Commonwealth v. Mazza
| Decision Date | 21 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | SJC-11363 |
| Citation | 142 N.E.3d 579,484 Mass. 539 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Anthony D. MAZZA. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John H. Cunha, Jr., Boston, (Charles Allan Hope, Boston, also present) for the defendant.
Dara Z. Kesselheim, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ.
The defendant, Anthony Mazza, was convicted in 1973 of murder in the first degree and robbery in connection with the strangling death of Peter Armata. See Commonwealth v. Mazza, 366 Mass. 30, 313 N.E.2d 875 (1974). He filed a series of motions for a new trial over the course of thirty-five years. Before us is an appeal from the denial of his sixth motion for a new trial. The motion was predicated on newly discovered evidence consisting of a set of affidavits averring that the key witness for the Commonwealth admitted to lying about the defendant's involvement in the victim's death, and a recently discovered witness statement made to police in 1972.
A single justice of this court, acting as gatekeeper, allowed the appeal to proceed before the full court. Following briefing and oral argument, the court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing while retaining jurisdiction. Over approximately the next five years, the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to locate relevant witnesses for the hearing. When the hearing finally went forward, therefore, the only relevant evidence submitted was in the form of affidavits and other documentary evidence, most of which was already part of the appellate record. The matter is now back before the court.
Having conducted a de novo review, we conclude that the witness statement constitutes newly discovered evidence that "would probably have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations." Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306, 491 N.E.2d 246 (1986). We therefore reverse the order denying the defendant's motion for a new trial, set the verdicts aside, and remand the case to the Superior Court for a new trial.
Background. 1. Trial proceedings. a. Direct examination of Robert Anderson. The case against the defendant almost exclusively relied on the testimony of Robert Anderson,1 who was incarcerated for unspecified reasons at the time of trial. Robert testified that, on the morning of Friday, June 30, 1972, he met the defendant, whom he had known for approximately six or seven months, in the South End section of Boston. At that time, the defendant informed Robert that he needed a place to stay. Later in the day, the two met again in downtown Boston, at which point Robert informed the defendant that he could stay at Robert's apartment. The two then went separate ways.
At approximately 2:45 A.M. on July 1, Robert, having spent the evening at a movie theater and bar, returned to his apartment in the Dorchester section of Boston and found the defendant inside, wearing brown leather gloves, and standing over the body of a man Robert had never seen before.2 The victim was lying face up on the floor, and his pants pockets had been turned inside out. When Robert asked what had happened, the defendant said that there had been a struggle.
The two proceeded to discuss moving the body; the defendant suggested disposing of the body the next day, but Robert insisted that it be done immediately and agreed to help.3 The defendant then gave Robert a watch, a ring, and the key to a Pontiac Grand Prix that was parked outside, all of which were later shown to have been the property of the victim. The defendant then tied the hands and feet of the body with cloth, and the two men moved the body into a closet in the back hallway off the kitchen.4
Once the body had been moved, the defendant telephoned for a taxicab and the two made plans to meet again later that morning. After the taxicab arrived, the defendant departed and Robert went to bed. Sometime after 9 A.M. that morning, Robert drove the Grand Prix to downtown Boston to meet the defendant. The two then went shopping, and the defendant purchased several articles of clothing. Robert later drove the Grand Prix home.
b. Cross-examination of Robert Anderson. Defense counsel's cross-examination of Robert elicited divergent accounts of his interactions with the defendant on the day of the killing.5 Among other things, as mentioned in note 4, supra, Robert gave varying versions of his involvement in hiding the body in the closet and claimed that the defendant subsequently put a lock on the closet door, although police did not observe a lock when they found the body.6 Further, Robert acknowledged having told a friend that he "hit [the victim] too hard,"7 although on redirect examination, Robert denied having hit the victim.
Robert admitted that he continued to drive the Grand Prix for several days. Initially, he suggested he had been unaware the car belonged to the victim because the defendant said it belonged to him. After being confronted with his prior testimony before the grand jury on that point, however, Robert admitted to knowing that the car was stolen the entire time he was driving it. The car key was eventually discarded in an incinerator at his friend Paul Clifford's apartment building after Robert observed police inspecting the Grand Prix. The key was later recovered by investigators. As for the victim's other belongings, Robert sold the watch to Clifford and gave the victim's ring to his brother William.
On July 3, police visited Robert's apartment in response to a report of a foul smell. Upon hearing police announce their presence at the front door of the apartment, Robert jumped from a second-floor rear window and ran to a subway station. He was arrested a few days later and initially charged with murder. By the time of trial, however, he was facing only a charge of accessory after the fact.
c. Other Commonwealth witnesses. One other witness testified to having seen the defendant near the scene of the crime. Florence Johnson, a friend of Robert's mother, testified that at between 2:30 and 2:45 A.M. on July 1, she saw Robert and another man, whom she did not know, in front of Robert's apartment building. She described the other man as about six feet tall, thin, with dark hair, a mustache, and sideburns. At trial, she identified the defendant as that other man.
Another witness saw the victim with a man roughly matching the above description at a club at approximately 1:45 A.M. on July 1. Jerry Leonard testified that he saw the victim leaving the club with a "Latin type person," but stated that no one in the court room resembled that man.
An employee of a retail store in downtown Boston identified the defendant as having attempted to use a credit card issued in the name of the victim on July 1, 1972.8
Robert's two brothers also testified. According to Michael, the middle brother, the defendant was someone who had been "hanging around" with Robert. He saw the defendant downtown on the morning of July 1, sitting in a Grand Prix. Michael also saw the defendant the next day, at which time the defendant approached Michael and indicated that he was looking for Robert in order to retrieve the Grand Prix.
William, the youngest brother, testified that when he went to Robert's apartment on July 2, he found Robert and the defendant there. While the defendant was in another room, Robert retrieved a key from a drawer, unlocked the closet door, and showed William the body.9 Robert also gave William the victim's ring.
Several police officers also testified, including one who had searched the defendant's apartment pursuant to a warrant. There, he found the victim's driver's license and bank identification card, but no physical or forensic evidence linking the defendant to the crime.
d. Defense theory. The defendant presented an alibi witness, William Atwood, who was one of three people who shared an apartment in the South End section of Boston with the defendant. Atwood testified that he was with the defendant, visiting various bars and restaurants, from approximately 6 or 7 P.M. on June 30, until they returned to their apartment around 2:30 or 2:45 A.M. on July 1, and eventually went to sleep. The only time they were separated during that time was for fifteen or twenty minutes sometime between 1 and 2 A.M.
At approximately 8 or 8:30 A.M. that morning, Atwood heard a knock on the window and saw Robert standing outside, as well as a Grand Prix parked at the curb. Robert told Atwood that he needed to talk to the defendant about something important, and Atwood let him into the apartment. Robert then shook the defendant awake and started "bragging" about having "convinced" a "guy to [go to] his house," who "was supposed to be gay or something like that," "and he somehow got a stocking around his neck, held it around his neck for a few minutes, let him drop to the floor, and ... took his money, his watch and his ring, his credit cards, and threw him in the closet."10 Robert showed Atwood the watch and the ring. He also "flash[ed] the credit cards in front of" the defendant and asked him to go shopping. The defendant then dressed and left with Robert. Later that day, the defendant returned with a new outfit.11
2. Posttrial proceedings. Over a period of thirty-five years following the affirmance of his convictions,12 the defendant filed six motions for a new trial. The first motion was filed pro se in 1977, and a substitute motion, also pro se, was filed in 1978 to replace the earlier motion. The 1978 motion was based on newly discovered evidence in the form of affidavits from four individuals, all averring that while Robert was incarcerated with the affiants in the years following the trial, he admitted to having lied and framed the defendant for the murder. All four of the affidavits purported to have been executed in either 1976 or 1977. The 1977 and 1978 motions never were acted upon.
In 1988 and 1995, the defendant filed two additional pro se motions for a new...
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