Commonwealth v. Spiropoulos
| Decision Date | 28 February 1911 |
| Citation | 208 Mass. 71,94 N.E. 451 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH SAME v. SPIROPOULOS. SAME v. DELOREY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
John J. Higgins, Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.
J. A E. Moroney, for defendant Spiropoulos.
Frank McDermott, for defendant Delorey.
The defendants, who were jointly indicted and tried for the murder of Annie Mullins, took numerous exceptions to the proceedings, but Mantir having been convicted in the second degree, and Delorey of manslaughter, they prosecute only those relating to the admission in evidence of the opinions of medical experts that, from the nature and location and the mortal wounds, the deceased did not commit suicide, and to the refusal of the court to rule that certain statements made by Mantir while under arrest charged with the crime could not be considered by the jury as proof of his guilt. We take up the questions in the order of their presentation at the argument.
The cause of death was not open to conjecture. When the body was discovered, her throat was found to have been slashed in front with some sharp instrument which passed through almost to the spinal column, completely severing the gullet and jugular vein. It being undisputed that the deceased was left-handed, and to rebut any possible inference that the homicide was suicidal, the medical examiners who conducted the autopsy, and a physician who viewed the body, and heard their testimony of the details, and whose qualifications were unquestioned, having been called by the government, were permitted to testify that, from the character, depth and direction of the wounds, they could not have been self-inflicted. Com. v. Johnson, 188 Mass. 382, 385, 386, 74 N.E. 939. It is generally recognized that in questions involving a knowledge of science and the arts, or where technical qualifications and professional skill are in issue, opinion evidence is admissible, while ordinary events associated with daily life are presumed, because of their experience, to be understood by the jury without the assistance of experts. Flynn v. Boston Electric Light Co., 171 Mass. 395, 50 N.E. 937; Edwards v. Worcester, 172 Mass. 104, 51 N.E. 447; Meehan v. Holyoke Street Railway, 186 Mass. 511, 72 N.E. 61; Wolfe v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 189 Mass. 591, 76 N.E. 222; Whalen v. Rosnosky, 195 Mass. 545, 81 N.E. 282, 122 Am. St. Rep. 271; Doherty v. Booth, 200 Mass. 522, 86 N.E. 945; Walker v. Williamson, 205 Mass. 514, 91 N.E. 885. It is, of course, true that the value of such evidence must differ in degree according to the nature of the inquiry, yet in the department of medicine and surgery such testimony often is of much importance, and a wide range of inquity is usually permitted. The medical experts from their attainments in anatomy, united with the experimental knowledge acquired from study and observation of the effect of blows or wounds upon the human body, were peculiarly well fitted to express an opinion, whether the left hand and arm of the deceased could have been so moved as to have been sufficient in scope, and power, to have produced a blow, causing a would of the severity and dimensions found on the deceased. The facts upon which their opinion rested seem to have been satisfactorily made out, and the jury were absolutely free to give to this evidence such weight as their judgment approved. We cannot assume that the experience or knowledge of the jurors as intelligent men versed in ordinary affairs must have been so varied and extensive that they would not be instructed, and aided, by this testimony, and to its admission no exception lies. Flaherty v. Powers, 167 Mass. 185; 44 N.E. 1074; Com. v. Piper, 120 Mass. 185; Com. v. Sinclair, 195 Mass. 100, 80 N.E. 799; Com. v. Porn, 195 Mass. 443, 81 N.E. 305; s. c., 196 Mass. 326, 82 N.E. 31, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 94; State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11, 130; Taylor v. Monroe, 43 Conn. 36, 44; State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 A. 1110, 27 L. R. A. 498, 48 Am. St. Rep. 202.
The objection to the admission in evidence as to what was said by the defendants when confronted at the police station, which in view of the gravity of the crime, the government concedes may be treated as exceptions duly saved, and the exceptions to the refusal to rule in the language requested, that 'inasmuch as none of the answers made by the defendant * * * Mantir at the station house * * * had any tendency to show guilt on his part, and as all of his answers were explicit denials of guilt of any and all charges made against him, none of the statements made by * * * Delorey in his alleged confession made in his presence, and implicating the said * * * Mantir, are admissible against him,' is pressed only by...
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