Commonwealth v. Owensboro, F. of R. & G.R.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 26 October 1893
• Citation: 95 Ky. 60,23 S.W. 868
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. OWENSBORO, F. OF R. & G. R. R. CO. SAME v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. SAME v. ELKTON & G. R. CO. SAME v. MAMMOTH CAVE R. CO. SAME v. BURNSIDE & C. R. R. CO. SAME v. HODGENVILLE & E. RY. CO. SAME v. LOUISVILLE SOUTHERN R. CO., (two cases, Nos. 175 and 180.) SAME v. LOUISVILLE, H. & W. R. CO. SAME v. OHIO VAL. RY. CO. SAME v. LOUISVILLE, ST. L. & T. RY. CO. SAME v. KENTUCKY & I. BRIDGE CO. SAME v. KENTUCKY MIDLAND RY. CO. SAME v. KENSEE COAL CO. SAME v. OWENSBORO & N. R. CO.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

23 S.W. 868

95 Ky. 60

COMMONWEALTH v. OWENSBORO, F. OF R. & G. R. R. CO.

SAME v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

SAME v. ELKTON & G. R. CO.

SAME v. MAMMOTH CAVE R. CO.

SAME v. BURNSIDE & C. R. R. CO.

SAME v. HODGENVILLE & E. RY. CO.

SAME v. LOUISVILLE SOUTHERN R. CO., (two cases, Nos. 175 and 180.)

SAME v. LOUISVILLE, H. & W. R. CO.

SAME v. OHIO VAL. RY. CO.

SAME v. LOUISVILLE, ST. L. & T. RY. CO.

SAME v. KENTUCKY & I. BRIDGE CO.

SAME v. KENTUCKY MIDLAND RY. CO.

SAME v. KENSEE COAL CO.

SAME v. OWENSBORO & N. R. CO.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

October 26, 1893

Appeal from circuit court, Franklin county.

Actions by the commonwealth of Kentucky against the Owensboro, Falls of Rough & Green River Railroad Company and various other railroad companies to recover taxes. From a judgment in favor of the railroad companies, the commonwealth appeals. Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.

Wm. J Hendrick, Reid Rogers, and Thomas H. Hines, for the Commonwealth.

Holmes Cummins, E. F. Trabue, Helm & Bruce, John W. & Harry G. Rodman, Dulaney & Mitchell, and Wm. Lindsay, for appellees.

HAZELRIGG J.

The principal questions involved on the foregoing appeals are common to all of them, and for that reason the cases are heard together.

On May 5, 1884, the general assembly of the state adopted the following act: "An act to encourage the building of railroads in the commonwealth of Kentucky, and to exempt from taxation all railroads which may be hereafter built under existing charters, or under charters which may be hereafter granted for a period of five years from the date of the beginning of the construction of such new roads. Section 1. That all railroads which may hereafter be built within this commonwealth under existing charters, or under charters which may be hereafter granted, shall be exempt from all taxation under the laws of this commonwealth for a period of five (5) years from the date of the beginning of the construction of such new roads. Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, that this act take effect from and after its passage." The appellees are railroad companies which began the construction of their respective roads after the adoption of this act; and on the faith of which act they are claiming an exemption from state taxation for five years from the time of such beginning. The appellant, by these suits, instituted in the Franklin circuit court, is seeking to collect taxes from the appellees, in spite of the act aforesaid, on the ground that in May, 1886 by an act taking effect September 14, 1886, the legislature repealed the act relied on by the appellees. This latter act is known as the "Hewett Revenue Bill." It is entitled "An act to amend the revenue laws of the commonwealth of Kentucky." It is an elaborate general revenue statute, providing, under separate articles, (1) the rate of taxation; (2) stocks in banks and other institutions (3) railroads; (4) turnpike roads and other corporations; (5) license tax; (6) the assessor and his duties; (7) board of supervisors; (8) duties of clerks; (9) collection of the revenue, etc. Section 1, art. 1, provides that an annual tax of 47 cents upon each $100 of value of all the real and personal estate directed to be assessed for taxation due and payable the fiscal year assessed, shall be paid by the owner or persons assessed. By section 3 it is provided that all property, real and personal, within the state, "not herein expressly exempt by law," shall be assessed, as nearly as practicable according to a uniform rate, and in the manner provided in detail by the act; and a succeeding section provides what property shall be exempt from taxation namely, property of the United States, property of the commonwealth, cattle of certain value, etc. Article 2 provides for the taxation of "stocks in banks and other institutions." Section 1, art. 3, provides that "the president or chief officer of each railroad company or other corporation owing a railroad lying in whole or in part in this state shall, on or before the 1st of September in each year, return to the auditor of public accounts of the state under oath, the total length of such railroad, *** with the average value per mile thereof;" and by a succeeding section it is provided that the same rate of taxation for state purposes which is or may be in any year levied on other real estate shall be levied upon the value so reported and found of the railroad, rolling stock, and real estate of each company. After providing for the taxation of turnpike roads and other corporations, imposing license taxes, and regulating the duties of assessors, boards of supervisors, clerks, and sheriffs in relation to the revenue, the act concludes (section 5, art. 12) as follows: "Chapter 92 of the General Statutes; the act of March 28, 1872, entitled 'An act to amend chapter 83 of the Revised Statutes, title "Revenue and Taxation;"' the amendment to said act of March 28, 1872, entitled 'An act to amend an act approved March 28, 1872, authorizing sheriffs to sell real estate to pay revenue tax,' approved April 19, 1873; the act approved April 2, 1878, title 'An act to amend section 6, article 6, chapter 92, General Statutes;' 'An act to amend article 2 of chapter 92 of the General Statutes, title "Revenue and Taxation;"' approved May 8, 1884; and all other acts, general and special, and parts of acts, inconsistent herewith, or not in conformity herewith,-are hereby repealed; but nothing in this act shall interfere with any existing local option, or any special or prohibition law in any county, nor with any local or general law for creating or collecting county levy, or with chapter 1315 of the Acts of 1879-80,-[agricultural and mechanical college tax,] or with an act entitled 'An act for the benefit of the branch penitentiary at Eddyville,' approved April 7, 1886." Sec. 6: "Nothing in this act shall be held to repeal or in any way impair the force and effect of any local or special act, or any general law in force or that may hereafter be passed providing for the appointment of collector or state revenue or county levy and poll tax, in any county of the state, nor shall anything herein be construed to repeal or impair the force of any special or local law giving to counties or towns, for road or street purposes, the fines collected for violations of the road or bridge laws of said county."

In determining the force and effect of this latter act on prior legislation, general or special, regulating taxation in the commonwealth, it is evident that its general purpose and intent should be given much weight. Manifestly, the act of 1886 is intended to compass and reform the entire revenue law of the state,-to constitute in itself a general and complete revenue system. As argued by counsel, "it singles out no special defects here and there, but is aimed broadcast at the whole structure. Else why should it have re-enacted, as it does, many old laws in identical and equivalent terms?" This general purpose, to be made effective and uniform, must sweep away a mass of special and class legislation adopted in pursuance of the system theretofore in practice. We notice, first, that all property, real and personal, shall be assessed for taxation, save that expressly exempted in the act itself. Not content with this, the act proceeds to repeal all acts, and parts of acts, general and special, inconsistent with itself, or not in conformity to itself. Can it be said that the act of 1884, providing by a general law for a tax exemption for a specified time of the property of all newly-built railroads in the state, the force of which was to continue the exemption forever or indefinitely, is not inconsistent with an act intended to embrace the whole tax law of the state, demanding the equal and uniform taxation of all property within the state, save the property of the United States, the commonwealth of Kentucky, etc., and demanding specifically, and without exception or exemption, the taxation of all the property of each railroad company within the state? We think not. Manifestly, there is the most positive repugnancy between the two acts, and upon abundant authority, if any were needed to sustain so evident a proposition, the latter act supersedes and repeals the former. "An intention to supersede local and special acts (End. Interp. St. § 231) may be gathered from the design of the act to regulate by one general system or provision the entire subject-matter thereof, and to substitute for a number of detached and varying enactments one universal and uniform rule, applicable throughout the state." "Ordinarily," says Mr. Bishop in his work on Written Laws, (section 152,) "if there are a general statute and one local or special on the same subject in conflicting terms, neither abrogates the other, but both stand together, the former furnishing the rule for the particular locality or case, the latter for the unexpected places and instances; and it is immaterial which is of the later date. But where, from any thing cognizable by the judges, they are satisfied the general law was meant by the legislature to supersede the local or special one, they will give it that effect." Here the repeal is gathered, not merely because the acts are inconsistent, but because the latter in express terms repeals all acts and parts of acts, general and special, inconsistent therewith, or not in conformity thereto. Sutherland on Statutory Construction (page 214) says that when a general act is passed, "and repeals all inconsistent legislation, it will have the effect to repeal all special acts which are in conflict with it;" and Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes (section 206) says that such a clause removes the chief objection to repeals by implication.

We may notice in this...