Commonwealth v. Lopez
Decision Date | 23 March 2021 |
Docket Number | No. 1313 EDA 2018,1313 EDA 2018 |
Citation | 248 A.3d 589 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Alexis LOPEZ, Appellant |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Leonard Sosnov, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Emily Patricia Daly, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Appellant, Alexis Lopez, appeals from his April 27, 2018 judgment of sentence, which included the imposition of mandatory court costs. Appellant argues that he was entitled to a hearing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(C) to determine his ability to pay those court costs before the court imposed them at sentencing. We disagree. Instead, we hold that while a trial court has the discretion to hold an ability-to-pay hearing at sentencing, Rule 706(C) only requires the court to hold such a hearing when a defendant faces incarceration for failure to pay court costs previously imposed on him. We therefore affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence.
This appeal implicates the interpretation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which presents a question of law. Therefore, our standard of review is de novo , and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Dowling , 598 Pa. 611, 959 A.2d 910, 913 (2008).
The judgment of sentence underlying this appeal was entered following the revocation of Appellant's probation. Appellant originally pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 11½ to 23 months’ incarceration, to be followed by three years of probation. On December 30, 2015, the trial court granted Appellant parole.
Appellant serially violated his parole. At Appellant's last probation and parole violation hearing on January 18, 2018, the court found Appellant in technical violation of his probation and revoked it. The court deferred resentencing and scheduled a resentencing hearing that was eventually held on April 27, 2018.
Prior to that resentencing hearing, Appellant filed a Motion for Ability-to-Pay Hearing at Sentencing to Waive Costs, in which he argued that the trial court was required to hold a hearing on his ability to pay before the court could impose mandatory court costs. Specifically, in the motion, Appellant maintained that Rule 706(C), along with Sections 9721(c.1) and 9728(b.2) of the Sentencing Code, mandated that the court hold an ability-to-pay hearing before imposing court costs at sentencing. See Pa.R.A.P. 706(C); 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9721(c.1), 9728(b.2).
The trial court heard arguments on the legal issues raised by Appellant's Motion for Ability-to-Pay Hearing at the resentencing hearing on April 27, 2018. Following the arguments, the court denied the motion, stating that it was not going to "start a court-wide practice of not imposing costs without having a hearing" when it was not required to do so by "current Superior Court law." N.T., 4/27/18, at 19. The court also denied the oral request Appellant made at the hearing to waive his probation supervision fees.
The court then resentenced Appellant to six to 23 months’ incarceration, with immediate parole, to be followed by two years of probation. It also imposed $1695.94 in mandatory court costs.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal and subsequently complied with the court's directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors complained of on appeal. In response, the court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. In the opinion, the court first explained that it had denied Appellant's Motion for Ability-to-Pay Hearing because it was simply not required to hold such a hearing prior to imposing court costs under the clear dictates of this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Childs , 63 A.3d 323, 326 (Pa. Super. 2013) ( ). The court also explained that it had denied Appellant's oral motion to waive probation supervision fees because of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas’ informal policy not to waive supervision fees unless that waiver was requested by the Probation Department. The court noted that such a policy was also consistent with Childs .
In his appeal, Appellant first argues that the court erred by denying his Motion for Ability-to-Pay Hearing because Section C of Rule 706 obliges a sentencing court to conduct an ability-to-pay hearing before imposing court costs on a defendant at sentencing. Specifically, Appellant argues that "[w]hile other sections of [ Rule 706 ] provide for the procedures in case of a subsequent default, Section C ... unambiguously requires that a court consider a defendant's ability to pay when it imposes costs." Appellant's Brief at 6, 8 ( ). We do not agree with Appellant that Section C can be read in isolation from the rest of Rule 706. As a result, we conclude that Rule 706 does not impose a requirement that a court hold an ability-to-pay hearing before imposing court costs on the defendant at sentencing.
Rule 706, as with all Rules of Criminal Procedure, is to be construed in accordance with the rules of statutory construction to the extent possible. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 101(c). Our Supreme Court has made clear that all sections of a statute must be read together and in conjunction with each other and must be construed with reference to the entire statute. See Trust Under Agreement of Taylor , 640 Pa. 629, 164 A.3d 1147, 1155 (2017). As this mandate applies equally to Rule 706, and all of its sections, it is critical to look at the Rule in its entirety. To that end, Rule 706 provides:
When the sections of Rule 706 are read sequentially and as a whole, as the rules of statutory construction direct, it becomes clear that Section C only requires a trial court to determine a defendant's ability to pay at a hearing that occurs prior to incarceration, as referenced in Sections A and B. To be sure, this Court reached this very conclusion in Commonwealth v. Ciptak , 441 Pa.Super. 534, 657 A.2d 1296 (1995), reversed on other grounds , 542 Pa. 112, 665 A.2d 1161 (1995). There, in rejecting the defendant's claim that Pa.R.Crim.P. 1407(c), the predecessor to Rule 706,1 required the sentencing court to determine his ability to pay prior to imposing costs at sentencing, our Court explained:
Id . at 1297-98 (emphasis added). As the Ciptak Court made clear, Section C, when read in context with its surrounding sections, only requires a court to determine a defendant's ability to pay before incarceration for delinquency, not before the imposition of all financial obligations at sentencing.
Appellant asserts that our Supreme Court overruled our Court's interpretation of Rule 1407 in Ciptak on appeal. However, the defendant in Ciptak raised two related, but distinct arguments. Like here, he first argued that the trial court erred by imposing costs on him without first holding a presentence ability-to-pay hearing. Importantly, though, he also argued that trial counsel had been ineffective for...
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... ... Childs , 63 A.3d 323, 326 (Pa.Super. 2013) ("Generally, a defendant is not entitled to a pre-sentencing hearing on his or her ability to pay costs."). Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Lopez , 243 A.3d 589, 590 (Pa.Super. 2021) ( en banc ), this Court explicitly reaffirmed this interpretation of Pennsylvania law: "[W]hile a trial court has the discretion to hold an ability-to-pay hearing at sentencing, Rule 706(C) only requires the court to hold such a hearing when a defendant faces ... ...
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...Childs .The Superior Court affirmed Lopez's judgment of sentence in a split, published en banc decision.2 See Commonwealth v. Lopez , 248 A.3d 589 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc ). The en banc panel held: "[w]hen the sections of Rule 706 are read sequentially and as a whole, as the rules of sta......
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...24-26. Appellant counters that Commonwealth v. Martin , 233 Pa.Super. 231, 335 A.2d 424 (1975) (en banc ), and Commonwealth v. Lopez , 248 A.3d 589 (Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc ), support his position that an ability to pay hearing was required by Rule 706(C). We disagree.In Martin , the defen......
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