Commonwealth v. Salter

• Decision Date: 04 August 2015
• Docket Number: No. 653 MDA 2014,653 MDA 2014
• Citation: 121 A.3d 987,2015 PA Super 166
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Stephanie J. SALTER, Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

121 A.3d 987

2015 PA Super 166

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant

v.Stephanie J. SALTER, Appellee.

No. 653 MDA 2014

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Dec. 10, 2014.

Filed Aug. 4, 2015.

Reargument Denied Oct. 14, 2015.

Stephanie E. Lombardo, Assistant District Attorney, York, for Commonwealth, appellant.

Timothy M. Barrouk, Harrisburg, for appellee.

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STABILE, JJ.

Opinion

OPINION BY STABILE, J.:

The Commonwealth appeals from the March 17, 2014 order of the Court of Common Pleas of York County granting Appellee, Stephanie J. Salter's, motion to suppress evidence obtained following a traffic stop. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In relevant part, the trial court summarized the facts and the procedural history of the case as follows:

In the early morning hours of September 21, 2013, Officer Corey Sheaffer was on routine patrol when he observed that the vehicle ahead of him did not have lights illuminating the license plate.¹ To confirm his suspicion that the lights were in fact not working, Officer Sheaffer turned off his headlights, which “confirmed” his suspicion. At this point, Officer Sheaffer decided to conduct a traffic stop on the vehicle. After the vehicle pulled over, Officer Sheaffer approached the vehicle and spoke with the driver, who he identified as [Appellee]. [Appellee] provided the officer with all necessary documentation, and it was at this point that the officer ... “noticed an odor of intoxicating beverage emanating from inside the vehicle.” Along with the smell, Officer Sheaffer observed [Appellee]'s eyes were glassy and bloodshot, which prompted him to ask [Appellee] how much she had had to drink. [Appellee] admitted that she had two glasses of wine.... At this point, the officer asked [Appellee] to submit to four field tests[.² ] ... After [Appellee] performed all four tests, Officer Sheaffer placed [Appellee] under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/14, at 2–3 (citations to the record omitted).

After the magisterial district court bound over all charges,³ the trial court conducted a hearing on Appellee's motion to suppress evidence. Following the hearing, the trial court found the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop,⁴ but it suppressed the evidence of the Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) test because the officer did not have probable cause to arrest Appellee for driving under the influence (DUI). The Commonwealth timely appealed.⁵

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court, in addition to reiterating the propriety of the suppression of the BAC test result, also added, for the first time, that the officer lacked probable cause to conduct a traffic stop for Appellee's failure to have her vehicle's license plate illuminated.

On appeal, the Commonwealth raises the following issues:

1. Did the suppression court err in reversing its earlier order in its 1925(a) opinion?

2. Did the suppression court err in granting [Appellee]'s omnibus pre-trial motion by finding that the initial stop was not supported by probable cause?

Appellant's Supplemental Brief at 4.⁶

We do not need to address the first issue because we conclude the trial court erred in finding the officer did not have probable cause to stop Appellee.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court, in concluding that the officer did not have probable cause to conduct a traffic stop, reasoned as follows:

In the present case, Officer Sheaffer testified that while he was behind [Appellee]'s vehicle he noticed that her license plate was not illuminated. To confirm that the lights were in fact not working, Officer Sheaffer turned off his headlights, which he testified, did “confirm” his suspicion. However on cross-examination, Officer Sheaffer testified that he was approximately 75 feet behind [Appellee] when he decided to pull her over for failing to have her license plate illuminated. This type of violation requires no further investigation after the stop.

Section 4303 of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code requires that license plate lamps be operational “in conformance with [ ] regulations of the [Department of Transportation].” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303(b). The applicable regulation of the Department requires that if a vehicle is equipped with a license plate lamp, it “shall emit white light and make the registration plate visible from a distance of 50 feet to the rear of the vehicle. ” 67 Pa.Code § 175.66(k).... There is no requirement that the lamp itself be visible from a distance of 50 feet. As stated above, Officer Sheaffer estimated that he was 75 feet behind [Appellee] when he initiated his traffic stop. There is no testimony in the record that Officer Sheaffer verified that the license plate did not illuminate the license plate closer than 75 feet.

Accordingly, we conclude that the record does not contain testimony which would support a finding of probable cause to stop [Appellee]'s vehicle for the violation of failing to have a license plate illuminated.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/5/14, at 5–6 (citation to Notes of Testimony omitted) (emphasis in original). We disagree.

Our standard of and scope of review in suppression matters is well-settled:

When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an appellate court is required to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and whether the inferences and legal conclusions drawn by the suppression court from those findings are appropriate. Because Appellee prevailed in the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the defense and so much of the evidence for the Commonwealth as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error. However, where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, “[t]he suppression court's conclusions of law ... are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.” As a result, the conclusions of law of the suppression court are subject to plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Dean, 940 A.2d 514, 516 (Pa.Super.2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

In Pennsylvania, the authority that addresses the requisite cause for a traffic stop is statutory and is found at 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b), which provides:

(b) Authority of police officer. —Whenever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). In Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285 (Pa.Super.2010) (en banc ), this Court, consistent with our Supreme Court's clarification of constitutional principles under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, stated with respect to § 6308(b) :

In light of our Supreme Court's interpretation of the current language of Section 6308(b), we are compelled to conclude that the standards concerning the quantum of cause necessary for an officer to stop a vehicle in this Commonwealth are settled; notwithstanding any prior diversity on the issue among panels of this Court. Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion: either of criminal activity or a violation of the Motor Vehicle Code under the authority of Section 6308(b) must serve a stated investigatory purpose. (footnote and citation omitted).

* * *

Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the suspected violation. In such an instance, “it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code. ” [Commonwealth v.] Gleason , 785 A.2d [983,] 989 [ (Pa.2001) ] (citation omitted)[, superseded by statute, Act of Sept. 30, 2003, P.L. 120, No. 24, § 17 (amending 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) ) ].

Id. at 1290–1291 (emphasis added in Gleason ). Accordingly, when considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code has occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary to further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding and DUI. If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because when a vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon a highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Compare Commonwealth v. Enick, 70 A.3d 843, 846 (Pa.Super.2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to drive on right side of...