Commonwealth v. Moore

• Citation: 143 Mass. 136,9 N.E. 25
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. MOORE.
• Decision Date: 02 December 1886
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

143 Mass. 136

9 N.E. 25

COMMONWEALTH v. MOORE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

December 2, 1886

COUNSEL

E.L. Barney, for defendant.

The juror Eddy was not a disinterested juror, and ought not to have been allowed to sit upon the jury. He was not so disinterested in the issues of the case as to be impartial. He was not "free from all legal exceptions." Pub.St. c. 170, § 6; Id. § 35.

E.J. Sherman, Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

The rulings of the court were correct. Abram I. Eddy was clearly competent to serve as a juror. Com. v. O'Neil, 6 Gray, 343. The fact that the witness was paid to procure evidence to convict the defendant would not affect his competency, but would his credibility. Com. v Mason, 135 Mass. 555; Com. v. Brown, 121 Mass 82; Com. v. Trainor, 123 Mass. 414; Pub.St. c. 153 § 5.

OPINION

GARDNER J.

Jurors in this commonwealth, are required to be persons of good moral character, of sound judgment, and free from all legal exception. Pub.St. c. 170, § 6. Upon motion of either party in a suit, the court is required to examine the person called as a juror therein, to know whether he is related to either party, or has any interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed an opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein. After the examination of the juror, as above provided, the party objecting may introduce any other competent evidence in support of the objection, subject to the discretion of the court. Com. v. Thrasher, 11 Gray, 55; Com. v. Gee, 6 Cush. 174. If it appears to the court that the juror does not stand indifferent in the cause, he shall stand aside, and another be called in his stead. Pub.St. c. 170, § 35. All this must be done before the jury is impaneled. Woodward v. Dean, 113 Mass. 297. The word "suit" has, in practice, been considered as meaning criminal prosecutions as well as civil proceedings. Com. v. Abbott, 13 Metc. 120; Com. v. Gee, ubi supra; Com. v. Thrasher, ubi supra; Com. v. O'Neil, 6 Gray, 343; Com. v. Eagan, 4 Gray, 18-20.

But few cases have arisen under this statute to which the attention of the court has been called. In Com. v. O'Neil, ubi supra, which is strongly relied upon by the government in support of the ruling of the superior court, three of the jurors were members of "Carson League." The object of its members was the prosecution of the laws against the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. They subscribed each a certain sum to the funds of the association, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of such prosecutions; and each member was liable to be assessed his proportion of all expenses incurred in such prosecutions, and was liable to pay the same to the extent of his subscription. The court held that, as the exceptions were framed, they could not find enough to show that the trial judge was legally bound to set the jurors aside, and that it did not appear "that either of them had any, even the smallest, pecuniary interest in the event of these prosecutions. The question whether they stood otherwise indifferent in the result of the trial does not appear to have been raised.

In Com. v. Eagan, 4 Gray, 18, one of the jurors, upon inquiry, stated that he was a member of the "Carson League," the object of which society was to prosecute individuals for violation of the liquor law; that assessments were made upon the members for the purpose of carrying out the object of the society; that his membership consisted in subscribing for stock; that he had paid one assessment, and expected to pay more. The juror further said that the amount of his assessment would not be changed or affected by the result of this indictment, and that there was nothing in the existence of his membership to prevent his giving a fair and impartial verdict, according to the evidence. The juror was permitted to remain upon the panel. It was held, upon exception, that the court had no knowledge of the assumed obligation of the members of the "Carson League" besides what the juror stated to be his understanding of them, and that they were not prepared to decide that in this instance the ruling of the court of common pleas was wrong. Mr. Justice METCALF, in giving the opinion of the court, said: "We deem it to be our duty, however, to say that, in our judgment, the members of any association of men, combining for the purpose of enforcing or withstanding the execution of a particular law, and binding themselves to contribute money for such purpose, cannot be held to be indifferent, and therefore ought not to be permitted to sit as jurors in the trial of a cause in which the question is whether the defendant shall be found guilty of violating that law."

One of these cases makes the fact of pecuniary interest in the juror a prominent feature in determining whether he was indifferent, or unfit to sit upon the trial. But this is not the only disqualification to the fitness of a person to sit as a juror. He may be entirely unaffected by the result of the trial, so far as any pecuniary interest is concerned, and yet he may have such ill will against one of the parties...