Commonwealth v. Pariseau

• Decision Date: 13 January 2014
• Docket Number: SJC–11302.
• Citation: 2 N.E.3d 859,466 Mass. 805
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Eli PARISEAU.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

466 Mass. 805

2 N.E.3d 859

COMMONWEALTH

v.Eli PARISEAU.

SJC–11302.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Berkshire.

Submitted Sept. 9, 2013.

Decided Jan. 13, 2014.

Brad P. Bennion for the defendant.

Joseph A. Pieropan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.

David E. Sullivan, District Attorney, & Steven Greenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, for District Attorney for the Northwestern District & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

DUFFLY, J.

Several months after the conclusion of a jury-waived trial, a Superior Court judge issued a decision determining that the defendant is a sexually dangerous person (SDP) and ordering him committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center (treatment center) for an indeterminate period. G.L. c. 123A, § 14 ( d ).¹ The judge's decision issued after our opinion in Commonwealth v. Blake, 454 Mass. 267, 268–269, 909 N.E.2d 532 (2009), which required that, absent extraordinary circumstances, a judge must issue a decision on an SDP petition within thirty days of the conclusion of a jury-waived trial. The defendant appealed, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support a determination that he is sexually dangerous and that, because the trial judge's decision was not rendered within thirty days of the end of the trial, he is entitled to dismissal of the Commonwealth's petition or, in the alternative, a new trial. The Appeals Court affirmed. See Commonwealth v. Pariseau, 81 Mass.App.Ct. 705, 712, 967 N.E.2d 154 (2012). We allowed the defendant's petition for further appellate review, “limited to the issue of what remedy, if any, is available when a judge who has presided over a jury-waived trial pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 14, does not render a decision within thirty days of the end of the trial, pursuant to [ Blake, supra ].”

Although the trial judge's decision was not issued within thirty days as required by Blake, supra at 268, 909 N.E.2d 532, we conclude that neither dismissal nor a new trial is warranted in circumstances such as those present here. Although such remedies may be appropriate in a particular case, as a general rule other procedures and remedies are available to a defendant who remains confined more than thirty days posttrial pending issuance of an SDP decision.² Where a determination remains under advisement more than thirty days after the end of trial, a defendant may, for example, move for a prompt decision and for release from confinement, and a judge may order such release with appropriate conditions, pending issuance of the judge's decision. Alternatively, a judge may issue a memorandum of decision withinthirty days of trial, with findings of fact and conclusions of law promptly to follow, if doing so is necessary to permit a timely decision to issue.³

1. Background. The defendant is a sex offender as defined in G.L. c. 6, § 178C. In 1991, he was convicted of twenty-two counts of rape of a child, G.L. c. 265, § 23, and was sentenced to a term of incarceration of from fifteen to twenty years. The defendant's 1991 convictions “stemmed from incidents in the summer of 1990, in which he sexually assaulted an eleven year old boy ... and forced the victim by threats to molest two younger girls.” Commonwealth v. Pariseau, 81 Mass.App.Ct. at 706–707, 967 N.E.2d 154. He was also convicted of open and gross lewdness in 1984, and of indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen in 1981. On September 2, 2009, one hundred and five days before the defendant's anticipated release date of December 16, 2009, the Commonwealth filed a petition in the Superior Court seeking to have him declared an SDP. See G.L. c. 123A, §§ 1, 12–16. At a hearing on October 21, 2009, the defendant stipulated that there was probable cause to believe that he met the statutory criteria to be deemed an SDP, and a Superior Court judge ordered him confined to the treatment center for evaluation by two qualified examiners. See G.L. c. 123A, § 13. The qualified examiners interviewed the defendant and submitted their written reports on December 2, 2009, concluding that the defendant met the criteria to be committed as an SDP. The Commonwealth timely filed its petition for trial.

On February 18, 2010, at the conclusion of the defendant's jury-waived trial, counsel for the defendant requested additional time to provide the judge with a written statement in lieu of closing argument, and with proposed findings of fact and rulings of law. The parties agreed that the defendant would file his proposed findings by March 12, 2010, and that the Commonwealth would file its proposed findings by March 19, 2010. The defendant and the Commonwealth both filed their written submissions on March 15, 2010. The case file contains a letter of inquiry from an associate of the defendant's trial counsel “on behalf of [the defendant's trial counsel]” concerning the status of the case that was received by the Superior Court on June 4, 2010. This letter is not reflected in the docket sheet. A second letter from the defendant's trial counsel “regarding [the] case” was docketed on July 27, 2010. The judge's memorandum of decision issued three days later, on July 30, 2010. The judge determined that “as a result of his personality disorder the [defendant] is likely to sexually re-offend if not confined to a secure facility,” and allowed the Commonwealth's petition.

The Appeals Court rejected the defendant's claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a determination that he is an SDP, concluding that “the evidence was more than sufficient to warrant” such a determination. Commonwealth v. Pariseau, 81 Mass.App.Ct. at 706, 967 N.E.2d 154. The court concluded also that violation of the thirty-day deadline “does not justify dismissal of the petition or a new trial, as the defendant's sexual dangerousness was well-established in a fair trial that was not affected by the delay in the issuance of the decision, and the trial judge immediately issued his decision once the delay was brought to his attention.” Id. 2. Discussion. A temporary civil commitment in connection with proceedings under G.L. c. 123A “implicates a liberty interest, and therefore, due process protections apply.” Blake, supra at 276–277, 909 N.E.2d 532 (Ireland, J., concurring), and cases cited. The statutory scheme pursuant to which the Commonwealth may seek civil confinement of an individual who has served his criminal sentence sets forth the specific steps to be followed in SDP proceedings, which ultimately may result in a trial on the Commonwealth's petition. Such proceedings “take[ ] place according to an expedited pace,” Blake, supra at 278, 909 N.E.2d 532 (Ireland, J., concurring), and the Commonwealth must adhere strictly to the timeframes established by the Legislature. See, e.g., Gangi v. Commonwealth, 462 Mass. 158, 160–161, 967 N.E.2d 135 (2012); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 435 Mass. 527, 530, 762 N.E.2d 794 (2001).⁴ In establishing this statutory framework, “[t]he Legislature clearly was aware of the liberty interests at stake.” Blake, supra (Ireland, J., concurring).

Although G.L. c. 123A, § 14, requires a defendant's confinement after a finding of probable cause and for the duration of trial on the Commonwealth's petition, it provides no specific period within which a determination must issue following a jury-waived trial. Consistent with the accelerated pace of the proceedings established by the SDP statute, in Blake, supra at 268, 909 N.E.2d 532, we therefore mandated a strict limit on the period within which a trial judge's decision must issue.

“The court unanimously disapproves of the lengthy delay that occurred in this case. We require that future jury-waived trials pursuant to G.L. c. 123A, § 14, be promptly resolved and, toward that end, hold that for such jury-waived trials begun after the date of this opinion, the judge must, absent extraordinary circumstances, render a decision within thirty days of the end of the trial.” ⁵

We did not, however, determine the appropriate remedy for a defendant who, because of a delay in the issuance of a judge's decision, is subject to continued confinement after the thirty-day period or after any extended deadline to which a defendant has agreed.

a. Extent of delay. As a preliminary matter, we address the Commonwealth's argument that there was no violation of the thirty-day deadline set forth in Blake because the defendant acquiesced to the delay by requesting additional time within which to file proposed findings and rulings. Nothing in our prior holdings precludes extension by agreement; where a defendant has acquiesced to an extension of time, either explicitly or implicitly, such as by requesting additional time after trial within which to file written submissions, the judge's decision should issue as soon as practicable after the filing of the written submissions, but in any event no later than thirty days from the agreed-upon date of extension.

Here, the judge allowed an extension of time until March 19, 2010, at the request of the parties. The judge's decision, therefore, should have issued by April 18, 2010; it was not released until July 30, 2010, more than three months later. No extraordinary circumstances are cited, either in the decision or in the docket, to explain the delay. Moreover, nothing in the record before us suggests that the defendant acquiesced to the additional delay. The defendant sent two letters to the court, received on June 4 and July 27, inquiring about the status of the case. The judge's decision issued only a few days after receipt of the second letter. Cf. Commonwealth v. McInerney, 380 Mass. 59, 67, 401 N.E.2d 821 (1980) (noting, in context of delay in sentencing, that writing letter seeking to expedite decision is “small measure of self-help [that] is not too much to expect”). Even if no letter had been sent, a defendant's silence, without more, does...