly what he is finding. Nowhere in the preceding two paragraphs does he state that the interaction between the officer and Appellee was lawful, nor does he state that the motion to suppress was denied, granted or some variation thereof. We recognize that Appellee and the Commonwealth proceeded as if Judge Smith denied the motion to suppress. This is evident by their actions following the hearing, i.e., filing a petition for reconsideration and responding that the coordinate jurisdiction rule prohibited Judge Lieberman from overturning Judge Smith's decision. The parties' subjective beliefs, however, may not be considered when determining what action Judge Smith took. Cf. All Seasons York S. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Transp. (In re Condemnation by Commw., Dep't of Transp.), 2008 WL 9405091, *4 n.14 (Pa. Cmwlth. Dec. 4, 2008), quoting Commonwealth v. Brennan, 195 A.2d 150, 151 (Pa. Super. 1963) ("When [interpreting another court's order], a 'court is bound by the words of the order itself, supplemented, if at all, only by statements or documents of record at the time the order was made.'"). By the plain terms of Judge Smith's words, and the lack of a written order, Judge Smith never ruled on the motion to suppress. Thus, the coordinate jurisdiction rule does not apply in this case.

We thus turn to the merits of Judge Lieberman's suppression ruling. Our "standard of review in addressing a challenge to the [grant] of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct."...