Commonwealth v. Rouse
Decision Date | 08 June 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 653 EDA 2017,653 EDA 2017 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Devin ROUSE, Appellant |
Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Devin Rouse, appellant, pro se.
Daniel P. Casullo, III, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Lawrence J. Goode, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
Appellant, Devin Rouse, appeals from the order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus ("Habeas Petition"), which the lower court treated as an untimely petition filed pursuant the Post–Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 – 9546. After careful review, we affirm.
The facts underlying Appellant's 2005 conviction for second-degree murder, robbery, carrying a firearm without a license, and possessing an instrument of crime are not germane to this appeal. After Appellant filed a direct appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on April 13, 2006, and our Supreme Court subsequently denied his petition for allowance of appeal from our decision. Commonwealth v. Rouse , 902 A.2d 981 (Pa. Super. 2006) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 589 Pa. 729, 909 A.2d 304 (2006).
Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on October 10, 2007, and appointed counsel filed an amended petition on his behalf on September 26, 2008. The PCRA court dismissed that petition without a hearing on March 5, 2009. This Court vacated that order, and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Rouse , 38 A.3d 925 (Pa. Super. 2011) (unpublished memorandum). That hearing occurred on January 27, 2014. Subsequently, the PCRA court granted Appellant's PCRA petition, ordering a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed. On January 12, 2016, this Court reversed the PCRA court's order, and our Supreme Court denied Appellant's petition for allowance of appeal from that decision. Commonwealth v. Rouse , 136 A.3d 1029 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied , 641 Pa. 603, 169 A.3d 30 (2017).
The instant matter began when Appellant filed his pro se Habeas Petition on September 13, 2016. Therein, he claimed that the sentencing statute for second-degree murder, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b), is void for vagueness, in violation of his due process rights under the Constitution of the United States and/or of this Commonwealth.1 Appellant also specifically averred in his Habeas Petition that his claim was not cognizable under the PCRA. Habeas Petition at 1–2.
The trial court, concluding that Appellant's claim asserted the illegality of his sentence, treated his Habeas Petition as a PCRA petition subject to the PCRA's timeliness provisions. Trial Court Opinion ("TCO"), 5/5/17, at 3–4. On that basis, the PCRA court determined that Appellant's petition was untimely, and that none of the PCRA's timeliness exceptions applied. As such, on November 10, 2016, the court issued notice, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, that it intended to dismiss Appellant's Habeas Petition without a hearing. Appellant did not file a response. On January 13, 2017, the trial court entered an order dismissing Appellant's Habeas Petition.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant did not file, and the PCRA court did not order him to file, a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on May 5, 2017.
Appellant now presents the following question for our review:
Did the lower court err in construing Appellant's state habeas corpus petition as a 2nd PCRA petition (and thereby time-barring it), when the PCRA statutes do not clearly state whether the issue presented is cognizable under the PCRA; whereas the writ of state habeas corpus may be sought to inquire into the cause of detention "under any pretense whatsoever[?"]
This Court's standard of review regarding an order denying a petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan , 592 Pa. 217, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (2007). We must begin by addressing the timeliness of Appellant's Habeas Petition, which was construed by the lower court as a PCRA petition, because the PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition. Commonwealth v. Bennett , 593 Pa. 382, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (2007). Under the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction relief, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the following exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii) applies:
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke one of these exceptions "shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Instantly, Appellant makes no argument that his Habeas Petition is timely under Section 9545(b)(1). Instead, he claims that the PCRA court erred by construing his Habeas Petition as a PCRA petition. Specifically, he asserts that his void-for-vagueness claim, directed at the sentencing provision for second-degree murder applied in his case, is not cognizable under the PCRA statute and, therefore, that the statute's timeliness provisions do not apply to his Habeas Petition. For the following reasons, we agree.
Section 9542 provides, in pertinent part, that:
This subchapter provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus....
42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (emphasis added). Appellant correctly notes that this provision exists in tension with the eligibility-for-relief provisions of the PCRA statute. Section 9543 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a) (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that the Appellant's Habeas Petition satisfies Section 9543(a)(1), as Appellant is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment. However, the only provisions of Section 9543(a)(2) that might arguably pertain to sentencing claims which, like the one presented by Appellant in his Habeas Petition, do not also pertain to matters of underlying guilt or innocence, are Sections 9543(a)(2)(vii) and (viii). As the jurisdiction of trial/sentencing court is not in question, that leaves only Section 9543(a)(2)(vii), which permits relief under the PCRA statute for claims involving the "imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(vii). Appellant asserts that the void-for-vagueness claim set forth in the Habeas Petition (essentially a due process claim), does not posit that his sentence exceeds the lawful maximum for second-degree murder and, therefore, is not a claim that is eligible for relief under the PCRA statute.
The trial court does not indicate in its opinion why it construed Appellant's void-for-vagueness argument as an illegal-sentencing claim that is cognizable...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Commonwealth v. Moore
...Appellant argues the Superior Court's opinion in this case is at odds with its opinion, issued a few months prior, in Commonwealth v. Rouse , 191 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2018). In Rouse , the appellant had filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus , arguing his sentence for second degree murder......
-
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez
...that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(b)(2)(i) ; see Commonwealth v. Rouse , 191 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2018), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Moore , 247 A.3d 990, 997-98 (Pa. 2021) ("[B]ecause [Rouse's] constitutional......
-
Commonwealth v. Parker
...this matter in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. However, this Court may affirm a PCRA court's order on any legal basis. See Commonwealth v. Rouse , 191 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2018) ("To the extent our legal reasoning differs from the [lower] court's, we note that as an appellate court, we may affir......
-
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 2233 EDA 2020
... ... what specifically about the statute Appellant contends is ... vague that "undermined the truth-determining process ... that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could ... have taken place." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(b)(2)(i); ... see Commonwealth v. Rouse , 191 A.3d 1, 7 (Pa. Super ... 2018), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v ... Moore , 247 A.3d 990, 997-98 (Pa. 2021) ("[B]ecause ... [Rouse's] constitutional challenge to [the sentencing ... statute for second-degree murder] does not implicate his ... ...