Commonwealth v. Johnson

Decision Date26 April 2012
Citation42 A.3d 1017
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Harve Lamar JOHNSON, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Joanne Tyler–Floyd, Joanne Floyd, Esq., PC, for Harve Lamar Johnson.

Timothy Jon Barker, Amy Zapp, PA Office of Attorney General, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, ORIE MELVIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice EAKIN.

This is a direct appeal nunc pro tunc1 from a death sentence imposed after a jury convicted appellant of first degree murder.2 At the penalty phase, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance; the jury found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstance and sentenced appellant to death. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Victim was a two-year-old female child living with her mother and her mother's boyfriend, the appellant. On April 6, 2008, police were called to their residence, where they found appellant outside. Victim was on the kitchen floor, unresponsive, and had both old and new bruises all over her body. Police attempted to revive victim, and paramedics transported her to York Hospital. Victim was then transferred to Hershey Medical Center, where she died the next day.

Mother initially told police her daughter fell into the bathtub; she later told police she fell down a flight of stairs. At trial, mother testified otherwise.3 Before April 6, 2008, victim had bruises on her fingers and legs and bald spots on her head. On that morning, victim upset appellant by coming into mother and appellant's bedroom. Appellant hit victim and told her to stand in the corner. At about 12:20 p.m., mother heard appellant yelling and victim crying, and saw appellant spanking the child at the top of the stairs. The spanking caused the child's diaper to explode, which angered appellant further; he began beating her again and threatened to beat mother. Mother, who was in a separate room during most of this incident, indicated appellant beat victim for 20 to 30 minutes, although she repeatedly asked him to stop. Eventually, mother could no longer hear victim scream or appellant yell. She then heard water running in the bathtub for approximately 10 minutes. Appellant returned, carrying victim's limp body. Appellant and mother attempted to resuscitate victim and, on mother's prodding, appellant called 911.

At trial, Police Sergeant Roy Kohler testified that when he responded to the 911 call, he noticed appellant near the residence, breathing rapidly and appearing distraught. Kohler asked appellant if he was okay; appellant replied, “No, I don't feel well.” N.T. Trial, 11/9/09, at 111. Kohler asked appellant to come to his police cruiser to be medically examined, and appellant agreed. While they were walking to the cruiser, appellant said, “I know I'm in trouble because of all the bruises all over her body. I beat her yesterday pretty bad with a belt.” Id., at 113.

Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) Supervisor Donald Sanders testified he medically examined appellant in the back of the cruiser. During the examination, appellant asked how victim was doing. Sanders said they were doing everything possible for the child, and asked what happened to her. Appellant replied, “I've been beating her.” Id., at 148. Sanders inquired, “What do you mean?,” and appellant stated, “I'm sorry, I did it.” Id. Sanders asked again, “What do you mean you did it?” Id. Appellant elaborated, “I have been hitting the child for the last two or three days.” Id. Sanders then asked, “Well, what did you use on the child?” Appellant responded, “A belt.” Id., at 149. Kohler subsequently drove appellant to the York City Police Department. During the drive, appellant said, “That girl and her mother bruise when I touch them at all. If I bite her mother or hit [victim] at all, they bruise right up.” Id., at 117.

At the police department, appellant admitted to detectives that, on multiple prior occasions, he beat victim as a form of discipline. He said victim came into his bedroom between 5:30 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. the day before her death, waking him up. He told victim to stay in a corner of the bedroom until he and mother awoke. He later woke up, left the residence, and returned to find mother upset. He assumed mother was upset because of victim, so between 12:30 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. he struck victim on her arms and buttocks approximately seven times with the cord from an Xbox controller. He noted these blows could have injured victim's chest and back because the cord wrapped around her body. Victim then moved her bowels, so he took her to a running bathtub of hot water. Appellant claimed he left the child in the bathtub to bring her clean clothes and, when he returned, he found her drowning and noticed a lump on her head. Appellant summoned mother, argued with her about what happened, and sought to revive victim. He admitted he did not call 911 immediately because victim was breathing and he did not want police to see the injuries on her arms.

The Commonwealth also introduced evidence showing blood spatter on a bedroom wall matched victim's DNA. Blood found on the top of the Xbox controller, a child's boot, appellant's clothes, and hairs found in a bedroom also matched victim's DNA. Blood and blood spatter, consistent with impact spatter and matching victim's DNA, were found on victim's clothes.

While victim was being treated at York Hospital, a nurse trained in forensic examination documented and photographed victim's injuries. Eighteen of these photographs were admitted at trial, and the nurse explained the injuries she photographed.

The morning after victim died, a forensic pathologist conducted an autopsy on victim's body and determined she died of multiple traumatic injuries. The pathologist found approximately 220 external injuries on victim, 150 of which were “fresh,” meaning they had occurred within 24 hours of victim's admission to the hospital. He noted victim's right ear had fresh trauma, and the center of her right ear had an abrasion consistent with someone scraping a fingernail in her ear. Victim's hair on the right side of her head was pulled out by its roots. Injuries on her left shoulder were caused by the cord of the Xbox controller, and her entire left arm was swollen. The pathologist determined bruises on the back of victim's forearm and contusions, bruises, and abrasions to her feet and lower legs were caused by blunt force trauma. The pathologist discovered numerous fresh internal injuries to victim's head, including swelling and bleeding in her brain, as well as retinal hemorrhages and damage to her spinal cord. He noted victim suffered trauma to her heart, right lung, liver, pancreas, and right adrenal gland, which were caused by multiple high-velocity impacts to the chest and belly. There were also hemorrhages to her neck caused by compression or strangulation. He opined victim was repeatedly struck at a speed of approximately 20 miles per hour. He concluded, at the rate of an injury every 20 seconds, it would take 45 to 60 minutes to inflict all of victim's fresh injuries.

A jury convicted appellant of first degree murder. At the penalty phase, the jury found—two aggravating circumstances: the offense was committed by means of torture, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(8), and victim was a child under the age of 12. Id., § 9711(d)(16). The jury found one mitigating circumstance: appellant had no significant history of prior criminal convictions. Id., § 9711(e)(1).4 The jury determinedthe aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstance and sentenced appellant to death. Id., § 9711(c)(1)(iv).

When a death sentence is imposed, this Court has an obligation to review the record to ensure the evidence sufficiently supports the first degree murder conviction and the finding of aggravating circumstances, and that the sentence was not the product of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors.” Commonwealth v. Dick, 602 Pa. 180, 978 A.2d 956, 958 (2009) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(i)-(ii)). In addition, appellant raises the following issues, which we rephrase and reorder for ease of discussion: (1) whether the trial court erroneously admitted prior bad act evidence regarding old injuries suffered by victim; (2) whether the trial court should have suppressed appellant's statements to Sergeant Kohler and EMT Supervisor Sanders; (3) whether the trial court should have suppressed appellant's statement made en route to the police department; (4) whether appellant's statements to detectives should have been suppressed; (5) whether search warrants for appellant's residence were valid; (6) whether appellant should have been excused from the courtroom during trial; (7) whether photographs of victim's injuries were properly admitted; (8) whether photographs of victim's injuries were properly used during mother's testimony; (9) whether the trial court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony; (10) whether the trial court should have instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter; (11) whether the pathologist should have testified at the penalty phase; (12) whether the trial court erred in limiting the direct examination of appellant's mother; (13) whether jurors should have been allowed to utilize their guilt phase notes in the penalty phase; and (14) whether the trial court improperly curtailed appellant's penalty phase closing argument.

I. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER CONVICTION

We begin by reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for appellant's first degree murder conviction. Appellant argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction because he lacked a specific intent to kill victim, as he only intended to discipline her. He also observes he attempted to resuscitate victim, did not attempt to prevent mother from reporting this incident to authorities, and eventually called 911. He contends these...

To continue reading

Request your trial
91 cases
  • Commonwealth v. Pacheco
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 17 Noviembre 2021
    ...there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Commonwealth v. Johnson , 615 Pa. 354, 42 A.3d 1017, 1031 (2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Reiterating that courts should interpret warrants in a commonsense manner, t......
  • Commonwealth v. Woodard
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 3 Diciembre 2015
    ...way during the interview and does not dispute that he left the police station when the interview concluded. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 615 Pa. 354, 42 A.3d 1017, 1028 (2012) (holding that "a person is in custody for Miranda purposes only when he is physically denied his freedom of action ......
  • Commonwealth v. Sanchez
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 17 Diciembre 2013
    ...Neither remedy was requested at trial; thus the Commonwealth asserts that the issue is waived. We agree. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 615 Pa. 354, 42 A.3d 1017, 1026 (2012) (“Appellant also faults the trial court for failing to give a contemporaneous limiting instruction. Insofar as appella......
  • Commonwealth v. Murray
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • 27 Diciembre 2013
    ...Appellant does not dispute the admissibility of the photographs themselves at this stage. Rather, citing to Commonwealth v. Johnson, H., 615 Pa. 354, 42 A.3d 1017, 1033–34 (2012), he argues that the trial court was required to “decide whether or not the photographs are of such essential evi......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT