Commonwealth v. Narvaez

• Decision Date: 22 November 2022
• Docket Number: SJC-13275
• Citation: 490 Mass. 807,198 N.E.3d 37
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Angel O. Perez NARVAEZ.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

490 Mass. 807

198 N.E.3d 37

COMMONWEALTH

v.Angel O. Perez NARVAEZ.

SJC-13275

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampshire.

Argued September 7, 2022

Decided November 22, 2022

Andrew C. Covington, Assistant District Attorney (Thomas H. Townsend, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for the Commonwealth.

Rachel T. Rose, Boston, for the defendant.

Present: Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, & Georges, JJ.

CYPHER, J.

The defendant, Angel O. Perez Narvaez, was charged with vandalizing with a "noxious or filthy substance" in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 103 ( § 103 ).¹ This case requires us to determine whether urine constitutes a noxious or filthy substance within the parameters of the statute. Because we conclude that it does not, we affirm the dismissal of the criminal complaint brought against the defendant for violation of § 103.

1. Background. We summarize the facts set forth in the criminal complaint. See Commonwealth v. Ilya I., 470 Mass. 625, 626, 24 N.E.3d 1048 (2015) ("Our review of [a] judge's order of dismissal is confined to the four corners of the application for complaint ..."). See also Commonwealth v. Richardson, 479 Mass. 344, 352, 94 N.E.3d 819 (2018). On February 10, 2020, at approximately 2:30 A.M. , the defendant was stopped and arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. While the defendant was handcuffed, the officer attempted to read him the Miranda rights, but the defendant became increasingly angry and uncooperative. The defendant began to scream at the officer, "I hope your mother dies of cancer

"; "I hope you die[,] pig"; and "You should [have] been killed in Afghanistan." After the officer transported the defendant to the State police barracks to complete the booking process, the defendant became even more hostile and uncooperative. When the officer again tried to read the defendant the Miranda rights, the defendant refused to cooperate, and screamed, "I am not blowing." The defendant eventually was placed in a jail cell and was told he must cooperate with the booking process before he could be released on bail. The defendant instead refused to be fingerprinted and repeatedly yelled, "Just take me to the judge[;] he will dismiss this right away."

At approximately 7 A.M. later that morning, another officer performed a cell check on the defendant and observed that the defendant had "made a complete mess of [his] cell." The defendant had urinated on the floor both inside and outside of the cell. Based on the location of the toilet in the cell, the officer stated that "it [was] apparent that [the defendant] purposely urinated through the cell bars on to the floor outside the cell." The urine had "seeped into the cracks between the floor tiles, potentially causing permanent damage to the sub floor beneath." Because urine, like other bodily fluids, can carry potentially dangerous bacteria and viruses, police hired a cleanup company specializing in cleaning hazardous fluids and spills to clean the defendant's cell.

As a result of his urinating inside and outside of the jail cell, the defendant was charged with vandalizing with a "noxious or filthy substance" in violation of § 103. A judge of the District Court allowed the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of probable cause. The judge determined that urine was not a noxious or filthy substance under § 103 and that the facts serving as the basis for the criminal complaint did not demonstrate sufficiently that the defendant intentionally injured, defaced, or defiled the jail cell. The Commonwealth sought review in the Appeals Court, which reversed the dismissal in an unpublished decision. See Commonwealth v. Perez Narvaez, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1122, 2022 WL 244102 (2022). We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review.

2. Discussion. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, because urine is not a noxious and filthy substance within the meaning of the statute, there was no probable cause to arrest him. Probable cause exists only where the facts and circumstances warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed. See Commonwealth v. Coggeshall, 473 Mass. 665, 667, 46 N.E.3d 19 (2016). See also Mass. R. Crim. P. 3 (g) (2), as appearing in 442 Mass. 1502 (2004). "[An] application for the complaint must establish probable cause as to each element of the [charged] offense." Coggeshall, supra. Probable cause is, however, "a decidedly low standard." See Commonwealth v. Hanright, 466 Mass. 303, 311, 994 N.E.2d 363 (2013).

We review a judge's determination of probable cause de novo. See Commonwealth v. Long, 454 Mass. 542, 555, 911 N.E.2d 174 (2009), S.C., 476 Mass. 526, 69 N.E.3d 981 (2017). Here, whether probable cause existed to issue a criminal complaint under § 103 depends on whether the Legislature intended to include urine as a "noxious or filthy substance."

"In interpreting the meaning of a statute, we look first to the plain statutory language." Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 490 Mass. 398, 405, 191 N.E.3d 975 (2022), citing Worcester v. College Hill Props., LLC, 465 Mass. 134, 138, 987 N.E.2d 1236 (2013). See Desrosiers v. Governor, 486 Mass. 369, 376, 158 N.E.3d 827 (2020), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 83, 211 L.Ed.2d 17 (2021) ("In interpreting a statute, we follow the plain language when it is unambiguous and when its application would not lead to an absurd result, or contravene the Legislature's clear intent" [quotations and citation omitted]). The words of the statute generally are the main source from which we ascertain legislative purpose. See Commonwealth v. Kelly, 470 Mass. 682, 688, 25 N.E.3d 288 (2015). "Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is conclusive as to legislative intent ... and the courts enforce the statute according to its plain wording ... so long as its application would not lead to an absurd result" (citation omitted). Cavanaugh, supra. However, "[w]here there is doubt or ambiguity about the meaning of a statutory provision, the court may turn to extrinsic sources to determine legislative purpose and intent." Id., citing Malloy v. Department of Correction, 487 Mass. 482, 496, 168 N.E.3d 330 (2021).

Section 103 provides:

"Whoever wilfully, intentionally and without right throws into, against or upon a ... building ... or puts or places therein or thereon oil of vitriol, coal tar or other noxious or filthy substance, with intent unlawfully to injure, deface or defile such ... building ... shall be punished by imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for not more than five years or in jail for not more than two and one half years or by a fine of not more than [$300]" (emphasis added).

The term "other noxious or filthy substance" is not defined in the statute. See G. L. c. 266, § 103. Therefore, we first consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase. See Commonwealth v. Keefner, 461 Mass. 507, 511, 961 N.E.2d 1083 (2012). See also G. L. c. 4, § 6, Third ("Words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language ..."). "Noxious" is defined as "[h]armful to [one's] health," or "injurious." See Black's Law Dictionary 1283 (11th ed. 2019). See also American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1207 (5th ed. 2016) ("noxious" defined as "[h]armful to living things"). The term "filthy" is defined as "[c]overed or smeared with filth" and "disgustingly dirty." See id. at 659. The Commonwealth contends that where urine so obviously is "disgustingly dirty," our inquiry into the meaning of the term "other noxious or filthy substance" ought to end there.² We disagree.

Ordinarily, we do not turn to extrinsic sources of legislative intent where a statute seemingly is clear and unambiguous on its face. See Cianci v. MacGrath, 481 Mass. 174, 178, 114 N.E.3d 52 (2019). In McCarthy v. Commissioner of Revenue, 391 Mass. 630, 633, 462 N.E.2d 1357 (1984), however, where the term "any person" was so general, yet undefined by G. L. c. 64E, § 15, this court found it necessary to go beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the statute, to reach its legislative history, to afford properly the statutory term its intended meaning. In the context of G. L. c. 64E, § 15, the term "any person" was an "equivocal word," one with "no fixed and rigid signification," having "different meanings dependent upon contemporary conditions, the connection in which it [was] used, and the result intended to be accomplished." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 404, 177 N.E. 656 (1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 684, 52 S.Ct. 201, 76 L.Ed. 578 (1932). Because the term was so general, yet undefined, only through inquiry into the statute's legislative history could this court properly determine what group of people were included in the term "any person," and were thus subject to the special fuel tax of G. L. c. 64E, § 15. See id. at 633-634, 462 N.E.2d 1357. Our holding in McCarthy demonstrates that in some circumstances, even though a statutory term may seem clear and unambiguous on its face, proper statutory analysis nonetheless may require us to go beyond the plain and ordinary meaning to afford the language its intended effect. See id. at 633, 462 N.E.2d 1357.

Here, as in McCarthy, the term "other noxious or filthy substance" may seem clear and unambiguous on its face, but it too, like the term "any person," is a general, yet undefined statutory term, the intended meaning of which cannot be fully discerned without going beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of § 103. See id. What is "noxious," "filthy," "harmful to one's health," or "disgustingly dirty" is equivocal and extremely fact dependent, having no "fixed and rigid signification." It is a term that may have "different meanings dependent upon contemporary conditions, the connection in which it is used, and the result...