Commonwealth v. Van Tuyl

• Decision Date: 10 June 1858
• Citation: 58 Ky. 1
• Parties: Commonwealth v. Van Tuyl.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

58 Ky. 1

Commonwealth v. Van Tuyl.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 10, 1858

APPEAL FROM CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT.

1. The offense of " feloniously obtaining money by false pretenses" consists in obtaining the money, with a fraudulent intent; the false pretense employed is only the means by which the offense is perpetrated. Therefore, where V. sold and delivered to J. a negro man, in the state of Ohio, representing him to be a slave, and received the purchase money and executed the bill of sale in Kentucky, and the negro turned out to be a free man, the court in Kentucky had jurisdiction to try V. for the offense of feloniously obtaining money by false pretenses, as the offense of so obtaining the money was committed in Kentucky. (People v Adams, 3 Denio's N. Y. Reports, 190; affirmed upon an appeal in 1 Comstock, 173.)

2. It is the duty and right of the court to instruct the jury, in criminal cases, as to the law of the case, and it is the duty of the jury to regard such instructions as containing the law; but if they disregard them and acquit the accused, the court could not, for that reason, grant a new trial. Thus far juries have the ultimate decision of the law as well as the facts. (Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marshall, 132.)

3. Juries, in criminal cases, must derive a knowledge of the facts from the witnesses, and of the law from the court they, however, have to pass upon both, and, by making an application of the law to the facts, decide whether the offense charged has been committed. In this sense only are juries judges of the law. (Seltinius v. United States, 5 Cranch's Circuit Court Reports.)

4. The Criminal Code (section 226) requires the court, on motion of either party, to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, in criminal trials; and section 233 expressly provides, " that all questions of law arising during the trial shall be decided by the court, and the jury shall be bound to take the decisions of the court on points of law as the law of the case." This part of the Code is not regarded as inconsistent with the provisions of the constitution, but as containing the law applicable to the question of how far juries shall regard the instruction of the court in such cases.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion of the court.

James Harlan, Attorney General, for the Commonwealth--

1. It may now be regarded as the settled constitutional doctrine in this state, that it is the duty of the court to decide all questions of law in every description of case, civil or criminal, and the duty of the jury to conform to the instructions of the court; and upon the facts as given by the witnesses, and the law as expounded by the court, the jury are to frame their verdict. (Montee v. Commonwealth, 3 J. J. Marshall, 149; 18 Law Reporter, 176; Seltinius v United States, 5 Cranch's Circuit Court Reports, and Livingston's Law Magazine, vol. 2, p. 538; Criminal Code, sections 226-233.)

The 8th section of article 9 of the constitution of 1799, (Revised Statutes, 41), and the 10th section of article 13 of the constitution of 1850, (Ib., 75), are identical. The case of Montee v. Commonwealth, supra, was decided under the old constitution, but is equally binding under the present one.

2. The money was obtained by the defendant in Carroll county, where the indictment was found and the trial took place, by his falsely saying he was the owner of the negro. The offense was not complete in the State of Ohio, but was committed in Kentucky, where the money was obtained. (See Wharton's Criminal Law, 281, third edition; Ib., 734-5; 1 Comstock, 173; 3 Denio, 190.)

3. The court should have permitted the bill of sale executed by the defendant to be given in evidence; it was competent to show the quo animo, with which the defendant received the money from Jenkins.

OPINION

SIMPSON JUDGE:

The defendant was indicted in Carroll county, in this State, for feloniously obtaining money, by false pretenses, of B. W. Jenkins.

The facts proved upon the trial were, that the defendant was in the State of Ohio, and had along with him a negro named John, who he represented to be a runaway slave belonging to him, that he was trying to take back to a slave state; stating that he was a resident of the State of Tennessee, from which place the slave had, some three or four months previously, made his escape. That whilst he was in the State of Ohio, he sold and delivered said negro to B. W. Jenkins, at the price of five hundred dollars, which Jenkins was to pay him when they arrived in Kentucky, and the purchaser was to run the risk of taking the slave to that place. After the parties arrived in Carroll county, in this State, the defendant, not however, in his own, but in another name, executed to Jenkins a writing acknowledging the payment of the money as the price of the negro, in which he covenanted that he was the lawful owner of the negro, and that he was a slave for life: and thereupon Jenkins paid him the five hundred dollars. It was also proved that John was not a slave, but was free; that he and the defendant both resided in the state of New York, and that the latter never had resided in the State of Tennessee.

Under the instruction of the court below, a verdict of not guilty was found by the judy, and a judgment rendered thereon in favor of the defendant.

The attorney for the Commonwealth excepted to the instructions of the court, prayed an appeal, and the attorney general has brought the case to this court to have the questions revised which he contends were erroneously decided...