Commonwealth v. Tompkins

• Decision Date: 12 April 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–P–700.,12–P–700.
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Daniel P. TOMPKINS.
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

83 Mass.App.Ct. 1124
985 N.E.2d 413

COMMONWEALTH
v.
Daniel P. TOMPKINS.

No. 12–P–700.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts.

April 12, 2013.

By the Court (GRASSO, TRAINOR & CARHART, JJ.).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28

The defendant appeals from his conviction in a jury-waived trial of two counts of vehicular manslaughter arising out of an automobile crash. The crux of the defendant's argument at trial was that he was not the driver of the car when it careened off the road. Accordingly, the defendant argues on appeal that his motion for required findings of not guilty incorrectly was denied because the blood samples taken from the driver's seat area matched another occupant of the car. He also argues that the judge erred by not ruling on the voluntariness of the defendant's statements to police and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress those statements. We affirm

Motion for required findings of not guilty. “We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Rabb, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 194, 208–209 (2007). According to the defendant, Jeffrey Blake's testimony that the defendant was the driver was wholly inconsistent with the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis showing that Blake's bloodstains were found around the driver's seat. The defendant therefore argues that because the evidence supported two equally logical possibilities on the identity of the driver, the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. To support his argument, the defendant relies on Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 40 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Woods, 382 Mass. 1 (1980), two cases where an appellate court determined that the jury's conclusions were irrational. In Vaughn, supra at 43, we said:

“Normally we would look to the jury to weigh the identification testimony against the evidence offered to support a defense. To avoid the conviction of a possibly innocent person, however, it is necessary that there be an exception to that general rule. The exception would include cases which involve evidence indicative of innocence in the form of documents, photographs, or other physically-verifiable items, which an appellate court is in a position equal to that of the jury to consider.”

The defendant claims that the blood evidence is similar to the documentary evidence in Vaughn and Woods. In those cases, however, there was uncontroverted documentary evidence that the respective defendants could not have been the perpetrators of the crimes with which they were charged. See Woods, supra at 5–8; ¹Vaughn, supra.² The placement of bloodstains is not the same type of documentary evidence that necessarily controverts the witnesses' testimony and allows us, as an appellate court, to review the evidence de novo. Contrast Woods, supra; Vaughn, supra. Therefore, it was left to the judge, in his role as fact finder, to assess the weight and the credibility of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005) (“If, from the evidence, conflicting inferences are possible, it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies, for the weight and credibility of the evidence is wholly within their province”).

The judge made extensive findings on the record, explaining why he credited some evidence and discredited other evidence. For instance, he gave no weight to the bloodstains because, in a car crash of this magnitude, common sense dictates that blood would be present throughout the car cabin.³ He also discredited the testimony of the defendant's witnesses regarding the alleged steering-wheel-shaped bruise on Blake's chest. Therefore, the case ultimately was decided on whether the judge chose to give more credibility to Blake or to the defendant. The judge chose to believe Blake's testimony, and we cannot say that his decision was irrational.

Voluntariness of...