Commonwealth v. Lehman

• Decision Date: 22 December 2020
• Docket Number: No. 49 MAP 2019,No. 47 MAP 2019,47 MAP 2019,49 MAP 2019
• Citation: 243 A.3d 7
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Michael A. LEHMAN, Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Scott Charles Davis, Appellee
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

243 A.3d 7

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Michael A. LEHMAN, Appellee

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Scott Charles Davis, Appellee

No. 47 MAP 2019

No. 49 MAP 2019

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: May 27, 2020

Decided: December 22, 2020

David Winslow Sunday Jr., Esq., Justin Michael Talarowski, Esq., James Edward Zamkotowicz, Esq., York County District Attorney's Office, for Appellant.

Lori Ann Yost, Esq., for Appellee Michael A. Lehman.

Marc Alan Bookman, Esq., for Appellee Scott Charles Davis.

Andrew Chapman Christy, Esq., for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania.

Marsha Levick, Esq., for amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center.

Leonard Sosnov, Esq., for amicus curiae Defender Association of Philadelphia.

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY

We granted discretionary review in these consolidated appeals to determine whether the costs of resentencing a criminal defendant may be recovered by the district attorney from the defendant, when resentencing became necessary because the original sentence was vacated upon a subsequent judicial determination the sentence was unconstitutional. Both lower tribunals correctly determined such costs may not be charged to the defendant, and we therefore affirm the decisions of the Superior Court.

I. Background

Appellees, Michael A. Lehman and Scott Charles Davis, were each convicted of a first-degree murder committed as juveniles¹ and sentenced to then-mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Both appellees later had their sentences vacated by way of federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus in light of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (mandatory life imprisonment without parole for juveniles violates constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment), and Montgomery v. Louisiana , 577 U.S. 190, 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016) ( Miller announced substantive rule of constitutional law and applies retroactively). Resentencing hearings took place in each case in the York County Court of Common Pleas, during which each appellee introduced expert testimony that he was ready for immediate parole. The Commonwealth introduced competing expert testimony. The court ultimately resentenced Lehman to a term of imprisonment of thirty years to life while Davis was resentenced to a term of forty years to life. Both appellees were also ordered to pay the costs of their resentencing.² On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed appellees’ sentences of incarceration but vacated the imposition of costs related to resentencing.³

In Lehman's case, the Superior Court issued a published opinion. Commonwealth v. Lehman , 201 A.3d 1279 (Pa. Super. 2019). Related to the present appeal, the Lehman panel first examined the legal framework governing the imposition of costs on criminal defendants, setting forth both statutory and common law authority, because it was unclear on what basis the resentencing court had relied. Id . at 1283-84. As noted supra at footnote three, the panel erroneously referred to 16 P.S. § 4403 as statutory authority,⁴ but Section 4403 is identical in all material respects to 16 P.S. § 1403, which actually governs the imposition of costs on criminal defendants in York County:

All necessary expenses incurred by the district attorney or the district attorney's assistants or any officer directed by the district attorney in the investigation of crime and the apprehension and prosecution of persons charged with or suspected of the commission of crime, upon approval thereof by the district attorney and the court, shall be paid by the county from the general funds of the county. In any case where a defendant is convicted and sentenced to pay the costs of prosecution and trial, the expenses of the district attorney in connection with such prosecution shall be considered a part of the costs of the case and be paid by the defendant.

16 P.S. § 1403 (emphasis added).

Regarding the common law authority to impose costs, the panel explained that prior to the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1976, which created the Judicial Code, and the Judiciary Repealer Act of 1980 (JARA), which repealed the statutes supplanted by the Judicial Code, Section 64 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1860, see 19 P.S. § 1223 (repealed by JARA), governed the imposition of costs in criminal cases. Lehman , 201 A.3d at 1284. Section 64 of the Criminal Procedure Act provided: " ‘in all cases of conviction of any crime, all costs shall be paid by the party convicted; but where such party shall have been discharged, according to law, without payment of costs, the costs of prosecution shall be paid by the county[.]’ " Id. , quoting 19 P.S. § 1223 (repealed by JARA).

The panel observed that, although JARA repealed these statutes, JARA also contained a savings clause that effectively preserved certain statutes as part of our common law. Id , quoting Act 53 of 1978 § 3(b), 1978 P.L. 202, 352 ("[i]f no such general rules are in effect with respect to the repealed statute on the effective date of its repeal, the practice and procedure provided in the repealed statute shall continue in full force and effect, as part of the common law of the Commonwealth, until such general rules are promulgated"). The panel thus determined that, since this Court has yet to prescribe general rules for the imposition of costs in criminal cases pursuant to our authority under 42 Pa.C.S. § 1726(a),⁵ Section 64 remains part of our common law. Id . The panel acknowledged Section 64 permits charging the defendant with "all costs," while the applicable statute authorizes a charge of "necessary expenses." Id . at 1285. However, the panel interpreted the word "all" in Section 64 to mean "necessary" only, because a literal interpretation of "all" would lead to absurd results such as forcing a defendant "to pay costs associated with lighting and heating the courtroom in which he or she was tried." Id . Accordingly, the panel concluded, "if costs are not ‘necessary’ they are not authorized under either Section 64 or Section 4403 [sic]." Id .

The Lehman panel next distinguished the case at hand from situations where defendants were assessed the costs of post-sentencing proceedings, such as PCRA or habeas proceedings, even though they occurred after the initial prosecution, because the petitions in those cases were unsuccessful; in effect, the Commonwealth's initial prosecution was upheld. Id ., citing Commonwealth v. Morales-Rivera , 67 A.3d 1290, 1294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (trial court authorized to order defendant to pay costs associated with PCRA hearing), and United States ex rel. Brink v. Claudy , 96 F.Supp. 220, 224 (W.D. Pa. 1951) (district attorney entitled to costs associated with defending federal habeas corpus petition). Here, however, Lehman's resentencing was the result of his successful habeas challenge to the Commonwealth's original prosecution. Id . Based on this distinction, the panel found Lehman's case to be "most analogous to Commonwealth v. Weaver , 76 A.3d 562 (Pa. Super. 2013), aff'd , 629 Pa. 313, 105 A.3d 656 (2014) (per curiam )." Id .

In Weaver , the Commonwealth charged the defendant with driving under the influence of morphine

; at trial, however, a laboratory employee called to testify by the Commonwealth stated that benzodiazepines rather than morphine were found in the defendant's blood. Weaver , 76 A.3d at 564. The trial court declared a mistrial and allowed the Commonwealth to amend the criminal information such that it charged Weaver with driving under the influence of benzodiazepines. Id . A different laboratory employee testified at Weaver's second trial, the jury convicted Weaver, and the sentencing court ordered him to pay the costs of the laboratory employees’ testimony at both trials. Id . Weaver subsequently filed a post-sentence motion arguing he should not be responsible for paying the cost of the laboratory employee's testimony at his second trial. Id . at 564-65. The court granted the motion and the Commonwealth appealed. Id . In affirming the trial court's decision not to impose costs on Weaver related to his second trial, the Superior Court relied upon language from Commonwealth v. Coder , 490 Pa. 194, 415 A.2d 406 (1980) : "[w]here it is determined that the prosecution is primarily responsible for the conditions which necessitate the change of venue, the defendant should be absolved of the costs incident to the change of venue." Coder , 415 A.2d at 409 n.4. Relying on Coder , the Weaver panel held "[a] defendant should not be assessed costs that would not have been incurred had the Commonwealth properly performed its prosecutorial duties. The language of [ Section] 1403 provides for only ‘necessary’ expenses. The costs in question would not have been needed had the charging instruments been correct." Weaver , 76 A.3d at 574.

The Lehman panel further recognized the defendant in Weaver " ‘chose’ to exercise his constitutional right to due process of law by being informed of the charges against him prior to trial" and then proceeded to a new trial on that basis, and "it is well-settled that a defendant may not be punished for exercising his or her constitutional rights." Lehman , 201 A.3d at 1286. The panel reasoned on this basis that holding Lehman responsible for paying the costs related to his resentencing "would punish him for exercising his constitutional right to receive a sentence that comports with the Eighth Amendment[.]" Id . The Lehman panel acknowledged Weaver did not align perfectly with the case at hand, but found "no reason to differentiate between the actions taken by the Commonwealth in prosecuting an action from the actions taken by the Commonwealth in enacting a statute that is later declared to be unconstitutional," and "[t]here was no action taken by the defendant in Weaver or [by...