Commonwealth v. Manooshian
| Decision Date | 01 December 1950 |
| Citation | 95 N.E.2d 659,326 Mass. 514 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. MANOOSHIAN. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Argued Nov. 6 1950.
W F. A. Graham, Boston, for defendant.
J. A. Sullivan Asst. Dist. Atty., Boston, for the Commonwealth.
Before QUA, C. J and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS and COUNIHAN, JJ.
This is a complaint to a District Court wherein the defendant was charged with unlawfully selling alcoholic beverages on August 29, 1949, to one Lois Walsh, a person under twenty-one years of age. On appeal the case was tried to a jury who returned a verdict of guilty. It comes here on exceptions of the defendant to the denial by the judge of a motion for a directed verdict of not guilty, to the denial by the judge of requests for instructions, and to certain parts of the judge's charge to the jury. The complaint in substance alleges a violation of G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 138, § 34, as appearing in St.1933, c. 376, § 2, and as amended.
There was no dispute between the Commonwealth and the defendant that on August 29, 1949, one Lois Walsh, then about nineteen years of age, gave the defendant a worthless check for $32.40 for some beer or ale and cigarettes which she at some time purchased from the defendant. He took out $2.68 for the purchases and gave her $29.72 in change. The only dispute was as to the time and the manner in which the alleged sale was made. She said that the sale was on credit, a few months prior to August 29, 1949, and the defendant said that it was for cash on August 29, 1949, after she had shown him a false birth certificate. She admitted that she knew the check was worthless and that she never intended to pay for the goods she received.
The defendant contends that in these circumstances Lois Walsh was guilty of larceny, G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 266, §§ 34, 35, 37, and that therefore there never was a sale of the beer to her by the defendant.
No case has been brought to our attention and we have discovered none defining a 'sale' under the statute, said § 34. There is no reason to believe, however, that any different meaning was intended from that used in the law of sales. A sale is defined in G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 106, § 3(2), as 'an agreement whereby the seller transfers the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.' Where there is an agreement to sell specific goods the property in those goods passes at such time as the parties intended. Unless a different intention appears, if there is an unconditional agreement to sell specific goods in a deliverable state, title passes when the agreement is made, even if the time of payment be postponed. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 106, § 21, Rule 1. Levinson v. Connors, 269 Mass. 209, 210, 168 N.E. 736. In the present case the jury could reasonably find that there was an actual transfer and delivery of the goods at a fixed price,...
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