Commonwealth v. Smith, 681 CAP

• Citation: 131 A.3d 467
• Decision Date: 21 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 681 CAP,681 CAP
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Wayne A. SMITH, Appellant.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

131 A.3d 467

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Wayne A. SMITH, Appellant.

No. 681 CAP

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Nov. 18, 2014.

Decided Dec. 21, 2015.

William Patrick Wismer, Esq., for Wayne A. Smith.

William R. Toal III, Esq., John Joseph Whelan, Esq., Delaware County District Attorney's Office, Amy Zapp, Esq., PA Office of Attorney General, for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, STEVENS, JJ.

OPINION

Justice EAKIN

.

Appellant appeals from the judgment of sentence of death imposed by a jury following the grant of a new penalty-phase hearing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

On November 18, 1994, Eileen Jones and appellant went to appellant's nephew to borrow a car; the nephew gave him the keys, and appellant and Jones left together in the car. Appellant returned the car later that evening.

The next afternoon, appellant told his brother he murdered Jones in a nearby park by choking her with his hands and belt. Jones's body was discovered November 22, 1994; the county medical examiner concluded the death was homicide by strangulation. After a search of appellant's home, police officers recovered several newspapers from which articles regarding the recovery of Jones's body had been removed.

Appellant was given Miranda¹ warnings and waived his rights. He stated he borrowed his nephew's car to purchase drugs, and Jones agreed to have sex with him in exchange for the drugs. Appellant and Jones went to a park, and appellant attempted to have sex with her. Appellant stated he choked Jones to death because he was concerned she would accuse him of rape. He disposed of her body in a nearby creek.

A jury found appellant guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. Appellant appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction and the sentence. Commonwealth v. Smith, 548 Pa. 65, 694 A.2d 1086, 1096 (1997)

. Appellant then filed a pro se petition under the Post–Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq., and counsel was appointed. Following a hearing, the PCRA court denied the petition. We affirmed the denial of guilt-phase relief, but vacated the death sentence and remanded for a new penalty-phase hearing on the grounds that counsel provided ineffective assistance. Commonwealth v. Smith, 606 Pa. 127, 995 A.2d 1143, 1173 (2010). At that 2012 penalty-phase hearing, a jury sentenced appellant to death after finding the aggravating circumstance of a prior voluntary-manslaughter conviction,² 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(12), outweighed the mitigating circumstances of appellant's emotional distress, id., § 9711(e)(2), and abusive childhood, id., § 9711(e)(8). Appellant timely appealed to this Court, raising the following claims of error:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying [a]ppellant's motion to bar the death penalty, after a delay of some 17 years, brought on ineffective assistance of counsel, during which valuable information was lost and defense witnesses died[.]

II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of [a]ppellant's prior homicide conviction[.]

III. Whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony that [a]ppellant read books on murder and how to commit the perfect crime[.]

IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying [a]ppellant a mistrial where the Commonwealth expert witness told the jury that [a]ppellant had been found guilty and place[d] on death row[.]

V. Whether the trial court erred in ordering the jury to resume deliberations after the jury stated it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict[.]

VI. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing [a]ppellant to ask prospective jurors whether they could consider life imprisonment knowing [a]ppellant had been convicted of a prior homicide[.]

Appellant's Brief, at 4.

I. Motion to Bar the Death Penalty

Appellant contends the trial court committed legal error and abused its discretion by denying his pre-trial motion to bar the death penalty. He notes 17 years have passed from his May 1995 conviction to final sentencing in June of 2012, which, he argues, violated his rights to due process and a speedy trial. Further, he argues this delay amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Article I, § 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution

. Appellant states several of his potential witnesses died between the 2002 PCRA proceedings and the 2012 new penalty-phase hearing. Moreover, appellant asserts Detective Lawrence Crews, who investigated the victim's death in appellant's 1980 voluntary-manslaughter case, could not recall certain facts regarding that conviction, depriving him of details which would have been helpful to the defense.

The trial court found appellant's argument was a matter of first impression and looked to other jurisdictions for guidance. Specifically, the trial court looked to State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994 (Ind.2007)

, where the Supreme Court of Indiana applied the balancing test used by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), to determine whether the defendant's rights to a speedy trial and due process were violated. In Azania, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to death, but the case was remanded for a new penalty-phase hearing. Azania, at 997. At the new penalty-phase hearing, 13 years after conviction, the jury returned a death sentence, which was affirmed. Id. The death sentence was again vacated, and, at the new penalty-phase hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to bar the death penalty. Id. The state appealed. Id.

The Supreme Court of Indiana, applying the Barker³ test, held the 13–year delay did not prejudice the defendant or violate his due process rights. See Azania, at 1005, 1010. The court noted any prejudice suffered by the defendant due to the passage of time did not rise to the level of violating due process. Id., at 1010

. The defendant had the opportunity to present evidence, and the jury could consider any impact the passage of time had on a witness's ability to testify.

Here, the trial court likewise applied Barker, and found the delay did not prejudice appellant or violate his due process rights. Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 6–12. The court focused much of its analysis on the fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant.

Addressing appellant's claim that he was prejudiced by the delay because multiple witnesses died through the passage of time, the court found he did "not specify which [potential witnesses] would have testified ... on his behalf." Id., at 8. Further, appellant did not describe any additional testimony they would have provided to assist him. Id. The court noted the testimony of these individuals was preserved by transcripts, which were read to the jury. Id. "[W]ithout more specific allegations as to what testimony was eliminated by the passage of time, the mere general allegation that the read transcripts from prior testimony was not as powerful as live testimony is insufficient to establish sufficient prejudice to [appellant]." Id., at 8–9.

The trial court also addressed appellant's claim that witnesses could not recall helpful details regarding his 1980 voluntary manslaughter conviction. See N.T. Sentencing, 6/18/12, at 80–82. Specifically, Detective Crews could not recall specific actions he took during that investigation. See id., at 87–88. The court concluded appellant again did not offer any specific mitigating information that was not provided by Detective Crews's testimony. Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 10. Appellant merely claims the detective's loss of memory prejudiced him, without discussing how any unstated information would have benefitted the defense.

The trial court made the same conclusion regarding the testimony of Sonya Rollins, the sister of the victim in the 1980 homicide. In particular, Rollins could not recall specifics surrounding her brother's death. See N.T. Sentencing, 6/18/12, 46–47, 50, 58–59. The court held a more "vivid recollection of the more horrific aspects of the underlying crime" would not have "assisted [appellant] in any manner." Trial Court Opinion, 7/29/13, at 10. Appellant made no specific arguments regarding any mitigating evidence that was lost, and the court found no prejudice.

The trial court also found appellant's complaint that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated was without merit, holding "the Eight[h] Amendment does not protect against delaying a sentence of death because those delays are designed to afford a defendant his constitutional right to appeal and cannot become grounds for an additional appealable issue." Id., at 10–11 (citing People v. Simms, 192 Ill.2d 348, 249 Ill.Dec. 654, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1141 (2000)

). The court noted appellant invoked his right to appeal and continued those appeals on multiple occasions. Id., at 12. "Therefore, [appellant]'s complaint that the delay in his sentencing violates his due process rights, as well as his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments is unsubstantiated." Id.

After careful review, we affirm the trial court's decision regarding this issue. Prior testimony was preserved, absences and lapses in memory have not been shown to involve identifiable exculpatory, mitigating, or even helpful information, and in the end, appellant has not demonstrated legal prejudice. A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and the scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Brown, 617 Pa. 107, 52 A.3d 1139, 1162 (2012)

(citations omitted). Upon such review, we affirm the determinations and ruling of the trial court.

Additionally, appellant asserts he was prejudiced by the length of time he has spent on death row. Appellant has been on death row for over 18 years, and he argues his time spent there waiting to be executed constitutes a "wanton infliction of harm in violation of the Eight[h] Amen...