Commonwealth v. Porta
| Decision Date | 07 April 1949 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. DELLA PORTA. COMMONWEALTH v. SBROGNA. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Kirk, Judge.
Anthony E. Della Porta and Vincent Sbrogna were convicted of buying, receiving and aiding in concealment of stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen, and they bring exceptions.
Exceptions sustained, verdict set aside.
Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS and WILLIAMS, JJ.
J. F. McAuliffe, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Boston, for the Commonwealth.
W. F. Marcella, of Boston, for defendant Sbrogna.
H. F. Callahan, of Boston, for defendant Della Porta.
In these cases, the defendants Della Porta and Sbrogna were charged with buying, receiving and aiding in the concealment of stolen goods, knowing the same to have been stolen, in violation of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 266, § 60. They were found guilty, and excepted to the denial of motions for a new trial based on the facts hereinafter stated.
After the jury had deliberated for nearly or quite eight hours, and were unable to agree as to the guilt of the defendants in these cases, one juror became ill. The officer in charge of the jury reported this to the judge, who directed the officer to dismiss the jury with a warning not to consult with anyone about the case before reporting to the court. The next morning the jury reported a verdict of guilty against a defendant tried with Della Porta and Sbrogna, and a disagreement as to them The judge asked any juror who had consulted with anyone about the case since the jury were dismissed to raise his hand. No juror raised his hand, and the judge said that he assumed that there had been no such consultation. The judge then directed the jury to resume their deliberations. The defendants Della Porta and Sbrogna excepted. After further deliberation of about five hours the jury brought in verdicts of guilty against Della Porta and Sbrogna, which were received and recorded.
By a familiar practice, in criminal cases, not capital, as well as in civil cases, the jury may be allowed to seal up their verdict and separate, when they agree during an adjournment of the court, and may come in and affirm the verdict at the next opening of the court. Lawrence v. Stearns, 11 Pick. 501;Commonwealth v. Costello, 128 Mass. 88;Commonwealth v. Walsh, 132 Mass. 8, 10;Commonwealth v. Heden, 162 Mass. 521, 39 N.E. 181. In civil cases, where the jury have separated without having agreed upon and sealed up a verdict they may be allowed to resume their deliberations after an interval, provided it clearly appears that the jurors have not discussed the case with others in the meantime. Mason v. Massa, 122 Mass. 477, 480;Spencer v. Williams, 160 Mass. 17, 19, 35 N.E. 88;Charles v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 230 Mass. 536, 542, 120 N.E. 69;Dziegiel v. Westford, 274 Mass. 291, 174 N.E....
To continue reading
Request your trial