Commonwealth v. Russell

• Decision Date: 25 April 1892
• Citation: 30 N.E. 763,156 Mass. 196
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. RUSSELL.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

156 Mass. 196

30 N.E. 763

COMMONWEALTH v. RUSSELL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

April 25, 1892

COUNSEL

Geo C. Travis, for the Commonwealth.

Frank M. Davis and Chas. F. Spear, for defendant.

OPINION

BARKER, J.

It is an established exception to the rule forbidding proof of collateral facts that in prosecutions for forgery and for uttering forged paper proof is admissible, in order to show an intent to defraud by the forgery, and also to show knowledge on the part of the accused with reference to the particular document which he is charged with uttering, that at or near the time of committing the alleged offense he had passed or had in his possession other similar forged documents. Com. v. Miller, 3 Cush. 243, 250; Com. v. Stone, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 43, 47; Rex v Ball, Russ. & R. 132; Rex v. Wylie, 1 Bos. & P (N.R.) 92; Rex v. Smith, 2 Car. & P. 633; Sunderland's Case, and other cases, 1 Lewin, Cr.Cas. 102-104; Rex v. Whiley, 2 Leach, 983; Com. v. White, 145 Mass. 392, 395, 14 N.E. 611. The admission of such evidence is necessary, because guilty knowledge is a fact not susceptible of proof by direct evidence, and can rarely be shown by explicit admissions, but only by acts and conduct. Intent to defraud often sufficiently appears from the circumstances of the transaction, where its immediate and necessary effect is to defraud; but there are many cases of the false making of instruments which have no such necessary effect, and in which the fraudulent intention must be proved by other and collateral circumstances. Although the introduction of such evidence compels the defendant to meet acts not charged, and may lead the jury to convict of one crime upon proof of another, it is admitted when the occasion arises. Com. v. Stone, ubi supra; Com. v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 173, 206. This doctrine is a branch of a more general exception, which, when knowledge or intent must be proved, allows evidence of acts not in issue, but which tend to show such knowledge or intent,--as in the trial of indictments for passing counterfeit money, ( Com. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472, 476; Com. v. Hall, 4 Allen, 302;) for obtaining goods upon false pretenses, (Com. v. Stone, ubi supra;) for embezzlement, (Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 216; Com. v. Miller, 3 Cush. 250; Com. v. Tuckerman, ubi supra; Com. v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575;) and for adultery, (Com. v. Merriam, 14 Pick. 519, 520.) As said by BIGELOW, C.J., in Com. v. Shepard, ubi supra, "it is essential to the rights of the accused that when such evidence is admitted it should be carefully limited and guarded by instructions to the jury, so that its operation and effect may be confined to the single legitimate purpose for which it is competent." In the case at bar the defendant was tried upon an indictment charging him with the forgery of a check upon a bank, purporting to be drawn to his order by one Andrews, and, in a second count, with uttering the same check, knowing it to have been forged. It was shown that when arrested he had three other checks upon the same bank, payable to his own order, one of which purported to be drawn by Andrews; and evidence, consisting in part of his own alleged confessions, was admitted, subject to his exception, tending to show that the checks found upon him, and also two others passed by him about the same time as the one set out in the indictment, were forgeries. Under the principle above stated, all the evidence excepted to was competent, both to show his knowledge that the check set out in the indictment was forged, and that his purpose in the forgery and the uttering was to defraud. It is to be presumed that correct and appropriate instructions, to enable the jury to make a proper application of the evidence, were given. Com. v. Shepard, 1 Allen, 575, 582; Adams v. Nantucket, 11 Allen, 203, 205.

Reserving for the present the questions raised as to the alleged confessions, these considerations require us to overrule the other exceptions to the admission of evidence, and also to...