Commonwealth v. Petranich
| Decision Date | 01 April 1903 |
| Citation | 66 N.E. 807,183 Mass. 217 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. PETRANICH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
M. J. Sughrue, for the Commonwealth.
John H Casey and Wm. H. Garland, for defendant.
This is an indictment for a sale of intoxicating liquor without a license, in violation of Rev. Laws, c. 100, § 1. One of the grounds of the defendant's motion to quash is that the indictment does not sufficiently negative the defendant's right to make the sale, inasmuch as it does not allege that the liquor was not native wine or cider manufactured in this commonwealth. The indictment is in form approved by many dicisions of this court, and it sufficiently alleges the illegality of the sale. Com. v. Clapp, 5 Cray, 97; Com. v. Fredericks, 119 Mass. 199; Com. v Burke, 121 Mass. 39.
The ground of defense principally relied on, both under the other parts of the motion to quash and under the exceptions to the refusal of the court to give the jury certain instructions requested, is that the statute is unconstitutional in that part which purports to permit the sale without a license, by the makers thereof, of native wine or cider manufactured in this commonwealth, while it forbids the sale, without a license, of wine or cider manufactured in another state. It is agreed that the liquor sold in this case was wine made by the defendant and his partner in the state of New York. The defendant also contends that the words 'native wine' mean wine made in any of the states of this country, and that, therefore, he is not within the prohibition of the statute.
The general provisions and manifest policy of the statute, as well as the language of the section referred to, make it pretty plain that 'native wine' means wine made in Massachusetts. The statute is in effect here, and not elsewhere. Native wines are native in reference to the place to which the statute relates. There is no good reason why less harm would come to the community from unregulated sales of wine manufactured in other parts of the United States than from such sales of wine made in Europe or elsewhere. According to the statute, the prohibition does not apply 'to sales made at wholesale by the manufacturer thereof, or cider manufactured in this commonwealth, or the sale in any quantity by farmers who raise apples sufficient to make the cider which they sell, if it is not drunk on their premises'; nor 'to sales by the makers thereof of native wine or of cider manufactured in this commonwealth, if the cider does not contain more than three per cent. of alcohol, * * * not to be drunk on their premises.' These sales are only permitted to be made by farmers or makers of the wine or cider. The provision seems to be intended for the benefit of manufacturers of wine or cider produced in this commonwealth. We are of opinion that the wine sold by the defendant was not within the exception.
Under article 1, § 8, of the Constitution of the United States, Congress has the power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.' This power is exclusive of any right of the states to pass laws in respect to commerce among the states. Any attempt of a state, in the exercise of the police power, to exclude from its territory an article of commerce produced in another state, is unconstitutional and void as against the action of Congress under the supreme authority of the Constitution of the United States, securing free commercial intercourse among the people of the several states. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 10 S.Ct. 681, 34 L.Ed. 128. In reference to intoxicating liquors, see a later statute. 26 Stat. 313 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3177]. Also, In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 11 S.Ct. 865, 35 L.Ed. 572. As applied to statutes which seek to discriminate in favor of products of the legislating state against like products of other states, this principle has been established and enforced in many cases. Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 U.S. 123, 26 L.Ed. 103; Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 23 L.Ed. 347; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 25 L.Ed. 743; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 6 S.Ct. 454, 29 L.Ed. 691; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 26 L.Ed. 565; Hannibal & St. Joseph R. R. Co. v. Heusen, 95 U.S. 465, 24 L.Ed. 527. Such statutes are held to interfere with the legislative control of commerce by the Congress, and to be in violation of the section of the Constitution from which we have quoted. The principles stated in the cases above cited are applicable to the question now before us. A statute which discriminates in favor of the products of our own state by permitting the sale of them on terms more favorable than are granted for sales of similar articles produced in other states is plainly unconstitutional under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, which, upon a point of this kind, are controlling. That part of Rev. Laws, c. 100, § 1, which purports to make an exception in favor of sales of native wine and cider manufactured in this commonwealth is, therefore, void.
It remains to consider what effect, if any, the invalidity of this provision has upon...
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