Commonwealth v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 24 July 1941 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. JOHNSON et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Franklin County; J. E. Swift, Judge.
William Johnson and others were convicted of being habitual school offenders by reason of persistently violating the reasonable regulations of the school they attended, and they bring exceptions.
Exceptions sustained, judgment reversed, and judgment for the defendants.
Argued before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, QUA, DOLAN, and COX, JJ.
J. W. Heselton, Dist. Atty., of Greenfield, for the Commonwealth.
G. K. Gardner, of Cambridge, and Hayden C. Covington, of Brooklyn, N. Y., for defendants.
This is a complaint brought in the District Court by the supervisor of attendance of the town of Deerfield against three children, each under sixteen years of age, charging them with being ‘habitual school offenders by reason of persistently violatting the reasonable regulations of the school they attended.’
The statute under which the complaint appears to have been brought is G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 77, § 5, reading as follows: ‘A child under sixteen persistently violating reasonable regulations of the school he attends, or otherwise persistently misbehaving therein, so as to render himself a fit subject for exclusion therefrom, shall be deemed an habitual school offender, and unless placed on probation as provided in section seven, may, on complaint of a supervisor of attendance, be committed to a county training school.’
On appeal to the Superior Court the case was tried before a judge sitting without a jury, on a ‘Statement of Agreed Facts' which was read in evidence. No further evidence was offered by any party. The defendants requested certain rulings. Some of the requested rulings were refused subject to the defendants' exceptions. The judge found the defendants guilty of the offence charged in the complaint. The judge offered to dispose of the case by placing the three defendants on probation upon certain stated conditions, but the defendants declined to accept said disposition if such acceptance ‘would require them to waive their rights under the bill of exceptions which they expect to file.’ The judge then ordered the defendants to stand committed to the Hampden County Training School, but stayed the execution of sentence pending decision of the questions of law involved in their exceptions.
The defendants' exceptions include an exception to the refusal of the judge to rule, as requested, that ‘the facts shown to this court are not sufficient to support a finding or judgment that the defendants have committed the offence with which they are charged.’
The refusal of the judge to rule as requested was error.
Material facts appearing in the ‘Statement of Agreed Facts' are these: The defendants, at the time the complaint was brought, were children respectively twelve, eleven and seven years old, residing with their father and mother in their father's home in the town of Deerfield, and have so resided for several years. The town maintained a system of public schools under the management of a school committee, including an elementary school ‘which is maintained for the purpose of providing public instruction for children of the ages of these defendants residing in the district.’ From the opening of the school in September, 1938, until October 21, 1938, and from about February 2, 1939, until April 26, 1939, the defendants attended school. At all material times it has been the practice of the teachers in the school attended by the defendants ‘to require all its pupils to participate regularly in an exercise which is conducted as follows: All pupils of each grade assemble and stand at attention facing the flag of the United States. They then raise their right hands and salute and say in unison: ‘I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.’' On October 14, 1938, the school committee adopted the following resolution:
While attending school the defendants ‘have persistently refused to take part in the exercise * * * [above described] but they have always been respectful in their refusal to take part in the exercise, and have been studious, industrious, obedient, and well-behaved children in every other respect.’ The reason for their refusal to take part in the exercise was that they and their parents are members of an ‘association of Christian people called Jehovah's witnesses' who ‘sincerely and honestly believe that participation in the exercise * * * contravenes the law of Almighty God,’ and that the ‘defendants have been instructed by their parents and by others in the beliefs of Jehovah's witnesses * * * and in consequence of such instruction now sincerely and honestly believe, and at all material times have sincerely and honestly believed, the same.’ The ‘Statement of Agreed Facts' sets forth their beliefs in much greater detail.
On October 19, 1938, the defendants' father was notified by the superintendent of schools of the town of Deerfield that the school committee had ‘voted to expel from the schools pupils who continually refuse or neglect to salute the Flag until such a time as they are ready to comply with the statute requiring such salute’ and that if the defendants ‘do not comply with this regulation of the School Committee’ (obviously referring to the resolution of October 14, 1938) by a fixed date ‘they will be considered as expelled from the schools.’ There was further correspondence on the subject, and a hearing before the school committee. Thereafter, on November 17, 1938, the school committee adopted resolutions excluding the defendants from the Deerfield public schools until they were ‘willing to comply with the provisions of chapter 71, section 69, General Laws’ and the resolution of the school committee of October 14, 1938. These resolutions of November 17, 1938, have never been modified nor rescinded by any specific vote. The nonattendance of the defendants at school from October 21, 1938, until February 2, 1939, ‘was due to their exclusion’ from the school, as herein described. There is nothing in the record to explain their attendance at school from February 2, 1939, until April 26, 1939.
On April 22, 1939, the school committee voted that the superintendent of schools be instructed to order the defendants' teachers to request the defendants ‘to salute the flag and join in the pledge of allegiance in accordance with the regulations of said School Committee decreed October 14, 1938 and the provisions of General Laws, chapter 71, section 69, at the regular school exercises on Monday, April 24, 1939 and again at the regular exercises on Tuesday, April 25, 1939, and in the event of the refusal or failure of any or all of said pupils to comply with said request that the superintendent be instructed to refer the cases to the attendance officer for action under the provisions of General Laws, chapter 77, section 5.’ Such orders were given to the teachers and such requests were made of the defendants. The complainant, the supervisor of attendance, attended the school on each of the dates stated ‘and observed on each occasion that said defendants refused and neglected to comply with said requests and did not salute the flag or join in the pledge of allegiance.’ Their ‘refusal to participate in the exercise * * * was due to their sincere and honest beliefs,’ already referred to.
No question is presented in this case of the propriety of the exclusion of these defendants from school. That question, however, was decided adversely to the defendants in a proceeding brought in the District Court of the United States by the father of the defendants individually and in their behalf. See Johnson v. Deerfield, D.C., 25 F.Supp. 918, affirmed, 306 U.S. 621, 59 S.Ct. 791, 83 L.Ed. 1027.
The District Court in that case followed the decision of this court in Nicholls v. Mayor and School Committee of Lynn, 297 Mass. 65, 7 N.E.2d 577, 579, 110 A.L.R. 377, decided upon facts not substantially different from the facts in the present case. The court there held constitutional the provision, inserted in G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 69, by St.1935, c. 258, reading as follows: ‘Each teacher shall cause the pupils under his charge to salute the flag and recite in unison with him at said opening exercises at least once each week the And it was further held that a general rule of the school committee requiring such a salute was ‘within the power conferred by G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 37, and * * * expressly authorized by St.1935, c. 258.’ It was said that the ‘latter statute established no penalty for a disobedient pupil, but is directed to the school committee and to the teacher,’ that power ‘to enforce the rule is implied in the grant of power to establish it,’ and that it ‘necessarily follows that, if said chapter 258 and the rule are valid, the school committee was acting within its jurisdiction in excluding * * * [the pupil there in question] from attending school.’ 297 Mass. at page 68, 7 N.E.2d at page 579. See, also, Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 84...
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