Commonwealth v. Meehan, No. 685 EDA 2019
| Decision Date | 13 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 685 EDA 2019 |
| Citation | 235 A.3d 1284 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Edward C. MEEHAN Jr., Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Samuel C. Stretton, West Chester, for appellant.
Lawrence J. Goode, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Matthew H. Davis, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Edward C. Meehan Jr., Esquire, (Appellant) appeals from the January 17, 2019 judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions for contempt. We vacate Appellant's judgment of sentence, and reverse his convictions.
The background underlying this matter can be summarized as follows. On January 10, 2019, the Honorable Jacquelyn M. Frazier-Lyde, a judge on the Philadelphia Municipal Court, held a preliminary hearing of a criminal case wherein Appellant represented one co-defendant, and Melissa Singleton, Esquire, represented the other co-defendant. Appellant moved to dismiss the charges against his client, but the court denied the motion to dismiss and held the case for court.
Although it does not appear in the notes of testimony, Appellant seemingly interrupted the trial court when it was advising Appellant's client of his upcoming court date because the trial court admonished Appellant, stating, N.T., 1/10/2019, at 21. The trial court continued advising Appellant's client, when Appellant interjected, "I am just laughing, judge." Id. The trial court excused Appellant from the courtroom and said, "[Y]ou can laugh on out of here, with all due respect." Id. The trial court opinion indicates Appellant "continued [making] distracting remarks, laughing and expressing disagreement with the trial court ruling[ ]" as he exited the courtroom in the midst of Attorney Singleton's bail motion on behalf of co-defendant. Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/2019, at 3. However, any such remarks were not transcribed by the court reporter. The notes of testimony indicate that Attorney Singleton's bail motion on behalf of co-defendant was addressed, and the court took a brief recess. N.T., 1/10/2019, at 21.
During this recess, the trial court requested Appellant return to its courtroom. When Appellant returned, the trial court asked, "What did you say?," apparently in reference to something it heard Appellant say when he was exiting the courtroom after he was initially excused. Id. Rather than respond to the question, Appellant argued the merits of his client's case. The following verbal exchange ensued:
Id. at 22. The trial court twice more presented the ultimatum - apologize or be subjected to a contempt hearing - to Appellant. Both times, Appellant responded, "You made a bad decision." Id. at 23-24. Following the court's fourth recitation of the ultimatum, Appellant responded, "I will apologize for you making a bad decision on the law." Id. at 24. The trial court then stated that it was going to hold a contempt hearing for Appellant, scheduled the hearing, and indicated the reason being that it must "maintain the integrity of the court at all times." Id. at 27. In reply to the trial court's reasoning, Appellant stated, "It's an uphill battle," to which the trial court responded, Id.
On January 17, 2019, a contempt hearing was held, at which Appellant appeared pro se . Immediately, Appellant apologized for his actions at the January 10, 2019 preliminary hearing. The trial court accepted Appellant's apology and read the charges – one count each of contempt under subsections (1), (2), and (3) of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132. The trial court then provided a lengthy description of its judicial duties, and concluded by asking Appellant "how do you plead?" N.T., 1/17/2019, at 7. Appellant initially expressed confusion, stating, "I'm sorry?" before answering, "I'm going to plead guilty, Judge." Id. The trial court clarified, "You plead guilty?" to which Appellant replied, "[Y]eah, my behavior was abominable." Id. Although Appellant purportedly pled guilty, the trial court nevertheless recited at length its factual findings in support of contempt, reading the January 10, 2019 record, and at times, supplementing it with its own perception of the events that occurred. The trial court then sentenced Appellant to five days of incarceration for each charge to run concurrently, and a $100.00 fine for each charge, for a total of $300.00.
On January 25, 2019, Appellant timely filed pro se a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence. After retaining counsel, on February 5, 2019, Appellant filed both an amended motion for reconsideration of sentence, in which he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions and the discretionary aspects of sentencing, and a motion to vacate the contempt finding pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration. The trial court denied Appellant's motions on February 12, 2019.
This timely-filed appeal followed.1 On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions under all three subsections of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132 and claims the trial court imposed an illegal sentence. Appellant's Brief at 10-11. The Commonwealth agrees with and advocates in behalf of Appellant.
Initially, we must ascertain the nature of the contempt proceeding to determine whether Appellant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. Ordinarily, when entering a guilty plea in a criminal proceeding, a defendant "waives the right to challenge on [direct] appeal all non-jurisdictional defects except the legality of the sentence and the validity of the plea." Commonwealth v. Luketic , 162 A.3d 1149, 1159 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Instantly, "[s]ummary proceedings for contempt of court are those in which the adjudication omits the usual steps of ‘the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.’ " Commonwealth v. Moody , 633 Pa. 335, 125 A.3d 1, 8 (2015), citing Commonwealth v. Stevenson , 482 Pa. 76, 393 A.2d 386, 392 (1978) (citations omitted). Furthermore, traditional procedural safeguards2 that ensure the validity of a guilty plea in a formal proceeding did not occur, confirming our conclusion that this indeed was a summary hearing. Therefore, Appellant's purported guilty plea is more aptly characterized as an acceptance of responsibility and apology to the trial court. Accordingly, it did not result in waiver of non-jurisdictional defects, and we can examine his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim.
"A trial court's finding of contempt will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Moody , 125 A.3d at 12, citing Commonwealth v. Baker , 564 Pa. 192, 766 A.2d 328, 331 (2001). Contempt of court may be classified as civil or criminal, and "[c]riminal contempts are further subdivided into direct and indirect contempts." Commonwealth v. Moody , 46 A.3d 765, 772 (Pa. Super. 2012). Contempt is classified as direct criminal contempt where the "dominant purpose is to punish the contemnor for disobedience" of a court's order and where that disobedience occurs "in the presence of the court, or so near thereto [as] to interfere with its immediate business." Id. at 771-72. Direct criminal contempt is codified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132, which provides contempt power to the trial court and authorizes the court to penalize:
42 Pa.C.S. § 4132.
Preliminarily, the trial court opinion asserts Appellant made "distracting remarks, laugh[ed] and express[ed] disagreement with the trial court ruling." Trial Court Opinion, 7/30/2019, at 3. Although some of these remarks were not transcribed in the January 10, 2019 hearing transcript, the trial court indicated in its opinion that it directly heard the remarks and observed the behavior. Appellant does not contest having made the remarks and engaging in the behavior.
Appellant was convicted pursuant to each subsection of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132. With respect to subsection (1), which refers to officers of the court, Appellant could not be held in contempt under this subsection because "the great weight of authority, both state and federal, supports the construction ... that attorneys do not fall within the purview of subsection (1) [of 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132 ]." Matter of Campolongo , 495 Pa. 627, 435 A.2d 581, 583 n.7 (1981) ; see also Moffatt by Moffatt v. Buano , 391 Pa.Super. 1, 569 A.2d 968, 970 (1990) (). Accordingly, we vacate Appellant's conviction under subsection (1).
Next, we review Appellant's conviction under subsection (2). Subsection (2) specifically provides that it can be invoked to hold officers, parties, jurors, and witnesses in contempt; yet attorneys are not mentioned. Pennsylvania's Statutory Construction Act informs our analysis, establishing that statutes that relate to the same persons or things must be construed together as one...
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