Commonwealth v. Mink

• Decision Date: 10 December 1877
• Citation: 123 Mass. 422
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Lucy Ann Mink
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

123 Mass. 422

Commonwealth v. Lucy Ann Mink

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

December 10, 1877

[Syllabus Material]

Middlesex. Indictment for the murder of Charles Ricker at Lowell, in the county of Middlesex, on August 31, 1876. Trial before Ames and Morton, JJ., who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows:

It was proved that Charles Ricker came to his death by a shot from a pistol in the hand of the defendant. The defendant introduced evidence tending to show that she had been engaged to be married to Ricker; that an interview was had between them at her room, in the course of which he expressed his intention to break off the engagement and abandon her entirely that she thereupon went to her trunk, took a pistol from it, and attempted to use it upon herself, with the intention of taking her own life; that Ricker then seized her to prevent her from accomplishing that purpose, and a struggle ensued between them; and that in the struggle the pistol was accidentally discharged, and in that way the fatal wound inflicted upon him.

The jury were instructed on this point as follows: "If you believe the defendant's story, and that she did put the pistol to her head with the intention of committing suicide she was about to do a criminal and unlawful act, and that which she had no right to do. It is true, undoubtedly, that suicide cannot be punished by any proceeding of the courts, for the reason that the person who kills himself has placed himself beyond the reach of justice, and nothing can be done. But the law, nevertheless, recognizes suicide as a criminal act, and the attempt at suicide is also criminal. It would be the duty of any bystander who saw such an attempt about to be made, as a matter of mere humanity, to interfere and try to prevent it. And the rule is, that if a homicide is produced by the doing of an unlawful act, although the killing was the last thing that the person about to do it had in his mind, it would be an unlawful killing, and the person would incur the responsibility which attaches to the crime of manslaughter.

"Then you are to inquire, among other things, and if you reach that part of the case, Did this woman attempt to commit suicide in the presence of Ricker? and, if she did, I shall have to instruct you that he would have a right to interfere and try to prevent it by force. He would have a perfect right, and I think I might go further and say that it would be his duty, to take the pistol away from her if he possibly could, and to use force for that purpose. If then, in the course of the struggle on his part to get possession of the pistol to prevent the person from committing suicide, the pistol went off accidentally, and he lost his life in that way, it would be a case of manslaughter, and it would not be one of those accidents which would excuse the defendant from being held criminally accountable.

"Did she get into such a condition of despondency and disappointment that she was trying to commit suicide, and was about to do so? If that was her condition, if she was making that attempt, and he interfered to prevent it and got injured by an accidental discharge of the pistol, it would be manslaughter." The jury returned a verdict of guilty of manslaughter; and the defendant alleged exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

W. B. Gale, for the defendant. To support the instructions given in this case, it is not enough that the attempt to commit suicide should be only sinful, wicked and morally wrong, but it must be criminal and unlawful in a legal sense; it must be an offence, a crime, known to the law and punishable thereby. Regina v. Packard, Car. & M. 236. By the common law, the killing one's self was a felonious homicide, and, it not being possible to punish the offender directly, he was made to suffer the penalty in his reputation and his estate. But the whole subject of crimes and their punishment has been revised by the Legislature of the Commonwealth, and consequently the common law in reference thereto has been repealed by implication. Commonwealth v. Cooley, 10 Pick. 37. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 11 Pick. 350. Lakin v. Lakin, 2 Allen 45. Commonwealth v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162. Gen. Sts. c. 168, § 8.

It therefore follows that the attempt to commit suicide is not a crime or an offence known to and recognized by the law in this Commonwealth, unless the statutes, which by implication have repealed the common law, have so mentioned it and provided a punishment for it. But it is decided in Commonwealth v. Dennis, 105 Mass. 162, that the attempt to commit suicide is not indictable or punishable in this Commonwealth. An act cannot be criminal or unlawful in a legal sense unless it constitutes an offence which subjects the person who commits it to legal punishment therefor, nor can it be said to be recognized by the law as criminal. As there is no law in force in this Commonwealth, either statute or common, which in any manner, even by implication, recognizes the attempt at suicide as criminal or unlawful, or prohibits or provides any punishment for it, it is not criminal or unlawful, but only sinful, or morally wrong; the court erred in basing its instructions on the ground that the defendant was committing a criminal and unlawful act.

If the attempt to commit suicide by the defendant was criminal and unlawful, then it is admitted that the deceased had a moral and legal right to interfere in a proper manner and with sufficient force, and if, in such effort to restrain her, he was accidentally killed, the defendant would be criminally liable; if, however, the attempt of the defendant to commit suicide was not a crime, but only sinful and morally wrong, the deceased had no legal right to interfere by force, but only a moral right to interfere and try to restrain the defendant from committing a sinful and immoral act, and if, in such interference upon moral grounds only, the pistol was accidentally discharged, the defendant would not be criminally liable therefor.

W. C. Loring, Assistant Attorney General, (C. R. Train, Attorney General, with him,) for the Commonwealth.

Gray C. J. Colt & Lord, JJ., absent.

OPINION

Gray C. J.

The life of every human being is under the protection of the law, and cannot be lawfully taken by himself, or by another with his consent, except by legal authority. By the common law of England, suicide was considered a crime against the laws of God and man, the goods and chattels of the criminal were forfeited to the King, his body had an ignominious burial in the highway, and he was deemed a murderer of himself and a felon, felo de se. Hales v. Petit, Plowd. 253, 261. 3 Inst. 54. 1 Hale P. C. 411-417. 2 Hale P. C. 62. 1 Hawk. c. 27. 4 Bl. Com. 95, 189, 190. "He who kills another upon his desire or command is, in the judgment of the law, as much a murderer as if he had done it merely of his own head." 1 Hawk. c. 27, § 6. One who persuades another to kill himself, and is present when he does so, is guilty of murder as a principal in the second degree; and if two mutually agree to kill themselves together, and the means employed to produce death take effect upon one only, the survivor is guilty of the murder of the one who dies. Bac. Max. reg. 15. Rex v. Dyson, Russ. & Ry. 523. Regina v. Alison, 8 Car. & P. 418. One who encourages another to commit suicide, but is not present at the act which causes the death, is an accessory before the fact, and at common law escaped punishment only because his principal could not be first tried and convicted. Russell's case, 1 Moody 356. Regina v. Leddington, 9 Car. & P. 79. And an attempt to commit suicide is held in England to be punishable as a misdemeanor. Regina v. Doody, 6 Cox C. C. 463. Regina v. Burgess, Leigh & Cave, 258; S. C. 9 Cox C. C. 247.

In the Colony of Massachusetts, by the Body of Liberties of 1641 all lands and heritages were declared to be free, not only from all feudal burdens, but from all "escheats and forfeitures upon the death of parents or ancestors, be they natural, casual or judicial," to which later codes, besides inserting the word "unnatural," added "and that forever." Body of Liberties, art. 10; 28 Mass. Hist. Coll. 218. Mass. Col. Laws (ed. 1660) 48; (ed. 1672) 88; Anc. Chart. 147. The principle thus declared has always been followed in practice; and there has accordingly never been in Massachusetts any forfeiture upon one's death on conviction or suicide, unless under some particular statute creating the crime, of which no instance is...