Commonwealth v. Lougee

Decision Date22 June 2020
Docket NumberSJC-12950,SJC-12955,SJC-12949
Citation147 N.E.3d 464,485 Mass. 70
Parties COMMONWEALTH v. Cameron LOUGEE. Commonwealth v. Shamus Horton. Commonwealth v. Scott Smith.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Shoshana E. Stern & Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant District Attorneys, & Andrea C. Harrington, District Attorney (Tara B. Ganguly, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for Cameron Lougee.

Brian J. Anderson, Everett, for Shamus Horton.

Joseph N. Schneiderman for Scott Smith.

Michael W. Morrissey, District Attorney, & Pamela Alford, Assistant District Attorney, for district attorney for the Norfolk district, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Reyna M. Ramirez, Boston, & Christine Sunnerberg, pro se, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.

GANTS, C.J.

In response to the community spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Commonwealth, this court exercised its rule-making and superintendence authority to issue a series of emergency orders designed to protect the public health and reduce the spread of disease by minimizing the need for in-person proceedings at court houses. On March 13, 2020, we continued all criminal jury trials scheduled to commence in Massachusetts State courts to a date no earlier than April 21, and subsequent orders extended the continuance to a date no earlier than September 8, 2020.1 We declared in each of these orders that the trial continuances serve the ends of justice and outweigh the best interests of the public and the criminal defendant in a speedy trial and that, therefore, the time periods of such continuances shall be excluded from speedy trial computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36, 378 Mass. 909 (1979).

The issue presented in the three cases before us is whether the periods of delay resulting from continuances pursuant to our emergency orders should be excluded from the computation of statutory time limits on pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, which authorizes detention of a defendant found to be dangerous, or under G. L. c. 276, § 58B, which authorizes detention of a defendant who has violated a condition of pretrial release. In these three cases, judges in the trial court did not exclude such periods of delay from the computation of time limits under §§ 58A and 58B, and therefore concluded that these time limits had expired. As a result, defendant Cameron Lougee was released from pretrial detention under § 58A but held on bail; youthful offender Shamus Horton was released from pretrial detention under § 58A, subject to house arrest, a global positioning system (GPS) bracelet, and other conditions; and defendant Scott Smith was released from pretrial detention under § 58B. The Commonwealth challenged these rulings in petitions filed with a single justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, and the single justice reported the cases for consideration by the full court.

We hold that the periods of delay resulting from continuances in these cases, pursuant to our emergency orders, should have been excluded from the computation of the time limits on pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, §§ 58A and 58B. Both statutes provide that their respective time limits on pretrial detention must be computed "excluding any period of delay as defined in Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 36(b)(2)." Rule 36 (b) (2), in turn, lists certain periods of delay that must be excluded from speedy trial computations under that rule, including "[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by a judge ..., if the judge granted the continuance on the basis of his [or her] findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweighed the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F).

Ordinarily, it is a trial judge who orders a continuance, who determines whether the delay will be excluded from the speedy trial computation, and who makes the required findings under rule 36 (b) (2) (F). But here, immediate and uniform action across the entire court system was needed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus and to avoid the inefficiencies and inconsistencies that would have resulted if trial judges had to make a separate decision and findings in each case as to whether a trial should be continued due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It was therefore necessary and appropriate for this court to order that all trials be continued, to determine that the resulting delay should be excluded from the speedy trial computation, and to make the required findings applicable to all cases. Because we determined that the time periods of these continuances are excludable for purposes of speedy trial computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) (F), and because periods of delay that are excluded for purposes of speedy trial computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2) must also be excluded from the computation of time limits on pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, §§ 58A and 58B, the time periods of these continuances must be excluded in computing the time limits on pretrial detention under §§ 58A and 58B.2

Background. 1. Supreme Judicial Court emergency orders. On March 13, 2020, this court issued an order regarding empanelment of juries (March 13 order) directing that, "to protect the public health by reducing the risk of exposure to the virus and slowing the spread of the disease ... all jury trials, in both criminal and civil cases, scheduled to commence in Massachusetts state courts between the date of this order and April 17, 2020, are hereby continued to a date no earlier than April 21, 2020." The March 13 order further provided that "[t]he continuances occasioned by this Order serve the ends of justice and outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. Therefore, the time periods of such continuances shall be excluded from speedy trial computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36."

Since that March 13 order, we have issued three additional orders –– on April 1 (April 1 order), April 27 (April 27 order), and May 26 (May 26 order) –– that have further continued all criminal trials, including both jury and bench trials. Most recently, the May 26 order continued all criminal jury trials scheduled to commence at any time from March 14 through September 4, 2020, to a date no earlier than September 8, 2020, and continued all criminal bench trials scheduled to commence at any time from March 14 through June 30, 2020, to a date no earlier than July 1, 2020, unless the trial could be conducted virtually by agreement of the parties and the trial judge.

Like the March 13 order, the April 1 order, April 27 order, and May 26 order each stated that the continuances occasioned by these orders serve the ends of justice and outweigh the best interests of the public and criminal defendants in a speedy trial, and that, consequently, the time periods of these continuances should be excluded from speedy trial computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36.

2. Cameron Lougee. Cameron Lougee was arraigned in the District Court on March 27, 2019, on charges of forcible rape of a child, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22A ; rape of a child aggravated by a ten-year age difference, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 23A ; and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B. The Commonwealth moved to have him held in pretrial detention due to dangerousness pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and Lougee was held pending that hearing. After a § 58A hearing on April 18, 2019, a District Court judge determined that Lougee could be released on $25,000 cash bail, with other conditions.

Lougee was unable to post that amount and remained in pretrial detention.

Lougee was subsequently indicted for the same offenses by a grand jury on July 18, 2019, and arraigned in the Superior Court on September 5, 2019. After another § 58A hearing on September 9, 2019, a Superior Court judge found Lougee to be dangerous and ordered that he be held without bail.

Trial was scheduled for March 23, 2020. On March 6, 2020, Lougee filed a motion to continue the trial due to the unavailability of his expert witness. The motion was allowed over the Commonwealth's objection, and a new trial date was set for May 11, 2020.3

On May 4, 2020, Lougee filed a "Motion to Release the Defendant from 58A Hold and Remit to Bail," which the Commonwealth opposed. At the hearing on this motion, which was conducted remotely, the judge calculated that the 180-day limit on Lougee's pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, would expire on May 15, 2020, unless the additional delay resulting from the continuance of Lougee's trial pursuant to this court's emergency orders was also excluded from that calculation. Following the hearing, the judge granted Lougee's motion, concluding that this court's emergency orders did not toll or extend the 180-day limit on Lougee's pretrial detention. The judge scheduled a bail hearing for May 15, when the pretrial detention under § 58A would end.

On May 8, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a petition with a single justice of this court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, seeking to vacate the Superior Court order. The single justice reserved and reported the case to the full court, but allowed the bail hearing to proceed. On May 15, a Superior Court judge set bail for Lougee at $75,000, with other conditions. Lougee was unable to post this amount, and he remains in pretrial detention.

3. Shamus Horton. Shamus Horton was indicted as a youthful offender for carrying a firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a ), and subsequently arraigned on the indicted charge on January 6, 2020. The Commonwealth moved for Horton to be held in pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A, and after a § 58A hearing on January 9, he was found...

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    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
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    ...and 58B,7 as well as speedy trial computations under Mass. R. Crim. P. 36 (b) (2), 378 Mass. 909 (1979). See Commonwealth v. Lougee, 485 Mass. 70, 72-73, 147 N.E.3d 464 (2020) ("immediate and uniform action across the entire court system was needed to prevent the spread of the coronavirus a......
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