Commonwealth v. Sego

• Decision Date: 27 August 1878
• Parties: Commonwealth v. John F. T. Sego
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

125 Mass. 210

Commonwealth v. John F. T. Sego

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

August 27, 1878

[Syllabus Material]

Suffolk. Indictment in five counts, charging the defendant with larceny of certain goods, the property of George E Rogers, in a certain building, to wit, the shop of said Rogers. The first count charged the larceny on May 1, 1877, of 100 dishes and 275 baskets; the second count, the larceny on June 6, 1877, of 240 plates 600 bowls and 300 pitchers; the third count, the larceny on July 10, 1877, of 50 dishes 860 teapots and 9 clocks; the fourth count, the larceny on September 5, 1877, of 100 dishes and 275 baskets; and the fifth count, the larceny on October 3, 1877, of 100 dishes and 275 baskets.

At the trial in the Superior Court, before Aldrich, J., the government, for the purpose of proving a confession made by the defendant to Rogers, in whose employ he was, called Rogers as a witness, who testified in substance that, after the defendant had been arrested and given bail, the witness sent for him, invited him into his private office, with one Adams, a salesman, and began the conversation by saying to the defendant, "I am satisfied that there are other receivers whom we have not yet discovered. I should like to have you make a clean breast of this matter, as Williams (an accomplice) has done;" that the defendant, who was nineteen years of age, confessed that he had, during the time covered by the several counts of the indictment, stolen from the shop of Rogers, at different times, large quantities of the goods described in the indictment; that he had taken silver ware and clocks from the shop in his pockets, and sold them to pawnbrokers for a trifle, and had taken from the shop baskets of crockery ware and other articles, of the kind described in the different counts of the indictment, to a certain house in Boston, and there he and Williams always divided the proceeds, when either assisted the other in a larceny; that some of his thefts were committed jointly with Williams, and others he committed alone; but he fixed no particular occasion of larceny, either by date or otherwise.

Adams, who was called as a witness by the government, substantially corroborated Rogers. The defendant seasonably objected to the admission of the confession, on the ground that such an inducement had been held out as to render it incompetent.

Rogers further testified that he had lost large quantities of goods such as were described in the several counts of the indictment; that the defendant had taken them, and that some of the goods had been recovered by him from two of the receivers named by the defendant; but he admitted that he knew of the loss of the goods only "by estimation," and not of his own knowledge, and that he knew of the defendant's acts only by the confession, and by what others had told him.

Williams, who had been sentenced, was called by the government, and testified that he and the defendant had for a period of some months, at various times, stolen from the shop of Rogers such goods as were described in the several counts of the indictment, but he did not fix any particular occasion of larceny. The defendant objected to the admission of his testimony on the ground that it was too general.

This was all the evidence to show that a larceny had been committed. There was no question raised as to the ownership and value of the property described, nor as to the fact that it was stolen in the shop of Rogers, if stolen at all. The defendant offered no evidence, and asked the judge to rule as follows: "1. That the evidence does not warrant a conviction upon any count, because no particular act of larceny is proved. 2. That the evidence, for the same reason, does not warrant a conviction upon more than one count. 3. That the evidence warrants no verdict of a greater offence than simple larceny upon any count. 4. That there is no evidence which will warrant a verdict of guilty upon any count of the indictment."

The judge refused so to rule; and instructed the jury that, "if they found from the evidence, including the confession of the defendant, that he had, on five different occasions within the period covered by the several counts, stolen articles described in the several counts of the indictment respectively, they would be authorized to render a verdict of guilty, and not otherwise."

The jury returned a verdict of guilty; and the defendant alleged exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

G. C. Bent, for the defendant.

C. R. Train, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth.

Lord, J. Colt & Soule, JJ., absent.

OPINION

Lord, J.

The statutes of this Commonwealth determine what shall be deemed aggravations of larceny. Gen. Sts. c. 161. By §§ 18, 21, the degree of punishment is fixed by the amount stolen. Section 16 provides the penalty for stealing from a building on fire, or property removed in consequence of an alarm of fire. Section 15 prescribes the punishment for stealing "in a building, ship or vessel." The amount stolen is not material under the last section cited. In this case the bill of exceptions states that at the trial "there was no question raised as to the ownership and value of the property described, nor as to the fact that it...