Commonwealth v. Maldonado
Decision Date | 23 May 2003 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. LUIS MALDONADO. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Present: MARSHALL, C.J., GREANEY, IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, SOSMAN, & CORDY, JJ.
Thomas D. Ralph, Assistant District Attorney (Elizabeth Dunigan, Assistant District Attorney, with him) for the Commonwealth.
Ivan Mercado for the defendant.
Having been convicted of illegal possession of a firearm and of being an armed career criminal, Luis Maldonado appealed from the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm which prompted his arrest, the allowance by the trial judge of two Commonwealth peremptory challenges striking the only potential black jurors from the jury panel, and the denial of his motion for a required finding on the armed career criminal indictment. The Appeals Court reversed the convictions, concluding that the Commonwealth's exercise of one of its peremptory challenges was not race neutral and should have been disallowed. Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 450 (2002).1 We granted further appellate review solely on the question of the propriety of the Commonwealth's use of its peremptory challenge. We reverse the convictions because the record below fails to establish that the Commonwealth met its burden of demonstrating a bona fide, race-neutral explanation for its exercise.
1. Background. The jury pool for Maldonado's trial contained two African-Americans. The first, a Superior Court judge, was initially seated on the panel but was challenged by the Commonwealth.2 More jurors were challenged by each side, until the second and final African-American juror was seated. The Commonwealth used its last peremptory challenge to exclude that juror. At that point, on her own motion, the trial judge remarked to the prosecutor that "the only black potential juror" had just been challenged, and demanded a reason. The prosecutor offered the following:
The judge was skeptical of the prosecutor's explanation that the juror was being challenged because of his single status and lack of children. She pressed the prosecutor as to what difference such a status made. The prosecutor responded:
The judge then allowed the juror to be excused, over Maldonado's objection, without findings or further explanation.
The Appeals Court held that the judge's decision to allow the challenge to stand was error. Citing Commonwealth v. Burnett, 418 Mass. 769 (1994), the court concluded that the judge had not followed the procedure mandated for discerning impermissible challenges when she failed to make a finding as to whether the prosecutor's proffered reason for the challenge was bona fide. Commonwealth v. Maldonado, supra at 456, 458. Consequently, the judge's decision to exclude the juror was due no deference on appellate review. Commonwealth v. Calderon, 431 Mass. 21, 26-27 (2000). The Appeals Court then proceeded to examine the Commonwealth's proffered reason for the challenge and, finding "no apparent reason" why the Commonwealth would want to keep a juror off the panel just because he was fifty-five years old and childless, it rejected the Commonwealth's explanation and ordered that Maldonado's conviction be reversed. Commonwealth v. Maldonado, supra at 457-458.
2. Discussion. This court has on several recent occasions given direction on the process to be used by trial judges in evaluating the exercise of peremptory challenges when confronted with a claim of their unlawful use. See Commonwealth v. Garrey, 436 Mass. 422 (2002); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 431 Mass. 804 (2000); Commonwealth v. Calderon, supra; Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313 (1999); Commonwealth v. Curtiss, 424 Mass. 78 (1997); Commonwealth v. Burnett, supra. Peremptory challenges are presumed to be proper, but that presumption may be rebutted on a showing that "(1) there is a pattern of excluding members of a discrete group and (2) it is likely that individuals are being excluded solely on the basis of their membership" in that group. Commonwealth v. Garrey, supra at 428, quoting Commonwealth v. Curtiss, supra at 80.3 The issue of the improper use of peremptory challenges may be raised by the party opposing the challenge or, sua sponte, by the trial judge. See Commonwealth v. LeClair, supra at 322, and cases cited ("immaterial" whether issue raised by judge or opposing party). In either case, once raised, the judge must make a finding as to whether a prima facie showing of an improper use of peremptory challenges has been made.4Commonwealth v. Burnett, supra at 771. If the judge finds that it has, the burden shifts to the party exercising the challenge to provide a "group-neutral" explanation for it.5Commonwealth v. Garrey, supra at 428, citing Commonwealth v. Curtiss, supra at 80-81. The judge must then specifically determine whether the explanation is "bona fide" or a mere "sham," "belatedly contrived to avoid admitting facts of group discrimination." Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 491, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), quoting People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 2d 258, 282 (1978).6 See Commonwealth v. Burnett, supra at 771.
The determination whether an explanation is "bona fide" entails a critical evaluation of both the soundness of the proffered explanation and whether the explanation (no matter how "sound" it might appear) is the actual motivating force behind the challenging party's decision. See Commonwealth v. Burnett, supra at 771 ( ); Commonwealth v. Soares, supra at 490 ( ). In other words, the judge must decide whether the explanation is both "adequate" and "genuine." Commonwealth v. Garrey, supra at 428.
An explanation is adequate if it is "clear and reasonably specific," "personal to the juror and not based on the juror's group affiliation" (in this case race), Commonwealth v. Burnett, supra at 771, quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.20 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Young, 401 Mass. 390, 401 (1987), and related to the particular case being tried. Batson v. Kentucky, supra at 98. Challenges based on subjective data such as a juror's looks or gestures, or a party's "gut" feeling should rarely be accepted as adequate because such explanations can easily be used as pretexts for discrimination.7Commonwealth v. Calderon, supra at 27 n.4 (); Commonwealth v. Carleton, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 144 (1994), S.C., 418 Mass. 773 (1994) ( ). An explanation is genuine if it is in fact the reason for the exercise of the challenge. The mere denial of an improper motive is inadequate to establish the genuineness of the explanation. An explanation that is perfectly reasonable in the abstract must be rejected if the judge does not believe that it reflects the challenging party's actual thinking. Commonwealth v. LeClair, 429 Mass. 313, 323 (1999) ( ).
Once a trial judge has ruled that a prima facie showing of the improper use of a peremptory challenge has been made, the need for specific findings by the judge as to whether the explanation offered by the challenging party is both adequate and genuine becomes readily apparent. On appeal, the appellate court must be able to ascertain that the judge considered both the adequacy and the genuineness of the proffered explanation, and did not conflate the two into a simple consideration of whether the explanation was "reasonable" or "group neutral." While the soundness of the proffered explanation may be a strong indicator of its genuineness, the two prongs of the analysis are not identical. The appellate court must also be able to ascertain that the consideration afforded to both adequacy and genuineness was itself adequate and proper. For example, while a proffered explanation based solely on the innocuous demeanor of a juror might generally be considered inadequate, the judge's specific observations of the juror might well provide the basis for exclusion where odd or inappropriate deportment is noted. Without a finding explaining why the judge permitted the exclusion of such a juror, the appellate court would be left with a record reflecting a generally unacceptable basis for exclusion. Finally, while appellate courts may be equipped to some extent to assess the...
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