Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club
| Decision Date | 16 June 1931 |
| Citation | 238 Ky. 739 |
| Parties | Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey Club et al. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
2. Constitutional Law. — Debates of Constitutional Convention may be resorted to in ascertaining purpose sought to be accomplished by particular constitutional provision where language is ambiguous.
3. Courts. — Courts will not overturn long line of decisions where large investments have been made on faith thereof.
4. Courts. — In determining whether pari mutuel system of betting on horse races constitutes lottery within Constitution, Court of Appeals is bound by is previous decisions and history on subject (Constitution, sec. 226).
5. Gaming — Lotteries. — "Gaming," "betting," and "lotteries" are separate and distinct things.
6. Lotteries. — Betting on horse races by pari mutuel system held not to constitute "lottery" within Constitution (Ky. Stats., secs. 1328a, 1960, 1961, 2573, 3990a-1 to 3990a-5, 3914b-6, 4223b-1; Constitution, sec. 226).
7. Constitutional Law. — It is within power and duty of Legislature to discern and correct evils, which power embraces removal of obstacles to greater public welfare.
8. Gaming. — Legislature possesses power to prohibit all forms of gambling, which includes power to regulate as well as right to prohibit in part and regulate in part, provided all persons in like situations are treated alike.
9. Statutes. — Only limitation on legislative power of classification in enacting statute is that classification shall be founded on some reasonable and actual distinction.
10. Gaming. — In determining validity of statute permitting pari mutuel system of betting on horse races on regular race track during races thereon, it was to be assumed that facts called for separate classification of race track betting (Ky. Stats., secs. 1960, 1961).
Ky. Stats., sec. 1960, comprehensively condemns all the acts described therein, while section 1961 merely excepts from the operation of section 1960 the persons who employ the pari mutuel system of betting on horse races within the inclosures while the races are being run, and amounts to a provision of law that one limited form of betting under specified conditions and control is not prohibited.
11. Constitutional Law — Gaming. — Statutes permitting pari mutuel system of betting on horse races within inclosures of regular race track while races are being run held not unconstitutional as special privilege (Ky. Stats., secs. 1960, 1961; Constitution, sec. 3).
12. Statutes. — Subject of legislation and not form thereof must be embraced by title of act (Constitution, sec. 51).
13. Statutes. — Title to act concerning gaming held sufficient, although it contained no reference to exception of pari mutuel system of betting on horse races (Ky. Stats., secs. 1960, 1961; Constitution, sec. 51).
The bill (Ky. Stats., secs. 1960, 1961) was entitled "an act concerning gaming," and necessarily covered all matters concerning gaming, including that embraced as well as that excluded from the terms of the law.
14. Statutes. — Constitution restraining enactment of special or local act by repeal in part of general act held not applicable to determination of constitutionality of statutes permitting pari mutuel system of betting on horse races within inclosures while races are being run (Ky. Stats., secs. 1960, 1961; Constitution, sec. 60).
15. Statutes. — Statute creating offense of gaming, and providing that it shall not include pari mutuel system of betting on horse races within inclosures while races are being run, held not forbidden by Constitution prohibiting passage of local or special act .
Constitution, sec. 59, subsec. 4, forbids the Legislature from passing any local or special act to regulate the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors, or to remit fines or forfeitures, and subsection 29 precludes all special laws where a general law can be made applicable to the subject.
16. Constitutional Law. — Invalidity of entire act concerning gaming because of exception of certain cases from its operation could be raised only by person prosecuted under act (Ky. Stats., secs. 1960, 1961).
17. Statutes. — Degrees of evil may afford sufficient basis for varying treatment by law.
18. Statutes. — When facts warrant classification, and it has relation to purpose of law, is supported by reasonable distinction, and operates uniformly on all within class, legislation is valid.
19. Statutes. — That exemption from gaming statute applied only to pari mutuel system of betting on horse races on regular race track during races thereon did not affect validity of exemption (Ky. Stats., secs. 1960, 1961).
20. Injunction. — Equity will not grant injunction to prevent violation of criminal statutes not involving use of property, breach of contracts, or maintenance of public nuisance.
21. Injunction. — Act which would constitute violation of act to prevent corrupt practices could not be restrained by injunction (Ky. Stats., secs. 1574a-1 to 1574a-3).
22. Injunction. — Injunction would not lie to restrain corporation from participating in elections (Ky. Stats., secs. 1574a-1 to 1574a-3).
23. Corporations. — Before charter of corporation may be forfeited for pernicious political activities, there must first be obtained in criminal proceeding judgment of conviction for their commission (Ky. Stats., secs. 1565b-1, 1565b-2, 1574a-1 to 1574a-3; Constitution, sec. 150).
24. Quo Warranto. — Allegations held insufficient to make out case of corrupt lobbying against horse-racing clubs incorporated in 1928 as regards basis for forfeiting charters (Ky. Stats., sec. 1961).
The pleadings alleged an agitation for the repeal of the exemption in Ky. Stats., sec. 1961; that afterwards various bills were introduced in the General Assembly at each session providing for a repeal of such law, and that defendants, to defeat the bills, employed various persons to attend each and every session of the General Assembly, to influence members of the General Assembly to vote against the repeal of such law. However, the petition alleged further facts showing that defendants did not come into being until during the 1928 legislative session, whereas the amended petitions to forfeit the charters of the clubs were not filed until 1929, so that the clubs could not have attended any other than the 1928 legislative session.
25. Evidence. — Courts judicially know that only session of General Assembly held since January, 1928, was session of 1928.
26. Pleading. — Pleading must be construed most strongly against pleader.
27. Quo Warranto. — Allegations held to make out case of corrupt lobbying against horse-racing club dissolved previously to filing petition for forfeiting charter.
28. Corporations. — Sale of stock of corporation on credit is not violation of statutes or Constitution (Ky. Stats., sec. 543).
29. Quo Warranto. — Allegations that corporations purposed establishing monopoly of race-track business held insufficient to form basis for forfeiting their charters for engaging in transactions detrimental to public welfare.
30. Clubs. — Corporations engaging in ract-track business had right to issue free passes, if they so desired; hence allegations regarding issuance of such passes did not warrant forfeiture of charters.
31. Quo Warranto. — Allegations of investment by corporations engaging in race track business of their capital and surplus in stock of other corporations held insufficient to raise question of illegality; there being no allegation that such investment was not authorized by charters.
32. Quo Warranto. — Under statute, commonwealth may maintain civil action in nature of quo warranto to forfeit charter of corporation (Ky. Stats., sec. 569; Civil Code of Practice, sec. 480).
33. Common Law. — Statute of Anne authorizing courts to enter judgment of fine and ouster in proceedings in nature of quo warranto held not law in Kentucky.
34. Quo Warranto. — No substantial fine may be imposed in quo warranto proceedings to forfeit charters of corporations (Ky. Stats., sec. 569; Civil Code of Practice, sec. 480).
35. Pleading. — Allegations of petition are admitted by demurrer.
36. Quo Warranto. — If corporation had, in order to defeat collection of money judgment which might be obtained in quo warranto proceedings, transferred all assets to other corporations latter corporations would be liable, to extent, at least, of assets received by them, for such money judgment.
37. Penalties. — In penal action to recover fine, it must be alleged that acts complained of occurred within year preceding filing of petition (Ky. Stats., sec. 1138).
38. Limitation of Actions. — Fine imposed in quo warranto proceedings to forfeit charters of corporations is civil in its character, and hence not governed by one-year limitation statute (Ky. Stats., sec. 1138).
39. Limitation of Actions. — Since fine which may be imposed in quo warranto proceedings to forfeit charters of corporations is civil in its nature, limitation statute must be pleaded as defense (Ky. Stats., sec. 2515).
40. Action. — Nature of judgment does not determine character of action.
41. Judgment. — Character of action determines nature and scope of judgment.
42. Quo Warranto. — Quo warranto proceedings to forfeit charters of corporations could not be reversed for imposition of only nominal fine.
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court.
J.W....
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