Commonwealth v. Sutton
| Decision Date | 20 March 1969 |
| Citation | 214 Pa.Super. 148,251 A.2d 660 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Willie SUTTON, Appellant. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Melvin Dildine, Chief, Appeals Div., Herman I. Pollock, Defender Philadelphia, for appellant.
Edward G. Rendell, Asst. Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Asst. Dist Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Arlen Spector, Dist. Atty Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before WRIGHT, P.J., and WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, JACOBS, HOFFMAN SPAULDING and HANNUM, JJ.
The appeal is quashed.
On February 10, 1947, appellant escaped from Holmesburg Prison, Philadelphia County, where he was serving a sentence for robbery. Shortly thereafter, he was indicted, in absentia, for prison breach pursuant to the Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 309, as amended, 18 P.S. § 4309, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. This warrant was never served, however, as appellant escaped detection until 1952. At that time, he was convicted and sentenced for robbery in New York where he had been captured. He has been incarcerated in New York until the present time. Subsequent to his capture, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1952, filed a detainer in New York based on the indictment for prison breach. Appellant is now eligible for parole in New York, but the detainer lodged against him prevents his release. Accordingly, appellant petitioned the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County to quash the outstanding indictment which supports the New York detainer. The lower court refused and this appeal followed.
Appellant maintains that the indictment should be quashed because the Commonwealth had denied him his right to a speedy trial. He bases this claim on rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and enunciated in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers of which both Pennsylvania and New York have been signators since 1959. Specifically, he argues that the Commonwealth had the opportunity from 1952 to 1959 to secure his presence from New York under the doctrine of comity between the States and from 1959 until the present time under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers. The Commonwealth's failure to do so over a period of seventeen years was without reasonable justification and constitutes a denial of his right to a speedy trial.
The majority has refused to consider this claim. Instead, it has quashed this appeal presumably because it is considered interlocutory. This conclusion, however, conflicts with the Commonwealth's position. In its brief, the Commonwealth apparently concedes that this appeal is properly before us. It does not argue this procedural aspect and instead addresses itself exclusively to the merits of appellant's contention.
I believe that this appeal is not interlocutory, and to quash it at this time would work substantial prejudice to appellant.
It is true that as a '' Commonwealth v. Fudeman, 396 Pa. 236, 152 A.2d 428 (1959).
'Such exceptional circumstances arise (1) where an appeal is necessary to prevent a great injustice to the defendant, or (2) where an issue of basic human rights is involved, or (3) where an issue of great public importance is involved.' (citations omitted) Commonwealth v. Swanson, 424 Pa. 192, 225 A.2d 231 (1967). In such instances, procedural delay in a criminal case, which is justified only as serving the orderly administration of the judiciary, will not be tolerated.
In the instant case, appellant has been incarcerated for the past seventeen years. Throughout that period, the Commonwealth has consciously chosen not to prosecute him, even though it has had the power to do so. This delay, appellant claims, has denied him his basic right to a speedy trial which now has the collateral effect of preventing his release on parole in New York. To quash the appeal at this time will result in an interminable, vexatious and unfair delay. Assuming, arguendo, that appellant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, this additional delay, when added to the seventeen years which have elapsed, would compound the damage already done to appellant to an intolerable and inhumane degree. Since appellant's claim is not frivolous on its face, he is entitled to have as rapid a determination of this question as is now possible.
Moreover, appellant's claim raises a dramatic constitutional issue as well as a question of statutory interpretation, both of which are matters of first impression in our state courts. It is apparent, therefore, that a speedy determination of the questions raised is in the public interest, and that we should consider the merits of appellant's claim. Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, 108 A.2d 780 (1954).
The Commonwealth has to date offered no justification for its failure to request appellant's extradition from New York for purposes of trying him on the outstanding indictment. Instead, it contends that it was under no duty, constitutional or otherwise, to do so.
This position, however, is repugnant to the policy enunciated in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers of which both Pennsylvania and New York are Signators. Act of September 8, 1959, P.L. 829, No. 324, § 1, 19 P.S. § 1431. The Act provides that any signator may extradite a prisoner in another signator state for the purposes of trying the prisoner on outstanding indictments against him. In clear language, Article I of the Act provides that
Towards that end, Article IV of the Act provides that '(t)he appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available (by that party state).'
Once the prisoner is extradicted, Article IV(c) states that he must be tried within 120 days of his arrival in the receiving state. If the state fails in this duty, then Article V(c) provides that the 'appropriate court of the (state) where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order, dismissing the same With prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.' (Emphasis added)
It is apparent, therefore, that the Detainer Act contemplates that a state will seek extradition of prisoners in another state expeditiously in order to bring them to a speedy trial on outstanding indictments against them. If a state extradites a prisoner and then fails to prosecute him within 120 days, the detainer and outstanding indictment against him are quashed With prejudice. Similarly, if the state refuses to seek extradition within a reasonable time, it should also follow that the outstanding indictment and detainer against him should be quashed, with prejudice. This result is mandated by the legislative purpose expressed in Article I requiring prosecutors to proceed on outstanding indictments as quickly as possible in order to promote 'prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.'
Moreover, the Commonwealth's position is antithetical to that recently enunciated in Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607 (filed January 20, 1969). In Smith, the United States Supreme Court held that the right of a speedy trial extends to a prisoner in one jurisdiction who has been indicted in a second jurisdiction if the second jurisdiction has the power, by agreement or treaty...
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Com. v. Sutton
...251 A.2d 660 ... 214 Pa.Super. 148 ... COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ... Willie SUTTON, Appellant ... Superior Court of Pennsylvania ... March 20, 1969 ... Melvin Dildine, Chief, Appeals Div., Herman I. Pollock, Defender, Philadelphia, for appellant ... Edward G. Rendell, Asst. Dist. Atty., James D. Crawford, Asst ... ...