Commonwealth v. Knight

• Decision Date: 20 October 1976
• Citation: 469 Pa. 57,364 A.2d 902
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Keith Mason KNIGHT, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Bruce Edward POWELL, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

364 A.2d 902

469 Pa. 57

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Keith Mason KNIGHT, Appellant.

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Bruce Edward POWELL, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 20, 1976

Argued May 3, 1976. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Robert E. Campbell, Public Defender, Gary E. Hartman Asst. Public Defender, Gettysburg, for appellant.

Oscar F. Spicer, Dist. Atty., Gettysburg, for appellee.

Before JONES C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

EAGEN Justice.

In a joint trial, Bruce Edward Powell and Keith Mason Knight were both convicted of two counts of murder of the first degree and two counts of conspiracy to commit murder. Powell and Knight were both sentenced to two consecutive terms of life imprisonment following the denial of post-verdict motions. These appeals from the judgments of sentence followed.

Both Knight and Powell assert four identical assignments of error as a basis for the granting of a new trial. ^[1] Powell asserts one additional assignment of error not argued by Knight. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgments of sentence.

I.

On April 16, 1974, Knight and Powell walked into the Frederick City Police Department in Maryland and informed an officer they had been involved in a double killing in Pennsylvania. Subsequently, Knight and Powell each made a statement to another officer describing the killings. Knight's statement admitted his own participation and also implicated Powell. The latter's statement admitted his involvement and said Knight participated in the killings. These statements were offered as and admitted into evidence at the joint trial without modification, that is, each statement as admitted into evidence made reference to the declarant's coparticipant by name. Later, Knight and Powell made separate statements to the Pennsylvania State Police which incriminated the declarant and also his coparticipant. When testimony recounting these statements was introduced as evidence at trial, the testimony was modified at the court's direction so as to delete the name of the declarant's coparticipant and substitute the words 'the other individual named.'

Initially, we agree with the trial court's post-verdict assessment as to the effect of the modification of the latter testimony recounting the statements given to the State Police: '. . . no one could sit on the jury . . . and not understand that each defendant was referring to the other!' Thus, we shall treat all of the statements introduced into evidence as having directly incriminated both the declarant and his coparticipant.

Both Knight and Powell assert that even if the statements were properly introduced against the declarant, ^[2] since each statement incriminated both the declarant and his co-participant, the introduction of the statements in a joint trial was a denial of their Sixth Amendment right under the Federal Constitution to confront the witnesses against them as interpreted in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

Assuming the instant facts present a violation of Knight's and Powell's right to confront the witnesses against them, and thus the admission into evidence of the statements constituted error as to the declarant's coparticipant, ^[3] we believe that, under the circumstances of this case, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, a new trial is not required on this basis.

In Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1570, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973), the Supreme Court of the United States stated:

'Upon an independent examination of the record, we agree . . . that the Bruton errors were harmless. The testimony erroneously Admitted was merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the jury. . . . We reject the notion that a Bruton error can never be harmless.' (Citations omitted. Emphasis added.)

What was said in Brown, supra, is equally applicable instantly. Both Knight's and Powell's statements were in substance and in specifics virtually identical in accounting in detail the killings, and each statement was admissible against the declarant. Supra n. 2. As such, the statements of each declarant in so far as it implicated the coparticipant was merely cumulative of what the coparticipant's statements related. Further, the Commonwealth's other evidence was uncontroverted as to events described in each of the statements.

Furthermore, as the trial court in its opinion following postverdict motions noted, the Commonwealth's other evidence was overwhelming. The testimony of an on-the -scene witness, Tony Williams, provided a detailed account of the events prior to and during the killings. ^[4] Finally, police testimony which was based on an investigation of the killings fully supported in both substance and detail Williams' account of the killings, as well as, Knight's and Powell's statements in so far as each statement incriminated the declarant. ^[5]

We, therefore, hold that, assuming Bruton, supra, was violated and thus error resulted because each declarant's statement incriminated the declarant's coparticipant, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Brown v. United States, supra.

II.

Knight and Powell assert they were denied their constitutional right to a public trial. Immediately prior to calling Tony Williams to testify, a side-bar conference was held. The district attorney informed the court an attorney for Williams' father had requested the courtroom be cleared of spectators before Williams began to testify. Both Knight and Powell objected. Following some discussion, the court overruled the objection and issued an order excluding all spectators with the exception of the press and a group of law students who were observing the trial.

Initially, we agree with the position, advocated by Knight and Powell, that no showing of prejudice is required where a violation of an accused's right to a public trial is asserted. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1949); United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3rd Cir. 1969); 3 Wharton's Criminal Procedure, 12th ed., § 439. But the right to a public trial is not absolute; rather, it must be considered in relationship to other important interests. ^[6] United States v. Kobli, supra; United States ex rel. Smallwood v. La Valle, 377 F.Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y.1974) aff'd 2 Cir., 508 F.2d 837, cert. denied 421 U.S. 920, 95 S.Ct. 1586, 43 L.Ed.2d 788. In considering such other interests, a court must assess all of the circumstances to determine if they present a situation in which an exclusion order is necessary. If the court determines a necessity exists, it may then issue an exclusion order; but the exclusion order must be fashioned to effectuate protection of the important interest without unduly infringing upon the accused's right to a public trial either through its scope or duration. ^[7] United States ex rel. Smallwood v. LaValle, supra; United States v. Kobli, supra at 923; and see generally 3 Wharton's Criminal Procedure, 12 ed. § 439; 48 A.L.R.2d 1436 (1956). Ultimately, the determination of whether to exclude spectators, as well as the determination of the scope and duration of an exclusion order, must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court because it alone is sufficiently close to the circumstances to apprehend fully the subtleties that may be present. ^[8] See generally, 48 A.L.R.2d 1436, 1450, § 8. Thus, only if a trial court abused its discretion in issuing an exclusion order or in fashioning the order will reversible error be found on appeal. Therefore, we must determine: (1) whether the court abused its discretion in issuing the exclusion order; and (2) if it did not, whether it abused its discretion in fashioning the scope and duration of the order.

Powell and Knight argue the record does not establish a need for an exclusionary order. We disagree. The record clearly establishes that Williams was only fourteen years of age at the time of trial; that at thirteen he was ordered to remain at the scene of a double killing; that the killings involved the mother and sister of one of the defendants; and that the sister was only six years of age at the time of the killings. Further, the Williams family had communicated to the court concern for Tony's emotional well-being through an attorney. The attorney had advised the court that Williams had suffered and was still suffering emotional trauma from his experience. Furthermore, the court was advised the entire Williams family had moved from the area in which the killings had taken place because of the effect the experience had on 'Tony.' The attorney had asked the court to consider these facts when Williams was called to the stand.

Both defense counsel were advised at the time of objection of the fact that the family attorney had communicated with the court. Yet, when counsel objected they did so generally and did not challenge or even ask to know the facts which caused the family such concern that they would contact an attorney to communicate with the court. If counsel had reason to doubt Williams would have difficulty testifying because of his emotional state, they should have requested an in-camera hearing to question Williams concerning his ability to testify with the spectators present. We specifically reject the notion that the trial court was required to withhold action on the request for the exclusion order until Williams was on the stand and manifested he was unable to testify. Such a position would not only subject the witness to further emotional trauma which was sought to be avoided, but it would further the possibility that the witness would...