Commonwealth v. Moore

• Decision Date: 25 March 2021
• Docket Number: No. 14 EAP 2019,14 EAP 2019
• Citation: 247 A.3d 990
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Ingram MOORE, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

247 A.3d 990

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Ingram MOORE, Appellant

No. 14 EAP 2019

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted: May 27, 2020

Decided: March 25, 2021

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY

We granted review in this case to determine the propriety of raising a claim in a habeas corpus petition that the sentencing statute under which Appellant was sentenced is unconstitutionally vague, or if such a claim is properly considered an illegal sentence claim cognizable solely under the mandates of the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).¹ After careful consideration, we determine such a claim is an illegal sentence claim and must be brought in a PCRA petition.

On April 17, 1995, a jury convicted Appellant, Ingram Moore, of murder in the first degree and possession of an instrument of a crime² for the September 18, 1993 murder of Kevin Levy. The specific facts surrounding Appellant's conviction are not relevant to the issues currently before us. Pertinent to the issues before us, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for first degree murder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a).³ Appellant appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed his judgment of sentence, and this Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Moore , 701 A.2d 780 (Pa. Super. 1997) (unpublished memorandum), allocatur denied 550 Pa. 702, 705 A.2d 1306 (1997). Accordingly, Appellant's judgment of sentence became final on March 7, 1998 when his time to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. Appellant filed a federal Writ of Habeas Corpus in United States District Court on September 23, 1999, which was dismissed as time-barred. Appellant had not filed any state post-conviction petitions until the present actions.

In April 2015, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum in the civil division of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. The petition alleged Appellant was being held illegally because the State Correctional Institute at Mahony, where he is incarcerated, did not have a copy of his signed sentencing order. After his petition was transferred to the criminal trial division, Appellant filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus adding a claim that his continued incarceration violated the Eighth Amendment of the United State Constitution's bar against cruel and unusual punishment and violated his due process rights. Appellant's petition lay dormant until he filed a Motion to Compel Disposition on March 12, 2016. Appellant then filed another Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on April 15, 2016 raising a claim that his continued incarceration was illegal as the statute he was sentenced under was unconstitutionally vague for failing to give defendant notice that a sentence of life imprisonment meant without parole.⁴ Having received no response to his petitions, on October 4, 2016 Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and/or Extraordinary Relief with this Court. This Court granted Appellant's petition, to the extent it was for a Writ of Mandamus, on November 30, 2016 and directed the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County to adjudicate Appellant's filing within ninety days. Moore v. Court of Common Pleas Phila. County , 116 EM 2016 (per curiam Order 11/30/16).

At some point, although the timing is unclear from the record, the trial court appointed counsel to represent Appellant regarding his petitions. Appointed counsel analyzed Appellant's habeas petitions under the PCRA and concluded Appellant did not have any meritorious claims. Counsel subsequently filed a Finley⁵ letter on April 18, 2017, requesting to withdraw based on this determination. The trial court issued a notice of intent to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P 907 on April 21, 2017, and Appellant filed a reply on May 6, 2017. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed Appellant's petitions on May 31, 2017 "pursuant to the [PCRA]." Trial Court Order, 5/31/17. Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal.

The Superior Court, in a unanimous unpublished memorandum, affirmed the trial court's dismissal and held the trial court correctly viewed Appellant's petitions for habeas relief as petitions for post-conviction relief under the PCRA. In making this determination, the Superior Court noted a writ of habeas corpus is properly considered a PCRA petition if the issue raised is cognizable under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Moore , 2018 WL 4326691, at *1 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum) (citing Commonwealth v. West , 595 Pa. 483, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (2007) ). The panel further noted the issue of the legality of a petitioner's sentence is a cognizable PCRA claim. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Burkett , 5 A.3d 1260, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2010) ). The court determined Appellant's petitions attacked the legality of his sentence "as [Appellant] contended it was imposed without legal authority" and were therefore properly considered PCRA petitions. Id. Appellant's petitions were untimely and therefore the trial court properly dismissed them as it did not have jurisdiction to address the substantive issues raised in the petitions. Id. We granted Appellant's request for allowance of appeal to address the following questions:

a. Did the lower court abuse its discretion in turning the State Writ of Habeas Corpus into a PCRA petition, then time barring the petition?

b. Does the Superior Court panel's opinion in question conflict with another Superior Court panel on the same legal question of PCRA cognizability?

Commonwealth v. Moore , 214 A.3d 232 (Pa. 2019) (per curiam).⁶

Appellant's challenge to the Superior Court's determination that his vagueness claim is an illegal sentence claim cognizable under the PCRA raises a purely legal question and, as such, our review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Parrish , 224 A.3d 682, 689 (Pa. 2020). A claim a petitioner is serving an illegal sentence is cognizable under the PCRA, as long as the claim is raised in a timely petition. Commonwealth v. Fahy , 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999). Historically, an illegal sentence claim was limited to a claim that a sentence exceeded the maximum sentence prescribed by law or was imposed by a court lacking jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. DiMatteo , 644 Pa. 463, 177 A.3d 182, 192 (2018). Over the years, however, the definition of what constitutes an illegal sentence has expanded.

In order to address Appellant's claims that the Superior Court erred in addressing his petitions under the PCRA, it is necessary to begin with the language of the PCRA statute. The scope of the PCRA statute is set forth, in pertinent part:

This subchapter provides for an action by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief. The action established in this subchapter shall be the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9542.

To be eligible for relief a petitioner's conviction or sentence must be the result of one of the following:

(i) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.

(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place.

(iii) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent.

(iv) The improper obstruction by government officials of the petitioner's right of appeal where a meritorious appealable issue existed and was properly preserved in the trial court.

(v) Deleted

(vi) The unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence that has subsequently become available and would have changed the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced.

(vii) The imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful maximum.

(viii) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2).

We will address both of Appellant's issues together as they are intertwined. Appellant argues the Superior Court's opinion in this case is at odds with its opinion, issued a few months prior, in Commonwealth v. Rouse , 191 A.3d 1 (Pa. Super. 2018). In Rouse , the appellant had filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus , arguing his sentence for second degree murder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(b)⁷ violated his due process rights because the statute was unconstitutionally vague as it did not make clear to a reasonable person that a sentence of life imprisonment is without the possibility of parole. The trial court determined appellant's claim implicated the legality of his sentence and therefore construed appellant's habeas petition as a petition for post-conviction relief under the PCRA. Rouse filed his petition outside of the PCRA's timeliness requirements, and none of the timeliness exceptions applied, so the trial court determined it did not have jurisdiction to address appellant's petition and dismissed it. Rouse , 191 A.3d at 4. On appeal, in considering if the trial court correctly construed appellant's habeas petition as a PCRA petition, the Superior Court looked at the PCRA's eligibility for relief requirements set out in Section 9543(a)(2). In doing so it found

[T]he only provisions of Section 9543(a)(2) that might arguably pertain to sentencing claims which, like the one presented by [a]ppellant in his Habeas Petition, do not also pertain to matters of underlying guilt or innocence, are Sections 9543(a)(2)(vii) and (viii).

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