Commonwealth v. Ramos

• Decision Date: 16 June 2003
• Citation: 827 A.2d 1195,573 Pa. 605
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Wilfredo RAMOS, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

827 A.2d 1195

573 Pa. 605

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Wilfredo RAMOS, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued October 23, 2002.

Decided June 16, 2003.

Reargument Denied July 31, 2003.

James S. Bruno, Philadelphia, for Wilfredo Ramos.

Catherine Marshall, Philadelphia, Karla Gebel Perrin, Amy Zapp, Harrisburg, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

BEFORE: ZAPPALA, C.J., and CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR and EAKIN, JJ.

OPINION

Justice NIGRO.

A jury found Appellant Wilfredo Ramos guilty of, inter alia, first-degree murder for shooting and killing James Crawford.¹ Following a penalty-phase hearing, the jury found one aggravating circumstance² and no mitigating circumstances and accordingly, returned a verdict of death. On January 11, 2000, the trial court formally imposed a sentence of death.³ Appellant filed timely post-trial motions, which the trial court denied. This direct appeal followed.⁴ For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Appellant initially contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder because the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was "inherently contradictory." Appellant's Br. at 12. As in all cases in which a death sentence has been imposed, this Court must review the evidence independently to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction for first-degree murder. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 454 A.2d 937, 942 n. 3 (1982). In doing so, we must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner in order to determine whether the jury could have found that every element of first-degree murder had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Spotz, 552 Pa. 499, 716 A.2d 580, 583 (1998).

Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for first-degree murder where the Commonwealth has established that the defendant acted with a specific intent to kill, that a human being was unlawfully killed, that the defendant committed the killing, and that the killing was deliberate. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d); Commonwealth v. Rios, 546 Pa. 271, 684 A.2d 1025, 1030 (1996). A specific intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant's use of a weapon on a vital part of the victim's body. Commonwealth v. Bond, 539 Pa. 299, 652 A.2d 308, 311 (1995).

The record below establishes that on October 11, 1998 at approximately 2:30 in the morning, James Crawford was standing in front of a bar at the corner of Lawrence and Indiana Streets in Philadelphia. Jeanine Davis, the girlfriend of Crawford's cousin, approached Crawford with the intent of procuring drugs from him. Crawford and Davis walked into a nearby abandoned house at the corner of Leithgow and Indiana Streets for the purpose of using drugs. When the two entered the house, Nick Cruz was inside. Meanwhile, Appellant and his half-uncle, Michael Centeno, drove up in a car and parked in the middle of Leithgow Street. Appellant and Centeno exited the car and walked toward the corner of Lawrence and Indiana Streets, where Crawford's friend Robert Kennedy was standing. As Appellant approached Kennedy, he asked Kennedy if anybody had any drugs. In response, Kennedy yelled for Crawford. Crawford told Davis and Cruz that he would be right back, and he left the house.

A few minutes later, Davis, who was standing inside the house, saw Appellant and Crawford together directly in front of the house.⁵ As Appellant began to walk away from Crawford, Davis heard Crawford yell, "Yo, man, give me my s—t." N.T., 12/27/1999, at 70. In response, she heard Appellant command Crawford to "[b]ack up." Id. Davis then saw Appellant turn around and shoot Crawford in the chest from about three feet away.

Once Crawford fell to the ground, Davis watched Appellant turn around in a circle and look around, which gave her a clear view of Appellant's face. She recognized Appellant from having previously seen him in the neighborhood. Davis then observed Appellant walk across the street and climb into the passenger seat of the car parked on Leithgow Street. The car sped away.

Davis subsequently gave a statement to police in which she described the shooter as a six-foot-tall Hispanic male with a thin build, about twenty to twenty-five years old, which is consistent with Appellant's physical description. Using these characteristics, police generated a line-up containing 106 different photographs. Out of this line-up, Davis selected two different photographs of Appellant and stated that he was the shooter.⁶

On November 17, 1998, Appellant was arrested and interviewed by police. Appellant gave a statement to police, admitting that he had been present at the shooting but accusing Centeno of robbing and shooting Crawford. According to Appellant's statement, as he was on his way to buy drugs at Lawrence and Indiana Streets, he ran into Centeno. When Centeno found out where Appellant was going, he decided to join him, telling Appellant that he was looking to "stick somebody up" and promising to split the proceeds of the robbery with Appellant. N.T., 12/28/1999, at 48 (testimony of Philadelphia Police Detective Richard Reinhold, in which he read Appellant's statement into evidence). Appellant claimed that on the way, Centeno showed him the gun he planned to use to commit the robbery, but Appellant contended that he did not know that Centeno was going to shoot anyone. Appellant also claimed that upon arriving at Lawrence and Indiana Streets, he bought a bag of heroin and four rocks of crack cocaine from Crawford and then walked away. Soon thereafter, according to Appellant, he heard a shot and saw Centeno running down Leithgow Street with a gun in his hand.

At Appellant's trial, Davis testified to what she saw in the early morning hours of October 11, 1998, and identified Appellant as the shooter. The Commonwealth also introduced Appellant's police statement into evidence to show that Appellant had admitted to being present during the shooting. Furthermore, Dr. Gregory Mc-Donald, a forensic pathologist, testified that Crawford died of a gunshot that was fired into his chest from point-blank range. Officer James Joyce, an expert in firearms identification, testified that the fatal bullet had been fired from a nine-millimeter or a thirty-eight-caliber handgun, which was consistent with the nine-millimeter cartridge case found by police at the scene of the shooting.

Given this record, we agree with the trial court that the evidence was clearly sufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction for first-degree murder. As detailed above, there was more than sufficient evidence presented at trial from which the jury could have concluded that Appellant deliberately fired a shot into Crawford's chest, a vital part of the body, and that the gunshot caused Crawford's death. See Bond, 652 A.2d at 310-11

(evidence was sufficient to establish first-degree murder where defendant deliberately fired a fatal shot into the victim's chest from close range).

Appellant argues, however, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his first-degree-murder conviction because the Commonwealth contradicted itself by having Davis identify Appellant as the shooter while also offering into evidence Appellant's statement, in which Appellant identified Centeno as the shooter. However, contrary to Appellant's assertion, the Commonwealth did not contradict itself. Rather, the record reveals that the Commonwealth introduced Appellant's statement into evidence for the limited purpose of showing that Appellant had admitted to being present at the scene of the shooting and therefore had the opportunity to commit the crime. Thus, Davis's identification of Appellant as the shooter did not in any way contradict the Commonwealth's use of Appellant's statement, and Appellant's insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim necessarily fails.⁷

In his second and third claims, Appellant essentially argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's jury...