Commonwealth v. Snook

• Decision Date: 06 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 1198 MDA 2019,1198 MDA 2019
• Citation: 230 A.3d 438
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Joshua Michael SNOOK, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

230 A.3d 438

COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee

v.Joshua Michael SNOOK, Appellant

No. 1198 MDA 2019

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted January 13, 2020

Filed March 6, 2020

Joshua Michael Snook, appellant, pro se.

Brian L. Kerstetter, Assistant District Attorney, Middleburg, Commonwealth, appellee.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KING, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

OPINION BY KING, J.:

Appellant, Joshua Michael Snook, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Snyder County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").¹ We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On February 17, 2013, Appellant's wife, Jennifer Snook, drove Appellant to his grandparents' home to retrieve a gun to shoot an individual with whom Appellant had argued that evening. While in his grandparents' home, Appellant fatally wounded

his grandmother with a knife and cut the arm and/or wrist of his grandfather. On March 20, 2014, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder and a nolo contendere plea to aggravated assault and conspiracy to commit murder. In exchange, the Commonwealth agreed to, inter alia : (i) the entry of nolle prossequi on all remaining charges; (ii) permit Appellant to communicate with his wife, who had been charged as a co-defendant in the case, after sentencing; and (iii) recommend an aggregate term of twenty (20) to sixty (60) years' incarceration. The court accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and imposed the negotiated sentence on April 23, 2014. The sentencing order included a provision permitting Appellant to correspond with his wife. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. Subsequently, co-defendant Mrs. Snook also entered a guilty plea and received a sentence of incarceration for her role in the events of February 17, 2013.

Appellant timely filed pro se his first PCRA petition on April 24, 2015. On April 28, 2015, the PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended PCRA petition on July 23, 2015. In the amended petition, Appellant asserted plea counsel had rendered ineffective assistance for, inter alia , inducing Appellant to enter into an unenforceable plea agreement. Specifically, Appellant averred it was impossible for him to communicate with his wife after sentencing due to a Department of Corrections ("DOC") policy prohibiting communication between co-defendants. The PCRA court conducted an evidentiary hearing on October 13, 2015.

On March 29, 2016, by agreement of the parties, the PCRA court: (i) deemed plea counsel ineffective for advising Appellant to enter a plea agreement which included a term that was impossible to fulfill; (ii) vacated the April 2014 judgment of sentence; (iii) and ordered resentencing. That same day, Appellant entered a new negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder and nolo contendere plea to aggravated assault and conspiracy to commit murder. The terms of the parties' new plea agreement omitted the provision allowing for communication with co-defendant Mrs. Snook, and included the Commonwealth's agreement to a reduced sentence of sixteen (16) to sixty (60) years' incarceration. After conducting a new oral plea colloquy on the record, the court accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and imposed the new negotiated aggregate sentence of sixteen (16) to sixty (60) years' incarceration. Following sentencing, the court informed Appellant of his post-sentence and appellate rights. Appellant, however, filed no post-sentence motions or direct appeal.

On March 30, 2017, Appellant timely filed pro se his first PCRA petition from the March 29, 2016 judgment of sentence. The PCRA court appointed new counsel on April 3, 2017. On July 12, 2017, Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition, asserting original PCRA counsel was ineffective during the March 29, 2016 plea proceedings because counsel failed to, inter alia , object to the plea colloquy as insufficient where neither the court nor counsel had explained the mens rea for malice.

On June 15, 2018, again by the parties' agreement, the PCRA court vacated the March 2016 judgment of sentence based on the deficient plea colloquy. Appellant then entered a new negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder and nolo contendere plea to aggravated assault and conspiracy to commit murder. As part of the new plea agreement, the Commonwealth agreed, inter alia , to a reduced aggregate sentence of twelve (12) to forty (40) years' incarceration, and to return Appellant's personal property. In exchange, Appellant expressly waived: (i) his right to appeal from the new judgment of sentence; and (ii) any future PCRA claims. Following a new oral plea colloquy, the court accepted the plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and resentenced Appellant to an aggregate twelve (12) to forty (40) years' incarceration, per the plea agreement. The sentencing order memorialized the terms of the parties' plea agreement, in relevant part, as follows:

9. It is hereby additionally ordered that as part of this sentence the following:

9.1. [Appellant] has waived his right to appeal this sentence and has additionally waived all of claims with respect to the filing of petitions for Post-Conviction Relief in regard to his entire criminal case.

9.2. The Commonwealth shall return to [Appellant] the following items of personal property after the expiration of the 30-day appeal period from this sentence:

His wallet, his Social Security card, his keys seized from his home filing cabinet, his birth certificate, and two iPhones.

(Sentencing Order, filed June 15, 2018). Appellant filed no post-sentence motions or direct appeal.

On June 11, 2019, Appellant timely filed pro se the current PCRA petition, which was his first petition from the June 15, 2018 judgment of sentence. In his petition, Appellant asserted several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant also complained the Commonwealth failed to comply with the June 15, 2018 plea agreement, because it had not returned Appellant's personal property. On June 28, 2019, the court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 ; Appellant responded pro se on July 9, 2019. On July 12, 2019, the PCRA court denied Appellant's petition as an untimely serial PCRA petition filed from the original April 2014 judgment of sentence. Appellant filed pro se a timely notice of appeal and a voluntary concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on July 22, 2019.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN REJECTING [APPELLANT'S] CLAIM THAT THE COMMONWEALTH IS IN BREACH OF APPELLANT'S

PLEA AGREEMENT AND SENTENCING ORDER OF JUNE 15, 2018?

DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S PCRA [PETITION] AS "UNTIMELY" AS IT WAS FILED WITHIN ONE YEAR OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE OF JUNE 15, 2018?

DID THE PCRA COURT ERR/ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO HOLD AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE APPELLANT RAISED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT WOULD ENTITLE HIM TO RELIEF?

DID THE PCRA COURT ERR IN FAILING TO APPOINT PCRA COUNSEL AND ORDERING AMENDMENT OF APPELLANT'S CLAIMS?

DID THE PCRA COURT ERR WHEN FAILING TO ADDRESS/CORRECT THE MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE RESULTING FROM COMMONWEALTH'S BREACH OF APPELLANT'S PLEA AGREEMENT AND SENTENCING ORDER?

DID THE PCRA COURT ERR, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WHEN FAILING TO REACH THE MERITS OF APPELLANT'S REMAINING CLAIMS THAT ARE NOW RESURRECTED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, DUE TO THE COMMONWEALTH'S BREACH OF APPELLANT'S PLEA AGREEMENT AND SENTENCING ORDER?

(Appellant's Brief at 4).

For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant's issues. Appellant argues his current PCRA petition is a first, timely petition filed from the June 15, 2018 judgment of sentence. Appellant contends the PCRA court erred when it failed to appoint PCRA counsel and hold an evidentiary hearing. Appellant avers plea counsel was ineffective for, inter alia , inducing Appellant into entering unknowing and unintelligent pleas where counsel should have investigated Appellant's intoxication on the night at issue as a possible defense. Appellant also maintains the Commonwealth breached the June 15, 2018 plea agreement when it failed to return Appellant's personal property, which was an express term of the parties' agreement. Appellant concludes this Court should reverse the denial of PCRA relief and remand for further proceedings. We agree some limited relief is due.

Preliminarily, a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence is final "at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).

A petition for collateral relief will generally be considered a PCRA petition if it raises issues cognizable under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin , 554 Pa. 547, 553, 722 A.2d 638, 640 (1998) ; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating PCRA shall be sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for same purpose). The plain language of the PCRA mandates that claims which could be brought under the PCRA, must be brought under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. Hall , 565 Pa. 92, 96-97, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (2001). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii) (stating claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable under PCRA).

"On the other hand, a collateral petition to enforce a plea agreement is regularly treated as outside the ambit of the PCRA and under the contractual enforcement theory of specific...