Commonwealth v. Reynolds
| Decision Date | 10 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1908 MDA 2013,J-A12022-15,1908 MDA 2013 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. GEORGE THEODORE REYNOLDS, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
George Theodore Reynolds ("Reynolds") appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his convictions of twenty-five counts of sexual abuse of children - child pornography ("possession of child pornography"), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6312(d)(1). Following our review, we affirm.
The relevant facts underlying this appeal may be summarized as follows. Reynolds and his now-estranged wife, Doris, married in 2002. Shortly thereafter, Doris obtained custody of two of her grandchildren, who were three and four years old. Almost a decade later, in January 2011, an investigation into Reynolds began when a child that Reynolds and Doris used to babysit revealed to his mother that Reynolds had touched himinappropriately.1 The child's mother contacted Juniata County Children and Youth Services ("CYS") and informed CYS caseworker Karen Imes of her son's allegations and an investigation ensured. Ms. Imes interviewed Reynolds and Doris separately. Gretchen Swank of the Pennsylvania State Police was present for both interviews. During her interview, Doris revealed that that she caught Reynolds viewing pornography of teenaged boys on multiple occasions on a computer in their home. Based on this and other statements made by Doris, Trooper Swank secured a search warrant for Reynolds' home. As part of the search, the police confiscated three computers from the residence. Analyses of the hard drives revealed thirty-two images of suspected child pornography; specifically, images involving males who appeared to be underage. The investigation also turned up allegations of sexual assault from the granddaughter that lived with Reynolds and Doris as well as a male foster child that lived with them for approximately one year.
Reynolds was charged with three counts of aggravated indecent assault; thirty-two counts of possession of child pornography; and nine counts of indecent assault. Reynolds filed several pre-trial motions seeking, inter alia, suppression of the images obtained from the computers, severance of the charges, and dismissal of the charges for violation ofPa.R.Crim.P. 600. The trial court denied all motions and the case proceeded to a two-day jury trial. The jury acquitted Reynolds on all aggravated indecent assault and indecent assault charges, as well as seven counts of possession of child pornography. He was convicted of the remaining twenty-five counts of possession of child pornography. The trial court sentenced him to one to four months of incarceration on each count, resulting in an aggregate sentence of two years and one month to eight years and four months of incarceration. Reynolds filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.
Reynolds has raised the following issues for our review:
Reynolds first challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the items recovered during the execution of the search warrant, arguing that the warrant was invalid because it was not supported by probable cause.
Under the federal and state constitutional prohibitions of unreasonable searches and seizures, both the United States Supreme Court and Court have consistently held that, subject to certain exceptions, a search is constitutionally invalid unless it is conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by a neutral and detached magistrate and supported by probable cause. Mincey v. Arizona, [] 98 S.Ct. 2408, [] (1978); Commonwealth v. Jones, [] 988 A.2d 649, 655 ([Pa.] 2010). Probable cause exists where, based upon a totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit of probable cause, including the reliability and veracity of hearsay statements included therein, "there is a fair probability that ... evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Commonwealth v. Johnson, [] 42 A.3d 1017, 1031 ([Pa.] 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). ... On appeal, [c]ourt affirms the decision of the suppression court unless it commits an error of law or makes a factual finding without record support. [Commonwealth v.] Briggs, [] 12 A.3d [291,] 320.
Commonwealth v. Lyons, 79 A.3d 1053, 1063-64 (Pa. 2013).
Reynolds argues that Trooper Swank mischaracterized Doris' statement in the affidavit attached to the application for the search warrant and therefore impermissibly fabricated probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant. Reynolds points out that in her police report, Trooper Swank states that Doris observed Reynolds viewing pornography of "men" that appeared "teenaged" and "close to underage," whereas in the affidavit of probable cause, Trooper Swank stated that Doris reported observing Reynolds watching pornography of "young males[] ... who appeared to be in their teens." Reynold's Brief at 18-19. This is deficient, Reynolds contends, because Trooper Swank "didn't say the age and certainly did not say underage or child pornography." Id. at 21 (emphasis in the original). Reynolds argues that Trooper Swank took an equivocal statement and turned it into a more definitive declarative that Reynolds was viewing pornographic images of minors. More succinctly, "[Reynolds] asserts that had Trooper Swank used ... Doris' exact statement as set forth in TrooperSwank's police report, there was no probable cause to believe there was child pornography ... and the warrant would not have been issued." Id. at 22.
The trial court rejected this argument. It found that that Reynolds' argument was Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/14, at 2. We can find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination. We agree that Trooper Swank's statement as recorded in her police report is substantively the same as her statement in the affidavit of probable cause submitted with the warrant application.
We also find no merit to Reynold's claim that because Doris did not affirmatively state that she saw child pornography, the warrant was rendered deficient. See Reynolds' Brief at 19 () (emphasis in the original). The factual allegations in Trooper Swank's affidavit of probable cause were supported by statements recorded in her police report following her interview with Doris, and that statement was sufficient to establish a fair probability that evidence of a crime, specifically, possession of child pornography, would be found in Reynolds'home.3 This is all that was required for the warrant to issue. Lyons, 79 A.3d at 1064. There is no merit to this claim.
Reynolds next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance of the "two distinct type [sic] of cases set forth in the criminal information[.]" Reynolds' Brief at 25.
Commonwealth v. Mollett, 5 A.3d 291, 305 (Pa. Super. 2010) (emphasis added). Prejudice in this context is defined as "that which would occur if the evidence tended to convict appellant only by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid cumulating the evidence." Commonwealth v. Boyle, 733 A.2d 633, 637 (Pa. Super. 1999).
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