Commonwealth v. Jokinen

• Decision Date: 23 November 1926
• Citation: 154 N.E. 189,257 Mass. 429
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. JOKINEN et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

257 Mass. 429

154 N.E. 189

COMMONWEALTH

v.JOKINEN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Norfolk.

Nov. 23, 1926.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Norfolk County; W. A. Burns, Judge.

Hugo Jokinen and others were convicted of an offense, and defendant Hugo Jokinen excepts. Exceptions overruled.

1. Criminal law k531( 1/2)-Defendant maintaining that confession was due to promises or threats has right to preliminary decision before evidence is admitted.

Defendant maintaining that confession was due to promises or threats of arresting officer has right to insist on preliminary decision on its competency before it is admitted for jury.

2. Criminal law k409-Incriminating admissions of accused are admissible without preliminary determination of admissibility.

Right of defendant to insist on preliminary decision on competency of evidence of alleged confession before admission thereof to jury does not prevail as to mere incriminating admissions or statements of independent facts which show guilt.

3. Criminal law k406(3)-Defendants' belief that arrest was for gambling did not render admissions inadmissible in prosecution for robbery.

In robbery prosecution, that defendants, at time of arrest, supposed they were charged with gambling, held not to render admissions or incriminating statements to arresting officer involuntary and inadmissible.

4. Criminal law k406(3)-Admissions are not involuntary because made after arrest.

Defendants' incriminating admissions and statements made to arresting officer held not involuntary merely because they were made after arrest.

5. Criminal law k531(3)-Confession to arresting officer is prima facie voluntary.

Confession of guilt, made by defendant to arresting officer, is prima facie voluntary.

6. Criminal law k406(3)-Failure to caution accused does not render admissions to arresting officer inadmissible.

Evidence of incriminating admissions and statements by defendants after arrest held not inadmissible because they were not cautioned that anything they might say would be used in evidence against them.

W. P. Kelley, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Boston, for the commonwealth.

M. M. Taylor, of Worcester, for defendant.

CARROLL, J.

During the trial of the defendants, it appeared that after they were arrested a conversation took place between them and a police officer of Quincy. The bill of exceptions recites that at the time of this conversation neither of the defendants had been informed as to ‘their constitutional rights relative to statements and declarations made by them while so under arrest; that the defendants testified that they believed that they were under arrest charged with gambling’; that they did not know until subsequently to the conversation with the police officer ‘that they were charged with the crime of robbery.’ The police officer testified that Maki said ‘he had not been working and had $450 four months ago’; that Jokinen said, ‘he did not have any money.’ When these statements were made, there had been no formal complaint against the defendants, but they were under arrest. The defendants excepted to the admission of the conversation on the ground that they were then under duress and had not been ‘informed as to their constitutional rights as aforesaid, and that they had not been informed as to what the charge against them was for which they were under arrest.’ It also appeared that when Maki was arrested he had on his person ‘$360 folded in a handkerchief and $22 folded in his pocket’; that Jokinen ‘had no money upon his person.’ The defendants were found guilty.

[1][2][3][4] If the defendant in a criminal case maintains that his confession of the crime was due to the promises or threats of the arresting officer, he has the right to insist upon a preliminary decision, by the judge, on the competency of the evidence, before it is admitted for the consideration of the jury. But this right of the accused does not exist unless he made a confession of the crime, that is, when he acknowledged he was guilty of the offense with which he is charged. The right does not prevail as to mere incriminating admissions or statements of independent facts which may serve in connection with other circumstances to show his guilt. Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 16, 141 N. E. 571. The...