Jones v. Rivera

• Decision Date: 14 January 2005
• Citation: 866 A.2d 1148
• Parties: Donedago JONES, Appellant, v. Christina D. RIVERA, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

866 A.2d 1148

Donedago JONES, Appellant, v. Christina D. RIVERA, Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted October 12, 2004.

Filed January 14, 2005.

Stephen G. Fox, Philadelphia, for appellant.

David L. Rohde, Havertown, for appellee.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, BOWES and MONTEMURO¹, JJ.

OPINION BY MONTEMURO, J.:

¶ 1 This is an appeal from the judgment entered July 19, 2004, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, on the court's June 8, 2004 Order denying Appellant's motions for post trial relief.² For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 This appeal arises out of a May 3, 2002, automobile accident during which Appellee backed her automobile into the passenger side of Appellant's vehicle. Due to accident related injuries, Appellant went to the emergency room, was unable to work for three days, and was treated by a physician for five months. His out of pocket expenses for lost wages and medical bills totaled $1,900.

¶ 3 On November 20, 2002, Appellant filed a complaint and the case went to arbitration on July 15, 2003. Appellant was awarded $4,000, and Appellee filed an appeal from that award on August 12, 2003. On September 1, 2003, Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1311.1 took effect, providing that a "plaintiff may stipulate to $15,000.00 as the maximum amount of damages recoverable upon the trial of an appeal from the award of arbitrators." Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1(a). If a plaintiff so stipulates, any party may offer documents such as bills, records, and expert reports at trial without authentication, provided that the party offering such evidence complies with notice requirements. Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1(b) (citing Pa.R.C.P. 1305(b)(1)). ¶ 4 Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1(a), Appellant filed a stipulation limiting his potential damage award which the Honorable Norman Ackerman struck by Order dated February 2, 2004. Judge Ackerman found that the rule is not applicable to any appeal filed prior to the rule's effective date, and is therefore not applicable to the present case. A jury trial was held on February 17, 2004, and Appellant failed to provide expert witness testimony or authenticated, certified documents pertaining to his medical treatment. He instead offered documentary evidence of damages. The trial court entered a compulsory nonsuit in favor of Appellee based on Appellant's failure to present authenticated evidence. Appellant then filed motions for post trial relief which were denied by the June 8, 2004, Order. This timely appeal followed.

¶ 5 On appeal Appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his offer of proof pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1. Specifically, he asserts that the trial court erred in determining: 1) that Rule 1311.1 does not apply to appeals from arbitration filed before the effective date of the rule; and 2) that the rule of coordinate jurisdiction barred the court from finding that Rule 1311.1 applies in the present case. As these issues are questions of law, we are not constrained by the determination of the trial court; our standard of review is de novo. Durante v. Pennsylvania State Police, 570 Pa. 449, 809 A.2d 369, 371 (2002) (citation omitted).

¶ 6 Preliminarily, we note that a rule or an amendment to a rule is effective on the date specified by the Supreme Court. Pa.R.C.P. 52(a). A new rule or an amendment to a rule applies to actions pending on the date the rule or amendment becomes effective, unless the Supreme Court directs otherwise. Pa.R.C.P. 52(c). Here, Rule 1311.1 took effect on September 1, 2003, while the action was pending; Appellee had filed an appeal from the arbitration award, but a trial had not commenced. The trial court found that Rule 1311.1 was not implicated in this case because the rule is not applicable to appeals filed prior to its effective date. However, citing Manzetti v. Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh, 565 Pa. 471, 776 A.2d 938 (2001), Appellant argues that the new rule is in fact applicable to actions pending on the date that it became effective, and therefore must be applied here. We agree.

¶ 7 In Manzetti, supra, our Supreme Court considered whether to apply an amended summary judgment rule that took effect while the action was pending; the amended rule became effective after the summary judgment motion was filed, but before the trial court ruled on the motion. Id. at 945 n. 1. The Court applied the amended rule, finding that the rules of civil procedure state that an amended rule is applicable to all actions pending on the date that the amendment becomes effective. Id. (citing Pa.R.C.P. 52(c)).

¶ 8 Here, the trial court attempted to distinguish Manzetti by emphasizing the fact that Rule 1311.1 is a new rule rather than an amended rule, and determined that as a new rule, it is inapplicable. The court explained its reasoning as follows:

Plaintiff's reliance on [Manzetti] is misplaced: first, [Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1] is a new rule, with a clearly given effective date. It is not an amended rule. As a new rule, it substantially changes the plaintiff's burden at a de novo trial resulting from an appeal from arbitration, provided the plaintiff stipulates to damages less than $15,000.

(Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4). This interpretation is inconsistent with the plain language of Rule 52(c), which by its terms does not distinguish between new and amended rules. It states that "a rule or an amendment to a rule" is applicable to actions pending on the effective date. Pa.R.C.P. 52(c). Given the clear, unambiguous language of Rule 52(c), we find that Rule 1311.1 applies here because the action was pending when the rule took effect.

¶ 9 Appellant also argues that the coordinate jurisdiction rule did not prevent the trial court from determining that Rule 1311.1 applies in the present case, thereby overruling Judge Ackerman's order striking the Rule 1311.1 stipulation. The coordinate jurisdiction rule provides that "courts of the same jurisdiction cannot overrule each other's decisions in the same case." Buck Hill Falls Co. v. Clifford Press, 791 A.2d 392, 396 (Pa.Super.2002), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 688, 825 A.2d 637 (2003). This rule promotes judicial economy and efficiency, and "serves to protect the expectations of the parties, to insure uniformity of decisions, to maintain consistency in proceedings, to effectuate the administration of justice, and to bring finality to the litigation." Zane v. Friends Hospital, 575 Pa. 236, 836 A.2d 25, 29 (2003). However, this general prohibition against revisiting a prior holding by a judge of coordinate jurisdiction is not absolute. Id. Departure from the rule is permitted in a narrow set of circumstances "where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed." Ryan v. Berman, 572 Pa. 156, 813 A.2d 792, 795 (2002) (quoting Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 664 A.2d 1326, 1332 (1995)).

¶ 10 Here, Appellant argues that the coordinate jurisdiction rule did not...