Commonwealth v. Toolan
| Decision Date | 23 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | SJC-11589 |
| Citation | 490 Mass. 698,194 N.E.3d 674 |
| Parties | COMMONWEALTH v. Thomas E. TOOLAN, Third. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Michelle Menken, for the defendant.
Elizabeth A. Sweeney, Assistant District Attorney, for the Commonwealth.
Present: Budd, C.J., Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, & Georges, JJ.
This case is before the court on the defendant's direct appeal from his convictions of murder in the first degree and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon in the stabbing death of Elizabeth Locktefeld, his former girlfriend, on October 25, 2004. Locktefeld was found dead on the floor of her home in Nantucket, having been stabbed twenty-three times, a few days after she ended her relationship with the defendant due to what she described as his excessive consumption of alcohol.
In this appeal, the defendant raises a number of challenges to the jury instructions given and the absence of requested instructions. He maintains that the judge should have clarified the legal definition of "mental disease or defect" after the Commonwealth's expert testified inappropriately by referencing a statutory definition, and that the absence of a clarifying instruction created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The defendant argues also that the judge's instructions did not adequately explain the difference between a lack of criminal responsibility and diminished capacity, such that the jury might not have understood that, if they found the defendant had been criminally responsible, they nonetheless could find the defendant had had a diminished capacity at the time of the stabbing. In addition, the defendant contends that it was error to instruct the jury that they could infer malice from the intentional use of a dangerous weapon. The defendant also maintains that the judge abused his discretion in not instructing the jury, as the defendant requested, to consider whether the defendant was incapable of resisting the urge to use drugs or alcohol, and thus that any knowledge the defendant might have had about the effect of intoxication upon his mental conditions should not have been considered in the determination whether the defendant had had a mental impairment at the time. Finally, the defendant asks us to exercise our extraordinary authority to grant him relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Having carefully reviewed the arguments and the record, we discern no error warranting a new trial and no reason to exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or to reduce the degree of guilt. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions.
1. Background. a. Facts. The jury could have found the following. In the fall of 2004, the defendant was living in New York City, where he had grown up, and the victim was living in Nantucket, where she had moved from New York earlier that year. On September 4, 2004, a mutual friend introduced the defendant and the victim to each other. Shortly thereafter, they began dating; the relationship deepened very quickly, such that the defendant and the victim were discussing marriage. Over the course of a few days in late October of 2004, however, while the victim was visiting the defendant in New York, the relationship degenerated rapidly, due to the defendant's excessive drinking. On around October 23, 2004, the victim ended the relationship for that reason, removed her belongings from the defendant's apartment, and returned to her home in Nantucket.
On October 23, 2004, the defendant called a long-time friend, Mark Mitchell, from a bar. The defendant sounded confused, and his speech was slurred. Mitchell was concerned and went to the bar, where he found the defendant drinking vodka. The defendant went to the rooftop of the building and threatened to commit suicide. Mitchell convinced him to come down from the roof and took the defendant to an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. After the meeting, the defendant purchased two bottles of vodka from different stores. Mitchell took each bottle from him. Mitchell brought the defendant to the defendant's apartment, and there the defendant fell asleep.
The next day, on October 24, 2004, the defendant went to LaGuardia Airport and purchased a one-way ticket to Nantucket. He was detained while going through security before boarding the plane because he had placed a large kitchen knife in a security bin, along with his coat and carry-on luggage, where it was detected by a scanner. Airport security officials noted that the defendant's breath smelled of alcohol, his eyes were glassy, his speech was slurred, and he appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. When asked about the knife, the defendant gave four differing reasons for having brought it with him. The defendant was issued a summons for possessing a knife with a blade more than four inches in length. He then went to a bar at another terminal.
The following day, October 25, 2004, the defendant returned to LaGuardia Airport and again purchased a ticket to Nantucket. This time, he successfully boarded the plane. When he reached Nantucket, he rented a bright-colored sport utility vehicle (SUV) and drove to a surf shop. He asked a salesperson where the scallop knives were kept. The salesperson told the defendant that the store did not sell any knives, and directed him to a nearby marine store. There, the defendant purchased two scallop knives and a longer, sheathed knife with an orange handle.
The defendant then drove to the victim's cottage, which was located on the same property as the main house where the landlord lived. He parked across the street, at an angle that partly obstructed passing traffic. He approached the landlord, who was working outside in the yard, and asked whether the victim was home. Although the landlord had just spoken to the victim and had seen her go inside the cottage, the defendant's appearance concerned her, and she replied that she did not know. The defendant headed to the cottage, where the door was standing open and the shades were not drawn. The defendant entered and, during an encounter that left blood on the walls, floor, and furniture in several rooms, stabbed the victim twenty-three times in the torso, chest, back, nose, arms, and hands. Before he left the cottage, the defendant pulled the shades and closed the door. He discarded a beer bottle and a vodka bottle outside the kitchen door. He drove back to the airport, where he left the rental SUV,1 and flew to Hyannis, where he rented another vehicle and started driving toward New York.
Shortly after the defendant left the cottage, the victim's landlord noticed that the curtains were drawn and the door was shut, contrary to the victim's usual practice. Concerned, the landlord telephoned the victim's brother. The brother called 911 and asked police to conduct a wellness check. After officers found the victim's bloodied body, the brother assisted them in obtaining the defendant's full name and address, and they issued an alert to look for the defendant's rental vehicle. The defendant was located by Rhode Island State police driving on Route 95 in Rhode Island. While troopers were following the defendant's vehicle to an exit where they had set up a roadblock, the defendant drove appropriately, without crossing any marked lanes and without speeding. When he was stopped at the roadblock, the defendant appeared lethargic and bewildered; he was unable to follow officers’ commands to unlock the driver's door. The defendant was arrested on suspicion of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and taken to the Hope Valley barracks of the Rhode Island State police.
Troopers found a prescription bottle of ninety Klonopin tablets in the defendant's vehicle.2 The prescription had been filled five days earlier, and the bottle contained sixty-two Klonopin pills. The defendant was given a breathalyzer test approximately two hours after his arrest. At that time, the test indicated a blood alcohol level of 0.185.
Troopers from the Massachusetts State police arrived, read the defendant the Miranda warnings, and told him that they were there to discuss the victim. The defendant called a friend and asked the friend to tell the victim to call police and tell them that she was okay. The defendant then continued talking to the officers and said that he had not seen the victim for three days. The clothes the defendant was wearing at the time of his arrest subsequently tested positive for the victim's blood. Officers also searched the defendant's apartment and found "a few" empty bottles of vodka, empty beer bottles, and prescription bottles of Zoloft and Klonopin.3
b. Prior proceedings. On January 10, 2005, the defendant was indicted on charges of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1 ; and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A. At his first trial in 2007, the Commonwealth proceeded on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The defendant was convicted under both theories.
The defendant appealed on the grounds, inter alia, of improprieties in jury selection and the denial of his motion for a change in venue due to extensive pretrial publicity. In addition, the defendant challenged the instructions on mental defect. See Commonwealth v. DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424, 430-433, 439-440, 951 N.E.2d 891 (2011) ; Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602, 617-618 & n.9, 931 N.E.2d 972 (2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763, 2 N.E.3d 177 (2014). He also challenged evidence presented to the jury concerning his exercise of his Miranda rights. We vacated the convictions and ordered a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Toolan, 460 Mass. 452, 472-473, 951 N.E.2d 903 (2011). At his second trial, the defendant relied upon a defense of a lack of criminal responsibility due to mental disease or defect and intoxication. He again was convicted of both charges and under both theories of murder.
2. Discussion....
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