Commonwealth v. Killion

• Decision Date: 26 February 1907
• Citation: 194 Mass. 153,80 N.E. 222
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. KILLION.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

194 Mass. 153

80 N.E. 222

COMMONWEALTH v. KILLION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 26, 1907

COUNSEL

Michael J. Dwyer, for the Commonwealth.

William C. Maguire and William H. Dietzman, for defendant.

OPINION

MORTON J.

The defendant was indicted for having accepted a bribe of $300 from one William J. Hartnett while serving as a juror at the trial of the Crocker will in the Supreme Judicial Court in April, 1904. There was a verdict of guilty. The evidence principally relied on by the commonwealth was that of confessions of the defendant. The defendant contended that he could not be convicted on his extrajudicial confessions unless there was evidence aliunde of the alleged crime; and he further contended that the commonwealth had offered no such corroborative evidence, and asked the court to direct a verdict for him and to instruct the jury in accordance with his contention. The court declined to make the ruling and give the instructions requested and the defendant duly excepted. The case was submitted to the jury under instructions not otherwise objected to.

The question whether extrajudicial confessions uncorroborated by other evidence of the alleged crime will warrant a conviction does not seem to have been expressly decided in this state. In the three cases relied on by the commonwealth (Com. v. Tarr, 4 Allen, 315; Com. v McCann, 97 Mass. 580; Com. v. Morrissey, 175 Mass. 264, 56 N.E. 285) there was corroborative evidence, and the court did not find it necessary to decide whether a conviction could be had upon an uncorroborated confession. In Com. v. Howe, 9 Gray, 110 and Com. v Smith, 119 Mass. 305, also referred to in the brief of the commonwealth, there was independent evidence, and in Com. v. Bond, 170 Mass. 41, 48 N.E. 756, the point whether a conviction could be had upon an uncorroborated confession was not raised. In Com. v. Sanborn, 116 Mass. 61, the court refused to instruct the jury as requested that no substantial reliance could be placed upon the verbal admissions of the defendant uncorroborated, but instructed them that whether substantial reliance could be placed upon such testimony depended upon the circumstances of each case, and that it was for them to say how far they could rely upon it. It was held that these instructions were correct and sufficient. This case would seem to go far towards settling the question in this commonwealth. In England it has been said that such testimony warrants a conviction (3 Russell on Crimes [9th Ed.] 366; Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown [8th Ed.] bk. 2, c. 46, § 37. And see U.S. v. Williams, 1 Cliff. 2, Fed. Cas. No. 16,707), though doubts have been expressed whether the cases relied on justify such a conclusion (3 Wigmore on Evidence, § 2070 et seq.; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law [2d Ed.] 582; 1 Greenleaf's Ev. § 217). In Rex v. Tuffs, 5 C. & P. 167, where the defendant was indicted for stealing two heifers and the only evidence was his statement that he had driven away two heifers from his uncle's premises, 'The World's End Dolver' (Dolver meaning a fen), and the heifers were not missed. Lord Lyndhurst told the jury that there was no evidence of a stealing of the heifers, though if it had been proved that the farm was the only 'World's End Dolver' it would have been sufficient, showing, if corroborative evidence is needed, how slight it may be. In this country the great weight of authority is against the sufficiency of an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession to warrant a conviction. See 3 Wigmore on Ev. § 2070, and 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 582, for a collection of cases. In some of the states there is a statute providing that a confession shall not be sufficient to warrant a conviction without additional proof that the crime charged has been committed. People v. Jaehne, 103 N.Y. 182, 199, 8 N.E. 374; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 582, note 1. But independently of statutory provisions the great weight of authority is, as has been said, against the sufficiency of a confession uncorroborated by other proof of the crime to warrant a conviction. The grounds on which the rule rests are the hasty and unguarded character which confessions often have, the temptation which, for one reason or another a party may have to say that which he thinks it most for his interest to say whether true or false, the liability which there is to misconstrue or report inaccurately...