Commonwealth v. Samuel Carver.

• Decision Date: 15 May 1916
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. SAMUEL CARVER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

224 Mass. 42

COMMONWEALTH v. SAMUEL CARVER.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 15, 1916

March 21 1916.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., LORING, BRALEY DE COURCY, & PIERCE, JJ.

Practice, Criminal Exceptions, Appeal, Trial together of two indictments against same defendant. Larceny, By false pretences. Evidence Relevancy and materiality, Competency. Pleading, Criminal Indictment.

Where, after the trial of an indictment and the return of a verdict of guilty, no sentence is imposed and stayed under R.L.c. 220, Section 3, and no report is made by the presiding judge under R.L.c. 219, Section

34, exceptions saved by the defendant at the trial cannot be brought before this court by a bill of exceptions.

Where, at the trial of an indictment for larceny, there is evidence tending to show that the defendant represented to one, from whom he was seeking a loan of money on a promissory note, that persons whose names were on the note as maker and indorsers were of good standing, that the representations were believed and were false, that the names were written upon the note by the defendant himself and that the money was paid to the defendant and would not have been paid but for the misrepresentations, a finding is warranted that the defendant procured the money by false pretences, which is larceny within the provisions of

R.L.c. 208, Section 26; St. 1910, c. 378, Section 2.

Where at the trial of an indictment for larceny, the Commonwealth contends and introduces evidence tending to show that the defendant procured money from the complaining witness by false representations as to the good standing of persons whose names were on a certain promissory note as maker and indorsers and by imitating their handwriting, and the question, whether the witness relied on the representations or relied only on the signature of the defendant as an indorser, was material, and after the witness in cross-examination has testified in effect that he did not make up his mind to make any loan until the defendant signed the note, the witness may be asked in redirect examination, "whether or not you would have parted with your money . . . if" the defendant "had not made the representations to you," the subject matter of the inquiry being material and the form of question being permissible within the discretion of the presiding judge.

Where, at such trial, the defendant admits that all the handwriting on the note is his own, but contends that he was authorized by the persons whose names were thereon to use their names, evidence is admissible to show that the defendant attempted to imitate the handwriting of such persons, such evidence being competent to show a guilty purpose to deceive and defraud, and therefore being relevant.

In the same case it was held, that one of the persons whose name was on the note was a competent witness to testify as to whether the signature purporting to be his looked like his handwriting.

Under R.L.c. 218, Sections 38, 67, an indictment charging that the defendant "did steal money" is a sufficient indictment for larceny by false pretences.

Whether one, who is the defendant in two indictments, one charging the forging and uttering of a promissory note and the other the larceny of money, where it appears that the money alleged to have been stolen was procured by false representations as to the good standing and signatures of persons whose names were written upon the note by the defendant, is entitled to a separate trial on each indictment, was not decided in the present case, where it appeared that the defendant consented to be tried on both indictments at one trial.

TWO INDICTMENTS, found and returned on March 6, 1915, the first charging the defendant in two counts with forging a promissory note and the second charging that he "did steal money," in amount $925, "one piece of paper" of that value, "of the property of one Hyman Slessinger."

The defendant consented to be tried on both indictments at one trial, and was tried before Irwin, J.

There was evidence tending to show that Slessinger gave the defendant $925, being induced to do so by representations of the defendant as to the good standing of the persons purporting to be the signers, other than himself, of the following promissory note: "$2000.00 Boston, July 21, 1914.

Three months after date I promise to pay to the order of Louis W. Reycroft Two Thousand 1/100 Dollars. Payable at any bank in Boston.

Value received. James F. Kennedy P. O. Box 1113, Boston. (On back)

Waiving demand and notice Louis W. Reycroft Joseph P. Logue Samuel Carver."

The defendant admitted that all the handwriting and signatures upon the note were in his handwriting.

Slessinger, in cross-examination, testified that he had seen the defendant frequently and knew he was a lawyer for eight or ten years and did not make up his mind to make any loan until the defendant signed the note. In redirect examination, subject to an exception of the defendant "to both the form and the substance," he was asked "whether or not you would have parted...