Commonwealth v. Platt
| Decision Date | 08 October 2003 |
| Citation | 440 Mass. 396,798 NE 2d 1005 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH vs. RAYSEAN L. PLATT. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Sosman, & Cordy, JJ.
Karen O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
William W. Adams for the defendant.
A District Court jury convicted the defendant, Raysean L. Platt, of leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage (G. L. c. 90, § 24 [2]), and of making a false report of a motor vehicle theft (G. L. c. 268, § 39). The defendant appealed from his convictions, claiming that (1) the trial judge erred in denying his motion for required findings of not guilty after the Commonwealth had rested; and (2) notwithstanding his failure to renew the motion, the convictions should be reversed because the Commonwealth's case had deteriorated between the time it rested and the conclusion of all the evidence.1 The Appeals Court reversed the convictions on the first ground and did not reach the second. Commonwealth v. Platt, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 264, 264 (2003). We granted the Commonwealth's application for further appellate review. Because we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979), was sufficient for the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the Commonwealth's case had not deteriorated between the time the Commonwealth rested and the close of all the evidence, we affirm the judgments of the District Court.
Facts. We summarize the facts as the jury could have found them, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Sanna, 424 Mass. 92, 93 (1997). Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 530 (1989). On June 21, 2000, at about 12:15 A.M., Pedro Pose, who resided at 187 Battles Street in Brockton, was roused from his sleep by his neighbors. He went outside and saw a vehicle on his front lawn "with the wheels up in the air" and considerable damage to his property. Pose did not see anyone except the neighbors and the police in or around the overturned vehicle.
At approximately 12:30 A.M., Officer William Healy of the Brockton police department arrived at the scene. On the front lawn of 187 Battles Street, the officer discovered a brown Ford Focus automobile with extensive front-end damage and a broken windshield. The officer also noticed serious damage to the lawn and the fence, a destroyed guardrail, and sidewalk damage in front of 187 Battles Street. The officer did not find any skid marks in the street, only on Pose's lawn.2 At about 6 A.M. on June 21, in response to a report of a stolen motor vehicle, Officer Healy went to the defendant's home at 21 Pleasantview Avenue. He found the defendant waiting for him outside. The officer noticed a small cut under the defendant's right cheekbone that looked "fairly recent," and an abrasion on the defendant's left elbow that appeared "fresh in nature."
The defendant told Officer Healy that his car had been stolen. The officer testified that the defendant appeared "extremely nervous," and his voice trembled and was barely audible. While speaking to the officer, the defendant looked down at the ground. When Officer Healy asked the defendant about the circumstances of the alleged theft, the defendant walked into the house and came back with his insurance policy. The defendant handed the policy to the officer, speaking inaudibly and in a way that did not make "much sense." Officer Healy told the defendant that he would return at another time to complete a stolen motor vehicle report.
The following day, Officer Healy returned to 21 Pleasantview Avenue at approximately 6 A.M. with a standard stolen motor vehicle report form. The defendant told the officer that his car was stolen at about 12:15 A.M. on June 21, 2000, while he was at a store on Centre Street in Brockton, the name of which he did not know. The defendant said that he left the engine running and the doors unlocked and, when he came out of the store, the car was gone. When asked why he waited five and one-half hours to report the theft to the police, the defendant gave no explanation.
Officer Healy then filled out the stolen motor vehicle report form that contained a conspicuous warning that false statements are punishable under the pains and penalties of perjury. The officer read the warning to the defendant and asked whether he understood what it meant. After the defendant indicated that he understood the warning, the officer handed the form to the defendant, asking him to read the warning. The defendant read the warning and signed the document in the officer's presence.3
On June 28, 2000, Robert Meyer, an investigator from the defendant's motor vehicle insurance company, interviewed the defendant at his house regarding an insurance claim the defendant had made based on the alleged theft and subsequent damage to the vehicle. The defendant told Meyer that on June 21, 2000, after midnight, the defendant and his girl friend had gone to a Shaw's supermarket for soda and light bulbs. They argued and, at a traffic light on Centre Street, the defendant's girl friend got out of the car. The defendant pulled over to the side of the street, shut off the car, left the keys in the ignition, and ran after her. When they later returned to the spot where the defendant had left the car, it was gone. The defendant assumed that the car was taken "as a joke"; he and his girl friend walked home. When asked why he waited until 6 A.M. to notify the police, the defendant explained that he "was having trouble with his telephone."
After the close of the Commonwealth's evidence, the defendant moved for required findings of not guilty; the judge denied the motion. The defendant then called two witnesses: his brother and coworker, Lemar Morello, and his girl friend, Eunice Rodrigues. Both witnesses presented evidence which was of an alibi nature.4 The defendant did not renew his motion for a required finding of not guilty at the close of all the evidence. Discussion.
1. Denial of motion for required findings of not guilty. The defendant argues that the judge erred in denying his motion for required findings of not guilty after the Commonwealth had rested, because no trier of fact could have rationally concluded that the defendant was driving his automobile at the time of the accident.5 We disagree. The defendant's contention essentially concerns the weight and credibility of the evidence, "a matter wholly within the province of the jury." Commonwealth v. Martino, 412 Mass. 267, 272 (1992).
a. The standard of review. The only issue raised by a motion for a required finding of not guilty is whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt to submit the case to the jury. Commonwealth v. Kelley, 370 Mass. 147, 150 (1976), and cases cited. In reviewing the denial of the motion, we consider the evidence, together with permissible inferences from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and "determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis supplied). Commonwealth v. Cordle, 412 Mass. 172, 175 (1992). See Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 140-141 (2001); Commonwealth v. Lodge, 431 Mass. 461, 465 (2000); Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). To make this determination, we look only to the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, and disregard any contrary evidence presented by the defendant. Commonwealth v. Lydon, 413 Mass. 309, 312 (1992). Commonwealth v. Kelley, supra.
Furthermore, in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we resolve all issues of credibility in favor of the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. James, 424 Mass. 770, 785 (1997).
A conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence alone, as long as that evidence is sufficient to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Dostie, 425 Mass. 372, 375 (1997). P.J. Liacos, M.S. Brodin, & M. Avery, Massachusetts Evidence § 4.2, at 115 (7th ed. 1999) (). The proper inquiry is "whether the evidence would permit a jury to find guilt, not whether the evidence requires such a finding" (emphasis supplied). Commonwealth v. Lydon, supra,
quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 401 Mass. 745, 747 (1988). The Commonwealth need not "exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" to prove its case, if the record viewed in its entirety supports "a conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."6
Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533-534 (1989), quoting United States v. Systems Architects, Inc., 757 F.2d 373, 377 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 847 (1985). If the evidence lends itself to several conflicting interpretations, it is the province of the jury to resolve the discrepancy and "determine where the truth lies." Commonwealth v. Lydon, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Martino, supra.
b. Sufficiency of the evidence. To support a conviction on the charge of knowingly leaving the scene of an accident involving property damage, the Commonwealth must present legally sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to conclude the defendant operated the motor vehicle at the time of the accident resulting in property damage. Here, both the defendant and Rodrigues admitted that the defendant was driving the car at midnight or shortly thereafter. The Commonwealth thus produced evidence that the vehicle had been operated by the defendant immediately prior to the accident. See Commonwealth v. Rand, 363 Mass. 554, 562 (1973).
The jury also heard testimony that the defendant had fresh cuts and abrasions consistent with having been in an accident. The defendant argues that this evidence...
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