Commonwealth v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 29 June 1880
• Citation: 1 Ky.L.Rptr. 108,78 Ky. 509
• Parties: The Commonwealth v. Johnson.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

78 Ky. 509

1 Ky.L.Rptr. 108

The Commonwealth v. Johnson.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 29, 1880

1. So much of the General Statutes as declares that only white persons are competent jurors is unconstitutional.

2. The 1st section, article 14, of the Constitution of the United States, provides that no state shall make or enforce any law which " denies to any person the equal protection of the laws."

3. The statute, in so far as it prohibits ministerial officers from summoning or selecting persons of color on juries is in direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

P. W HARDIN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, FOR APPELLANT.

W. L JACKSON FOR APPELLEE.

OPINION

COFER JUDGE:

Our statute provides that " no person shall be qualified to serve as a grand juryman unless he be a white citizen and a housekeeper of the county in which he may be called to serve and over the age of twenty-one years; " and that " no person shall be a competent juryman for the trial of criminal, penal, or civil cases in any court unless he be a white citizen, at least twenty-one years of age, a housekeeper, sober, temperate, discreet, and of good demeanor."

In the recent case of Strauder v. The State of West Virginia (100 U. S. S., 6303), the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state law which excluded all colored persons from service on juries is unconstitutional and a judgment of a state court convicting the plaintiff in error of the crime of murder, and which had been affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state, was reversed on the sole ground that the statute excluding negroes from juries is in conflict with that part of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States which forbids any state to " deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

That case is exactly analogous to this; and if the decision of the Supreme Court in that case is to be recognized by this court as an authoritative and binding exposition of the constitution, we must hold so much of our statute as declares that only white persons are competent jurors is unconstitutional.

The judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority.

This case involves a question arising under the Constitution of the United States. The appellee claims that he is deprived by a statute of the state of a right secured to him by the Constitution of the United States; and in the event we decide against his claim of right, the Supreme Court of the United States has revisory power over our judgment by appeal or writ of error.

In such a case it seems to us clear that we are concluded by the decision we have cited, and others to the same effect made about the same time, and that it is wholly unnecessary to enter into any discussion of the question. (Cooley's Con. Lim., pp. 14 and 361, 4th edition; Bank of the U. S. v. Norton, 3 A. K. Mar., 423; Smoot v. Lafferty, 2 Gillman, 383.)

We therefore hold that so much of our statute as excludes all persons other than white men from service on juries is unconstitutional, and that no person can be lawfully excluded from any jury on account of his race or color.

This question has not been heretofore passed on by this court, and as the duty of selecting and summoning jurors is devolved upon merely ministerial officers, we ought to assume that, in performing their duties, they obeyed the statute as enacted by the legislature, and that they excluded colored persons...