Commonwealth v. McKinney

Decision Date02 July 1973
Citation453 Pa. 10,306 A.2d 305
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Charles McKINNEY, Appellant.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

John J. Dean, John H. Corbett, Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Robert W. Duggan, Dist. Atty., Carol Mary Los, Robert L. Eberhardt J. Kent Culley, Asst. Dist. Attys., Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before JONES C.J., and EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

EAGEN Justice.

On November 16, 1971, the appellant, Charles McKinney, while assisted by selfretained counsel, entered a general plea of guilty to murder in Allegheny County. [1] After an extended evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Joseph H Ridge, McKinney was adjudged guilty of murder in the first degree. Post trial motions were filed and subsequently argued before a court en banc. The motions were denied and McKinney was then sentenced to prison for life. This appeal followed.

During the degree of guilt hearing, the Commonwealth was permitted to introduce into evidence, over objection, a recorded statement given by McKinney to the police. It is contended the court erred in not suppressing this statement [2] and that without this evidence the record does not sustain the finding of guilt of murder in the first degree.

Initially, we will summarize the Commonwealth's evidence at the hearing before the trial court.

On July 21 1971, Shedrick Sutton, sixty-five years of age, was found dead on the floor in a bedroom of his residence in Pittsburgh. The room was in great disarray; the drawers of a dresser were pulled out and articles were scattered over the floor. The side door leading from the outside to the kitchen of the house was ajar and showed evidence 'of recent pry marks.' A post mortem examination established Sutton's death was caused by multiple fractures of the skull. A toxicology examination proved positive for alcoholic content of .32 per cent ethanol.

On the evening of July 1l, 1971, the appellant-McKinney borrowed a tire iron from a friend by the name of John Hardaway whose car was parked on the street in the vicinity of the Sutton residence. When asked by Hardaway what he was going to do with the tool, McKinney replied, 'I know a man who keep a couple of grand. You don't have to do nothing. If I get it, I will split it with you.' McKinney was then observed by Hardaway proceeding to the Sutton property, and walking along the side of the house.

McKinney was taken into police custody on July 24, 1971, and gave a statement to the police wherein he said he entered the Sutton residence on July 16th, through a side window which he pried open with a borrowed tire iron 'go get some money'; that he found Sutton lying on a bed mumbling to himself, and as McKinney was going through Sutton's pockets, the latter jumped up and grabbed him; that he panicked and hit Sutton over the head several times with the tire iron; that Sutton fell to the floor unconscious and McKinney took a ten and two one dollar bills from the bed, plus some clothing and then left. [3]

We turn now to the legal issue posed by this appeal, namely, the admissibility of McKinney's extra judicial statement. It is not asserted the challenged statement resulted from duress or coercion. In fact, at the suppression hearing McKinney admitted that he was not abused or threatened by the police and he told them what happened because, 'It had been bothering me . . . I wanted to get it over.' It is also undisputed that before making any incriminating admissions to the police, McKinney was fully warned of his constitutional rights as mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). But, it is argued McKinney did not effectively waive his right to remain silent when questioned by the police because: (1) the police misled him into believing a witness had already told them he observed McKinney commit the crimes; (2) the police did not warn him of the possibility he would be charged with murder; and (3) the police did not advise him of the felony-murder rule in Pennsylvania, i.e., that all murder committed in the perpetration of a burglary or a robbery is murder of the first degree.

We will discuss the first two contentions together and the pertinent facts are these.

During their investigation the police interviewed Hardaway and...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT