Commonwealth v. Knapp

• Decision Date: 10 March 2004
• Citation: 804 NE 2d 885,441 Mass. 157
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. WILLIAM KNAPP.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

441 Mass. 157

804 NE 2d 885

COMMONWEALTH v. WILLIAM KNAPP.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

December 2, 2003.

March 10, 2004.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.

Tracey A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney (Lisa B. Beatty, Assistant District Attorney, with her) for the Commonwealth.

Robert E. Fox for the defendant.

CORDY, J.

The question we must decide on a reservation and report from a single justice of this court is whether any provision of G. L. c. 123A permits the release of a person on probationary conditions after a judge has found probable cause to believe that the person is sexually dangerous and the Commonwealth has petitioned for a trial. We conclude that the statutory scheme requires that such a person be confined in a secure facility until the conclusion of trial, and that such a requirement does not violate the due process protections of the United States Constitution.¹

Background. The respondent, William Knapp, has twice been convicted of sexual offenses.² He was scheduled to be released from custody on April 14, 2001. On March 19, 2001, the Commonwealth filed a petition pursuant to G. L. c. 123A, § 12 (b), alleging him to be a sexually dangerous person who should be committed under G. L. c. 123A, § 14 (d). After an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge found "credible evidence . . . to establish probable cause to find that Knapp is a sexually dangerous person," and committed him to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) for a sixty-day period of examination. See G. L. c. 123A, § 13 (a). At the conclusion of the examination period, the Commonwealth moved that Knapp be further committed pending the trial on its petition.³ On June 22, 2001, the judge denied the motion and ruled that Knapp could be released pending trial to in-house confinement once proper electronic monitoring was secured. He eventually was released.⁴ The Commonwealth appealed from this order to a single justice of the Appeals Court, who declined to grant relief. Pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, the Commonwealth then petitioned for review by a single justice of this court, contending that, after a judge has found probable cause and the Commonwealth has petitioned for trial, a respondent must be confined to a secure facility until (and throughout) his commitment trial. Knapp opposed the Commonwealth's petition, asserting that G. L. c. 123A could be interpreted to permit his release and that automatic pretrial detention would violate his due process rights. The single justice reserved and reported the issue to the full court.⁵

Discussion. Finding "the danger of recidivism posed by sex offenders . . . to be grave and that the protection of the public from these sex offenders is of paramount interest to the government," the Legislature in 1999 enacted a mechanism, codified at G. L. c. 123A, to provide for the civil commitment of individuals convicted of sexual offenses who are found to be sexually dangerous persons. St. 1999, c. 74, § 1.⁶ The preamble to the legislation proclaimed that "the deferred operation of this act would tend to defeat its purpose, which is to protect forthwith the vulnerable members of our communities," and therefore "declared it to be an emergency law." St. 1999, c. 74, preamble.

General Laws c. 123A sets forth strict procedures that courts and the Commonwealth must follow with regard to the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons. Section 12 (a) requires facilities holding persons convicted of sexual offenses to notify the office of the appropriate district attorney and the Attorney General six months before their scheduled release. Section 12 (b) instructs that if either determines that the person to be released is likely to be sexually dangerous, they may file a petition supported by sufficient facts alleging as much. On the filing of such a petition, § 12 (c) directs the court to hold a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the person is sexually dangerous. If, after the probable cause hearing, the judge finds that there is sufficient admissible evidence on each element such that a jury could find that the person is sexually dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt (probable cause), see Commonwealth v. Reese, 438 Mass. 519, 524 (2003), § 13 (a) provides that the judge "shall" commit the person to the treatment center for up to sixty days for examination and diagnosis by two qualified examiners. Those examiners must file a written report within forty-five days, and within fourteen days thereafter (or within sixty days of the commitment, see Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 439 Mass. 826, 831 2003), the Commonwealth must then decide whether to move for trial. If it does, § 14 (a) directs that the person "shall be confined to a secure facility for the duration of the trial," and that the trial must occur within sixty days.

The language that the Legislature has employed and the procedures that it has set forth demonstrate its clear "concern with protecting the public from harm by persons . . . who are likely to be sexually dangerous." Commonwealth v. Bruno, 432 Mass. 489, 504 (2000). The statute's strict timetables and express recitations of respondents' rights throughout the process also demonstrate the Legislature's simultaneous concern for individuals' liberty.⁷ We interpret the legislation in light of these principles.

Reading the statute as a cohesive whole, as we must, Haines v. Town Manager of Mansfield, 320 Mass. 140, 142 (1946), we conclude that it establishes a scheme that allocates discretion by the level of scrutiny that has been applied to the Commonwealth's allegation that a person is sexually dangerous. Section 12 of the statute sets out the procedure to be followed up through the probable cause hearing. In this context, § 12 (e) provides that "if the person . . . is scheduled to be released from prison . . . prior to the court's probable cause determination, the court . . . may temporarily commit such person to the treatment center pending disposition of the petition," and that a person so committed "may move the court for relief from such temporary commitment at any time prior to the probable cause determination" (emphases added). We have interpreted § 12 (e) to mean that, before a finding of probable cause to support the Commonwealth's allegation (while any potential danger has yet to be fully demonstrated or examined), a judge is permitted to either release or temporarily commit the respondent (if his prison sentence has expired) depending on the adequacy of the Commonwealth's showing of evidence of sexual dangerousness. See Commonwealth v. Bruno, supra at 510-511 (showing necessary to warrant temporary commitment under § 12 e must be equivalent of "probable cause to arrest" and include some expert evidence).⁸

After a finding of probable cause, however, §§ 13 and 14 of the statute operate to deprive the judge of discretion with respect to whether the person will be committed. At this point, "the prisoner . . . shall be committed to the treatment center . . . for the purpose of examination" (emphasis added). § 13 (a). If, after examination, the Commonwealth petitions for a trial, "the court shall notify the person . . . that a trial by jury will be held within sixty days," and "the person . . . shall be confined to a secure facility for the duration of the trial" (emphasis added). § 14 (a). The use of this language leaves no doubt that the Legislature intended confinement at the treatment center or another secure facility to be mandatory after a finding of probable cause.⁹

Knapp argues, however, that § 14 (e) recognizes judicial discretion to consider relief from confinement even after a probable cause finding, as the circumstances in each case may require. He points particularly to language in § 14 (e) that, on its face, seems to parallel the language of § 12 (e). His reading of § 14 (e) is too broad. Although it provides that "if the person named in the petition is scheduled to be released from custody at any time prior to the final judgment, the court may temporarily commit such person to the treatment center pending disposition of the petition" (emphasis added), this language is preceded by language within the same section of the statute making secure confinement mandatory after a probable cause finding and the Commonwealth's petition for trial. See § 14 (a). Section 12 contains no such limiting predicate language. To the contrary, it contains language — notably absent from § 14 — affording the respondent an avenue to obtain relief from temporary confinement at the treatment center prior to his probable cause hearing. See § 12 (e). Thus, in the context of § 14, of which it is a part, we interpret § 14 (e) as intending only to authorize the transfer of a respondent from prison to the treatment center if his sentence is scheduled to expire after the probable cause hearing but before the final disposition of the commitment petition. See Commonwealth v. McLeod, 437 Mass. 286, 287-289 (2002). We do not interpret it to grant a judge the authority or discretion to release any such person from secure confinement.¹⁰

Knapp further argues that the language in § 14 (a) directing the confinement of persons "for the duration of the trial" applies only to the period of actual court proceedings, and does not apply to the period between the finding of probable cause and the beginning of the trial itself. This makes little sense. The Legislature's stated purpose is to protect the public from harm by persons likely to be sexually dangerous. A sexually dangerous person would not pose a greater risk to the public during the court proceedings than before, and we find it implausible that the Legislature would require confinement only during proceedings simply to reduce the risk of flight during that limited period. Once a judge has found that probable cause exists to believe that a person is...