Commonwealth v. Sansone

• Decision Date: 22 April 1925
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. SANSONE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

252 Mass. 71

147 N.E. 574

COMMONWEALTH

v.SANSONE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

April 22, 1925.

Exceptions from Superior Criminal Court, Suffolk County.

Joseph A. Sansone was convicted of so driving an automobile that lives and safety of the public might be endangered, and he excepts. Exceptions overruled.

G. Alpert, Asst. Dist. Atty., of Boston, for the Commonwealth.

E. Adlow, of Boston, for defendant.

SANDERSON, J.

[1][2][3] The defendant was convicted of so driving an automobile that the lives and safety of the public might be endangered. The testimony offered by the commonwealth tended to prove that an automobile, while being driven by the defendant in Adams Square, Boston, at the rate of 30 miles an hour, hit a woman who was crossing the street. Subject to the exception of the defendant, the daughter-in-law of this woman was permitted to testify that the condition of her mother-in-law, as to her ability to walk, her hearing and eyesight, was good. The questions called for no expert opinion, but for such information as is obtained by ordinary observation. Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122, 19 Am. Rep. 401. It was competent for the commonwealth to prove all the circumstances, including the condition, movements and conduct of the person injured. Commonwealth v. Vartanian (Mass.) 146 N. E. 682. The testimony also was proper for the consideration of the jury in connection with that of the defendant offered later, that the woman walked into the left mud guard of the automobile. The other exception to the admission of evidence not having been argued is treated as waived.

[4] Counsel for the defendant in cross-examining a witness called by the commonwealth, asked:

‘Did you discuss this case with any one since the accident?’

Upon objection by the district attorney, counsel stated, in reply to an inquiry by the court, that his purpose in asking the question was to show that the witness had assisted the government in looking for witnesses and in prosecuting the case, and to disclose that the witness was prejudiced. The trial judge excluded the question. The defendant then asked the witness:

‘Did you speak to a newsboy in Adams Square with reference to this case?’

[5] Upon the statement of counsel for the defendant that that question was asked for the same purpose, the judge excluded it. The credit to be given a witness to material facts is not merely collateral, and reasonable cross-examination for the purpose of proving the falsity of his testimony or bias or prejudice on his part has been held to be a matter of right. Day v. Stickney, 14 Allen, 255;Stevens v. Stewart-Warner Speedometer Corp., 223 Mass. 44, 111 N. E. 771;Commonwealth v. Russ, 232 Mass. 58, 79, 122 N. E. 176. The answers to the two questions asked would not in themselves have a tendency to show either of these things, and upon the offer of proof it is not possible to determine what facts counsel expected to bring out, and whether they, if established, would have a tendency to prove interest or prejudice. The offer did not suggest that the witness was employed or asked by the commonwealth to assist in the case; that he had any pecuniary interest in it, nor that he had expressed any ill will toward the defendant. It did not appear from the offer that the witness said anything to any one who did or could assist the commonwealth, and the witness was not asked if he had assisted the commonwealth in any way. The offer was broader than the questions and in large part not responsive to them. Hallwood Cash Register Co. v. Prouty, 196 Mass. 313, 315, 82 N. E. 6. The only witnesses called were the witness being cross-examined, the daughter-in-law who accompanied the woman who was injured, the defendant,...