Commonwealth v. Pitts
Decision Date | 27 August 1979 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, v. Arthur PITTS, Appellant. |
Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued April 24, 1979.
David Zwanetz, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Robert B. Lawler, Chief, Appeals Div., Asst. Dist. Atty., James Garrett, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before EAGEN C. J., and O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN JJ.
Appellant Arthur Pitts, was tried by a judge sitting with a jury for the homicide of Edward Carter on December 23, 1975. The jury found appellant guilty of murder of the third degree and possessing instruments of crime. Post-verdict motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to ten to twenty years in prison for the conviction of murder of the third degree and two and one-half to five years on the instruments of crime conviction, both sentences to be concurrent. This appeal followed. [1]
Appellant first argues the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain his conviction for murder of the third degree. This argument centers on appellant's belief the jury should have accepted defense testimony of voluntary intoxication, rather than the Commonwealth's evidence.
The facts surrounding this issue are as follows. On December 23, 1975, appellant and decedent, Edward Carter, were drinking alcoholic beverages during the day. The testimony indicates a quantity of wine and large quantities of whiskey were consumed by appellant, decedent and a mutual friend, "Mr. Lumpkin." At approximately 6:00 p. m., Roberta Johnson, decedent's paramour, helped decedent upstairs to the bedroom. Johnson's assistance was necessary as Carter was intoxicated. Both Carter and Johnson lie on the bed, Johnson watching television and Carter sleeping. Appellant entered the room, attempted to wake up Carter, and complained that Carter was involved with "his woman." During this argument, Johnson left the bedroom, but asked Lumpkin to go up to the bedroom to watch decedent and appellant. Upon her return to the bedroom, Johnson was asked by Lumpkin to call the police. She entered the room and saw Carter on the couch. He had sustained stab wounds of the stomach and leg, which caused his death. [2] As Johnson went to the house next door to call police, she noticed appellant leaving the house where the stabbing had occurred. She saw him drop a kitchen knife and then retrieve it. Subsequently, when the police arrived at the scene of the Carter slaying appellant returned to the house and attempted to conceal the knife in a flower pot. The knife was found by the police and it was later determined the knife had human blood on it. Appellant was then arrested. The arresting and interrogating officers both testified that although appellant's breath did smell of alcohol, his reflexes and ability to understand and discuss events surrounding the stabbing appeared unimpaired.
In Commonwealth v. Firth, 479 Pa. 333, 388 A.2d 683 (1978), this court reiterated the standard of appellate review in judging the sufficiency of the evidence:
A review of the Commonwealth's evidence reveals that evidence to be sufficient, if it is believed. The factfinder can believe all, part or none of the testimony.
Appellant next argues that the court below erred in failing to instruct the jury on the relationship of voluntary intoxication to the intent element of voluntary manslaughter.
The trial court charged:
"In the event you should be persuaded to entertain the question of finding the defendant guilty of only voluntary manslaughter, whether he might have been intoxicated would then be no part whatever of your reasoning, and you must as to that determination dismiss all evidence of his intoxication from your consideration." (N.T. 434).
The relevant statute, in effect at the time of this crime, stated:
"Intoxication or drugged condition are not, as such, defenses to a criminal charge; but in any prosecution for any offense, evidence of intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to negative an element of the offense." Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, eff. June 6, 1973. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 308. [3]
Section 308 makes clear that evidence of intoxication is relevant and admissible to negate an element of a crime.
In Commonwealth v. Mason, 474 Pa. 308, 378 A.2d 807 (1977), this court stated:
(Emphasis in original.)
In light of Commonwealth v. Mason, and the then applicable § 308 of the Crimes Code, the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on the relationship of voluntary intoxication and the specific intent requirement of voluntary manslaughter. However, the Commonwealth argues the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree.
The jury in the instant case found appellant guilty of murder of the third degree. Murder of the third degree is a killing done with legal malice but without specific intent to...
To continue reading
Request your trial