Commonwealth v. Peach

• Decision Date: 11 October 1921
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. ALBERT P. PEACH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

239 Mass. 575

COMMONWEALTH v. ALBERT P. PEACH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

October 11, 1921

September 22, 1921.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., DE COURCY CROSBY, CARROLL, & JENNEY, JJ.

Manslaughter. Negligence, Causing death.

Practice, Criminal Charge to jury, Requests, rulings and instructions, New trial, Exceptions, Law of the case. Merger. Motor Vehicle Reckless driving.

At the trial of an indictment charging the defendant with manslaughter "by so recklessly or negligently operating a motor vehicle that it collided with" another, causing the death of an occupant of the second vehicle, the defendant contended that the driver of the motor vehicle with which he collided was negligent. The judge charged the jury in substance that negligence of the driver of the second vehicle was not a defence available to the defendant "if the defendant's recklessness caused the death complained of." The defendant alleged an exception, and thereupon the judge gave further instructions to the effect that the jury should take into account all the circumstances preceding and attending the collision, including among others the conduct of the driver of the second vehicle; that, if the defendant's conduct was reckless, independently of the conduct of the driver of the second vehicle, the defendant would be guilty if death was caused by his recklessness; that, if they should find the driver of the second vehicle negligent, but should still find that, quite regardless of his negligence, the defendant was reckless, they should "find him guilty of recklessness;" that, if his conduct "would not have resulted as reckless conduct would have resulted but for the recklessness or negligence" of the driver of the second vehicle, the defendant "would be innocent of recklessness. But . . . he cannot excuse his recklessness, if you find him reckless, by showing the negligence of" the other driver. Held, that the instructions to the jury were sufficient and that the defendant's exception must be overruled.

At the trial of the indictment above described, it was proper for the judge to refuse to rule that the "Commonwealth must show that the defendant had an intent to commit the crime of manslaughter," and that such

"intent must be an active state of mind amounting to reckless and wanton disregard for the lives of others." The indictment for manslaughter, above described, was tried in the Superior

Court at the same time with a complaint charging the defendant with a violation of St. 1909, c. 534, Section 22; St. 1916, c. 290, in operating a motor vehicle upon a public way so that the lives and safety of the public were endangered. Without objection or exception by either the Commonwealth or the defendant, the judge charged the jury that, if they should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter as alleged in the indictment, it would be their duty to return a verdict of not guilty of the offence charged in the complaint. The jury found the defendant guilty of the offence charged in the indictment and not guilty of that charged in the complaint. The defendant moved for a new trial on the ground that the two verdicts were inconsistent. Held, that

(1) The ruling of the judge, unexcepted to, became the law of the case;

(2) Upon the record it was clear that, under the charge to the jury, the verdicts were consistent;

(3) Whether there could be a merger of the offences charged in the indictment and in the complaint, above described, was not considered.

INDICTMENT in two counts, found and returned on May 5, 1921, charging, in the first count, that the defendant "did assault and beat Harriet E. Peck and by such assault and beating did kill" her, and, in the second count, that the assault and beating was "by so recklessly, carelessly and negligently driving and operating a motor vehicle that it collided with a motor vehicle of which the said Harriet E Peck was an occupant;" also a

COMPLAINT, received and sworn to in the District Court of Eastern Hampden on October 10, 1920, charging the defendant with operating an automobile upon a public way so that the lives and safety of the public were endangered.

Upon an appeal from a conviction on the complaint in the district court, the indictment and the complaint were tried together in the Superior Court before Callahan, J.

At the close of the evidence, the defendant asked for the following rulings:

"6. The Commonwealth must show that the defendant had an intent to commit the crime of manslaughter.

"7. This intent must be an active state of mind amounting to reckless and wanton disregard for the lives of others."

Material portions of the charge to the jury are described in the opinion. The "further instructions" referred to in the opinion as given by the judge after exception had been alleged by the defendant to portions of the charge, were as follows:

"I thought I made this plain to you, that it was your duty to take into account all the circumstances preceding and attending the collision, including among others the conduct of the driver of the Peck automobile. And I thought in that connection I instructed you that if the defendant's conduct was reckless, independently of the conduct of Peck, the defendant would be guilty if death was caused by his recklessness. I so instruct you now. In such a case the defendant could not avail himself of the argument that Peck was negligent, because his guilt was already established by his own conduct, quite independently of anything that Peck might have done. However, in determining whether or not the defendant was reckless, it is proper to take into account the entire situation with which he was called upon to deal as he entered the curve as well as at the moment of the collision, including the conduct of Peck, the driver of the machine. If, taking that into account, you should find that Peck was negligent, but should still find that quite regardless of any negligence of Peck this defendant was reckless it would be your duty to find him guilty of recklessness. If, on the other hand, his conduct would not have been reckless, would not have resulted as reckless conduct would have resulted but for the recklessness or negligence of Peck, of course he would be innocent of recklessness. But understand, understand it clearly, he cannot excuse his recklessness, if you find him reckless, by showing the negligence of Peck."

The jury found the defendant guilty on the indictment and not guilty on the complaint. The defendant thereupon filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that "the verdict of `not guilty' on the complaint charging that the defendant operated an automobile or motor vehicle so that the lives and safety of the public were endangered and the verdict of `guilty' on the indictment charging manslaughter, both of which offences import negligent, reckless, wilful and wanton misconduct, are contradictory and repugnant."

At the hearing upon the motion, the defendant asked for the following rulings:

"1. The finding of the defendant guilty of manslaughter and not guilty of the offence of driving so that the lives and safety of the public might be endangered is...